Details
Reproduction results
I confirmed the issue on:
- CoreDNS 1.14.2
- linux/amd64
- go1.26.1
PoC payload characteristics:
- decoded payload size:
737,280 bytes - base64url-encoded
dnslength:983,040 - request-target length:
983,055
Observed request outcome:
5000 / 5000requests returned400 Bad Request- total runtime for the 5000-request run:
18.22s
The important point is that the requests are rejected only after expensive processing has already happened.
CPU profile highlights
The CPU profile captured during the attack showed significant time in:
net/http.readRequestnet/url.ParseQuery/net/url.QueryUnescape/net/url.unescapegithub.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.requestToMsgGetgithub.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.base64ToMsgencoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString- Go GC worker paths
Representative cumulative values from the captured profile included:
github.com/coredns/coredns/core/dnsserver.(*ServerHTTPS).ServeHTTP→10.91sgithub.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.RequestToMsg→10.88sgithub.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.requestToMsgGet→10.88sgithub.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.base64ToMsg→3.50sencoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString→3.46snet/http.readRequest→10.57snet/url.(*URL).Query/ParseQuery/QueryUnescape→7.38sruntime.gcBgMarkWorkerand related GC paths were also heavily active
This demonstrates that the issue is not limited to final DNS unpacking. The oversized GET request forces meaningful work in HTTP parsing, URL handling, base64 decoding, and garbage collection before rejection.
Allocation profile highlights
Allocation profiling showed very large transient allocation volume caused by the rejected requests:
- total
alloc_space:26,756.48 MB
Top contributors included:
net/textproto.(*Reader).readLineSlice→19,668.19 MBnet/textproto.(*Reader).ReadLine→3,738.84 MBencoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString→2,766.16 MB
Within the CoreDNS DoH GET path specifically:
github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.RequestToMsg→2,775.67 MBgithub.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.requestToMsgGet→2,775.67 MBgithub.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/doh.base64ToMsg→2,773.67 MB
Heap delta (inuse_space) also showed live growth attributable to this path, including:
encoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString→7,629.75 kB
Memory observations
Runtime memory monitoring showed a clear increase in peak resident usage during the attack:
- baseline
VmHWM / VmRSSbefore load was approximately55,864 kB - observed
VmHWMduring testing reached approximately146,100 kB
So even though requests returned 400, the server still experienced substantial transient memory growth and allocator / GC pressure before rejection.
Impact
A remote, unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly send oversized DoH GET requests to the HTTPS endpoint and force significant pre-rejection work.
Impact includes:
- elevated CPU consumption
- large transient allocations
- increased garbage-collection pressure
- higher peak resident memory usage
- degraded throughput and responsiveness
- denial of service risk on memory-constrained or heavily loaded deployments
This is especially relevant for internet-facing DoH deployments, where an attacker can repeatedly trigger the GET parsing path without authentication.
The fact that the final HTTP status is 400 Bad Request does not mitigate the issue, because the expensive processing has already occurred before the rejection is generated.
Suggested remediation
A robust fix should address both stages of the problem:
- Apply an early bound on the DoH GET request target / raw query length before expensive query parsing.
- Enforce an encoded-length and decoded-length limit for the
dnsparameter before callingDecodeString(). - Preserve equivalent size constraints across GET and POST paths.
A minimal hardening direction would be:
- reject oversized GET requests before
req.URL.Query()on the DoH path - reject
dnsvalues whose encoded length exceeds the maximum valid DNS message encoding - reject any decoded payload larger than the supported DNS message size before unpacking
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Credit request: When referencing, republishing, or issuing downstream advisories for this vulnerability, please preserve the original researcher credit as Ali Firas (thesmartshadow).