Details
The combined impact is especially severe when both password and data_2fa are exposed for the same administrator or customer account. In that case, an attacker can attempt to crack the password hash offline and then use the exposed TOTP seed to generate valid 2FA codes, defeating both factors of authentication.
Administrator credential material is particularly sensitive because compromise of an administrator account may allow privileged panel actions and access to server-level or customer-level hosting configuration. Customer and FTP credential material is also sensitive because it may allow unauthorized access to hosted content and account-specific resources.
Remediation
API responses should be built from explicit allowlists of safe response fields instead of returning full database rows. Sensitive fields such as password and data_2fa should never be included in normal get or listing responses.
As a tactical fix, remove or redact credential-equivalent fields before calling $this->response(...) in the affected API command classes.
As an architectural fix, introduce centralized response serialization for API models so that sensitive fields are consistently excluded across all endpoints. This should include password hashes, TOTP seeds, recovery secrets, API secrets, tokens, private keys, and any future authentication material.
Because TOTP seeds may have been exposed, affected installations should consider requiring 2FA reset or rotation for accounts whose data_2fa values may have been returned through vulnerable API responses.