Details
| File | Default path | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| data/config.yaml | from -c flag default (cmd/dashboard/main.go:104) | Contains jwt_secret_key (signing key, HS256), agent_secret_key, OAuth2 client secrets, GitHub release token, GeoIP API key, and any custom secrets |
| data/sqlite.db | from -db flag default (cmd/dashboard/main.go:105) | Full dashboard state: users (incl. admin), bcrypt password hashes, server registry, API tokens, notification configs |
Chain to administrative account takeover (verified path)
- Read config —
GET /dashboard../data/config.yamlreturns plaintext YAML containingjwt_secret_key. - Read database —
GET /dashboard../data/sqlite.dbreturns the SQLite file; an attacker opens it and reads theuserstable to recover admin user IDs (and any other claims the JWT references). - Forge a JWT — the dashboard's JWT middleware at
cmd/dashboard/controller/jwt.go:22,27is wired with:
Key: []byte(singleton.Conf.JWTSecretKey),
SigningAlgorithm: "HS256",
CookieName: "nz-jwt",
IdentityKey: model.CtxKeyAuthorizedUser,
HS256 is symmetric — possession of the key is sufficient to sign tokens that pass verification. An attacker mints a token whose user_id claim matches the admin user from step 2 and attaches it as the nz-jwt cookie (or Authorization: Bearer ...).
- Operate as admin — every admin handler (
adminHandlerchain) now accepts the forged session, granting CRUD on servers, users, cron tasks, notifications, and OAuth2 settings.
The chain is fully deterministic against a default-configured dashboard: two unauth HTTP GETs and a JWT signing operation, no race, no user interaction, no special timing.
Suggested fix
Make the prefix test segment-aware and reject paths whose cleaned form escapes the template root before any filesystem call. Minimal diff:
- if strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/dashboard") {
- stripPath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/dashboard")
+ if c.Request.URL.Path == "/dashboard/" || strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/dashboard/") {
+ stripPath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/dashboard/")
+ cleanPath := path.Clean("/" + stripPath)
+ if cleanPath == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, "../") || strings.Contains(cleanPath, "/../") {
+ c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, newErrorResponse(errors.New("404 Not Found")))
+ return
+ }
localFilePath := path.Join(singleton.Conf.AdminTemplate, stripPath)
The /dashboard -> /dashboard/ redirect at line 382 already exists, so requiring the trailing slash is safe and aligns with the regexes in frontendPageUrlRegistry.
The same hardening should be applied to the user-template branch (lines 399–405), which uses the same path.Join pattern with singleton.Conf.UserTemplate. While the /dashboard prefix-confusion vector doesn't hit it directly, any future code change that hands a controlled URL.Path to that branch would re-introduce the same primitive.
A defense-in-depth alternative is to replace the local os.Stat + http.ServeFile branch with a http.FileServer(http.FS(subFS)) rooted at the embedded admin-dist subdirectory, which keeps the embedded-FS contract and removes the working-directory escape entirely.