Advisory

GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Impact

Any 9router reachable on a network (default 0.0.0.0 bind, plus Docker -p, tunnel, or tailscale — all first-class features) can be:

  • used as a free AI relay billed to the victim's provider accounts, exhausting quota and exfiltrating data through their keys; and
  • used to reach internal services / cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) with the response reflected to the attacker.

Unauthenticated, no user interaction, default configuration. The only precondition is the normal one (≥1 configured provider).

Recommended fix

  1. Determine "local" from the socket peer IP, never the Host header — treat as local only if the TCP peer is 127.0.0.0/8 / ::1.
  2. Bind 127.0.0.1 by default; require an explicit, warned opt-in for 0.0.0.0; fix the CLI to not print "localhost" when bound to all interfaces.
  3. For any non-loopback peer, require a valid API key regardless of requireApiKey; add requireApiKey: true to DEFAULT_SETTINGS (fail-closed).
  4. Validate provider_options.baseUrl against an allowlist (or drop the override) and block requests to private/link-local ranges in resolveBaseUrl.
  5. Remove Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * from /v1 GET metadata routes.

Sources & licences