Details
Recommended remediation
Option 1: Add a ResetPasswordCodeLives-aware generation function (preferred)
Introduce a dedicated code-generation path that passes conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives instead of ActivateCodeLives:
// internal/userx/userx.go
func GenerateResetPasswordCode(userID int64, email, name, password, rands string) string {
code := tool.CreateTimeLimitCode(
fmt.Sprintf("%d%s%s%s%s", userID, email, strings.ToLower(name), password, rands),
conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives, // ← correct lifetime
nil,
)
code += hex.EncodeToString([]byte(strings.ToLower(name)))
return code
}
Update email.User to expose this through the interface:
// internal/email/email.go interface
GenerateResetPasswordCode(email string) string
Update SendResetPasswordMail to call it:
func SendResetPasswordMail(c *macaron.Context, u User) error {
return SendUserMail(c, u, tmplAuthResetPassword, u.GenerateResetPasswordCode(u.Email()), ...)
}
Because VerifyTimeLimitCode reads the lifetime from the token itself, no change to the verification side is required — tokens generated with ResetPasswordCodeLives will automatically expire at the correct time.
Option 2: Validate the extracted lifetime against the configured maximum
Add a post-extraction check in VerifyTimeLimitCode or in the reset-specific verification function to reject tokens whose embedded lifetime exceeds ResetPasswordCodeLives:
// in verifyUserActiveCode, after extracting the prefix:
embeddedLives := ... // parse positions 12-18 of the code
if embeddedLives > conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives {
return nil // reject tokens with a longer-than-allowed lifetime
}
This is a defence-in-depth measure but does not fix the root cause; Option 1 is preferred.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.