gogs.io/gogs
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.14.3(semver)
Fixed versions
0.14.3
Fix
- Fixed version
0.14.3go get gogs.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-52809, GO-2026-5140
Gogs's password-reset tokens use account-activation lifetime, ignoring RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES
Summary
Password-reset tokens are generated using conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives (the account-activation lifetime), not conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives. The token lifetime is baked into the token itself at generation time and is re-extracted from the token at verification time, making RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES irrelevant to actual enforcement. When an administrator configures a shorter reset window (e.g., 10 minutes) for compliance or security reasons, reset tokens remain exploitable for the full activation lifetime instead, while the reset email falsely advertises the shorter expiry.
Severity
Medium (CVSS 3.1: 6.8)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES < ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES, AND (2) the attacker to have intercepted the victim's reset token (e.g., from a compromised or shared email inbox).Affected component
internal/userx/userx.go — GenerateActivateCode() (line 39)internal/email/email.go — SendResetPasswordMail() (line 132)internal/route/user/auth.go — verifyUserActiveCode() (lines 426–439) and ResetPasswdPost() (line 621)CWE
Description
The reset token lifetime is hardcoded to ActivateCodeLives at generation
GenerateActivateCode (called for both account activation and password reset) bakes conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives — not ResetPasswordCodeLives — into the token as a 6-digit field:
// internal/userx/userx.go:36-46
func GenerateActivateCode(userID int64, email, name, password, rands string) string {
code := tool.CreateTimeLimitCode(
fmt.Sprintf("%d%s%s%s%s", userID, email, strings.ToLower(name), password, rands),
conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives, // ← always ActivateCodeLives, never ResetPasswordCodeLives
nil,
)
code += hex.EncodeToString([]byte(strings.ToLower(name)))
return code
}
CreateTimeLimitCode embeds the minutes value at positions 12–17 of the token:
Token format: YYYYMMDDHHMM (12) | 000180 (6-digit lives) | SHA1 (40) | hex-username
SendResetPasswordMail calls u.GenerateEmailActivateCode(u.Email()) — which resolves to GenerateActivateCode — with no option to pass a different lifetime:
// internal/email/email.go:131-132
func SendResetPasswordMail(c *macaron.Context, u User) error {
return SendUserMail(c, u, tmplAuthResetPassword, u.GenerateEmailActivateCode(u.Email()), ...)
}
ResetPasswordCodeLives is used only for display, not enforcement
VerifyTimeLimitCode discards the minutes argument and re-extracts the lifetime directly from the token itself:
// internal/tool/tool.go:62-86
func VerifyTimeLimitCode(data string, minutes int, code string) bool {
start := code[:12]
lives := code[12:18]
if d, err := strconv.Atoi(lives); err == nil {
minutes = d // ← argument overridden by value baked into the token
}
retCode := CreateTimeLimitCode(data, minutes, start)
if retCode == code && minutes > 0 {
before, _ := time.ParseInLocation("200601021504", start, time.Local)
if before.Add(time.Minute * time.Duration(minutes)).Unix() > now.Unix() {
return true
}
}
return false
}
The verifyUserActiveCode caller passes conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives as minutes, but it makes no difference:
// internal/route/user/auth.go:426-439
func verifyUserActiveCode(code string) (user *database.User) {
minutes := conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives // passed to VerifyTimeLimitCode but immediately overridden
if user = parseUserFromCode(code); user != nil {
prefix := code[:tool.TimeLimitCodeLength]
data := strconv.FormatInt(user.ID, 10) + user.Email + user.LowerName + user.Password + user.Rands
if tool.VerifyTimeLimitCode(data, minutes, prefix) {
return user
}
}
return nil
}
ResetPasswdPost validates the reset token through verifyUserActiveCode, so it inherits the same flaw:
// internal/route/user/auth.go:621
if u := verifyUserActiveCode(code); u != nil {
ResetPasswordCodeLives appears only in email template data and in the admin config display — it has zero effect on actual token validation:
// internal/email/email.go:109 — template data only, not used to generate the token
"ResetPwdCodeLives": conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives / 60,
Full execution chain
POST /user/forget_password → SendResetPasswordMail generates a token embedding ActivateCodeLives = 180 at bytes 12–17.ResetPwdCodeLives in the template) but the embedded lifetime is 180.POST /user/reset_password?code=<TOKEN> → ResetPasswdPost → verifyUserActiveCode → VerifyTimeLimitCode extracts 000180 from the token → confirms the token has not yet reached the 180-minute mark → returns the user object → password is updated.Proof of Concept
# app.ini configuration that exposes the bug:
[auth]
ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES = 180
RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES = 10
# 1) Request password reset for victim account
curl -i -X POST -d '[email protected]' http://HOST/user/forget_password
# 2) Obtain the reset link from the email.
# Wait 11 minutes (past RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES, within ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES).
# 3) Submit the "expired" reset code — it still succeeds
curl -i -X POST \
-d 'code=<CODE_FROM_EMAIL>&password=AttackerNewPass' \
'http://HOST/user/reset_password?code=<CODE_FROM_EMAIL>'
# Expected: HTTP 302 redirect to /user/login — password successfully changed
# despite the reset window having "closed" 10 minutes ago.
Impact
RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES shorter than ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES to limit the window of exposure for intercepted reset emails gets no security benefit from that configuration.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.14.3 (semver)0.14.3
0.14.3go get gogs.io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0