Advisory

GHSA-63cw-r7xf-jmwr

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Reproduction results

I confirmed the issue on:

  • CoreDNS 1.14.2
  • linux/amd64
  • go1.26.1

PoC payload characteristics:

  • decoded payload size: 737,280 bytes
  • base64url-encoded dns length: 983,040
  • request-target length: 983,055

Observed request outcome:

  • 5000 / 5000 requests returned 400 Bad Request
  • total runtime for the 5000-request run: 18.22s

The important point is that the requests are rejected only after expensive processing has already happened.

CPU profile highlights

The CPU profile captured during the attack showed significant time in:

  • net/http.readRequest
  • net/url.ParseQuery / net/url.QueryUnescape / net/url.unescape
  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.requestToMsgGet
  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.base64ToMsg
  • encoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString
  • Go GC worker paths

Representative cumulative values from the captured profile included:

  • github.com/coredns/coredns/core/dnsserver.(*ServerHTTPS).ServeHTTP → 10.91s
  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.RequestToMsg → 10.88s
  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.requestToMsgGet → 10.88s
  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.base64ToMsg → 3.50s
  • encoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString → 3.46s
  • net/http.readRequest → 10.57s
  • net/url.(*URL).Query / ParseQuery / QueryUnescape → 7.38s
  • runtime.gcBgMarkWorker and related GC paths were also heavily active

This demonstrates that the issue is not limited to final DNS unpacking. The oversized GET request forces meaningful work in HTTP parsing, URL handling, base64 decoding, and garbage collection before rejection.

Allocation profile highlights

Allocation profiling showed very large transient allocation volume caused by the rejected requests:

  • total alloc_space: 26,756.48 MB

Top contributors included:

  • net/textproto.(*Reader).readLineSlice → 19,668.19 MB
  • net/textproto.(*Reader).ReadLine → 3,738.84 MB
  • encoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString → 2,766.16 MB

Within the CoreDNS DoH GET path specifically:

  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.RequestToMsg → 2,775.67 MB
  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.requestToMsgGet → 2,775.67 MB
  • github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.base64ToMsg → 2,773.67 MB

Heap delta (inuse_space) also showed live growth attributable to this path, including:

  • encoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString → 7,629.75 kB

Memory observations

Runtime memory monitoring showed a clear increase in peak resident usage during the attack:

  • baseline VmHWM / VmRSS before load was approximately 55,864 kB
  • observed VmHWM during testing reached approximately 146,100 kB

So even though requests returned 400, the server still experienced substantial transient memory growth and allocator / GC pressure before rejection.

Impact

A remote, unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly send oversized DoH GET requests to the HTTPS endpoint and force significant pre-rejection work.

Impact includes:

  • elevated CPU consumption
  • large transient allocations
  • increased garbage-collection pressure
  • higher peak resident memory usage
  • degraded throughput and responsiveness
  • denial of service risk on memory-constrained or heavily loaded deployments

This is especially relevant for internet-facing DoH deployments, where an attacker can repeatedly trigger the GET parsing path without authentication.

The fact that the final HTTP status is 400 Bad Request does not mitigate the issue, because the expensive processing has already occurred before the rejection is generated.

Suggested remediation

A robust fix should address both stages of the problem:

  1. Apply an early bound on the DoH GET request target / raw query length before expensive query parsing.
  2. Enforce an encoded-length and decoded-length limit for the dns parameter before calling DecodeString().
  3. Preserve equivalent size constraints across GET and POST paths.

A minimal hardening direction would be:

  • reject oversized GET requests before req.URL.Query() on the DoH path
  • reject dns values whose encoded length exceeds the maximum valid DNS message encoding
  • reject any decoded payload larger than the supported DNS message size before unpacking

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Credit request: When referencing, republishing, or issuing downstream advisories for this vulnerability, please preserve the original researcher credit as Ali Firas (thesmartshadow).

Sources & licences