Advisory

GHSA-8757-69j2-hx56

Also known as: CVE-2026-43891, PYSEC-2026-30

Summary

changedetection.io has an Arbitrary Local File Read via a crafted backup restore

Details

Details
The vulnerability is caused by trusting attacker-controlled snapshot paths restored from backup files.

The vulnerable flow starts in the backup restore logic. When a backup ZIP is restored, the application extracts the archive and copies each restored watch UUID directory directly into the live datastore using shutil.copytree(entry.path, dst_dir). This preserves attacker-controlled files inside the restored watch directory, including history.txt.

Relevant code:

After restore, the application parses history.txt in the watch history property. This is the core trust-boundary issue.

Relevant code:

The relevant logic is effectively:

if os.sep not in v and '/' not in v and '\\' not in v:
    v = os.path.join(self.data_dir, v)
else:
    snapshot_fname = os.path.basename(v)
    proposed_new_path = os.path.join(self.data_dir, snapshot_fname)
    if not os.path.exists(v) and os.path.exists(proposed_new_path):
        v = proposed_new_path

This has the following security consequence:

  • If the history.txt value is only a filename, it is resolved safely under self.data_dir.
  • If the value contains path separators, it is treated as a path reference rather than a watch-local snapshot name.
  • If that external path already exists, it is preserved unchanged.

As a result, a malicious restored history.txt entry such as:

1776969105,/etc/passwd

will be accepted if the referenced file exists and is readable by the application process.

The second vulnerable step is in get_history_snapshot(). Once the untrusted path has been accepted into the watch history, the application reads the resolved path directly without enforcing that it remains inside the watch directory.

Relevant code:

That function eventually performs direct file reads such as:

with open(filepath, 'r', encoding='utf-8', errors='ignore') as f:
    return f.read()

The third step is reachability. The trusted history entry is consumed by both the Preview UI and the watch history API.

Relevant code:

In the Preview flow, the application selects the latest history timestamp and calls:

content = watch.get_history_snapshot(timestamp=timestamp)

In the API flow, the application also calls:

content = watch.get_history_snapshot(timestamp=timestamp)

This creates the following end-to-end exploit chain:

  1. An attacker supplies a crafted backup ZIP.
  2. The restore process preserves attacker-controlled history.txt.
  3. The history.txt parser accepts an absolute or out-of-directory path if that path exists.
  4. Preview or the history API dereferences the stored path directly.
  5. The application returns the contents of the targeted local file.

The root cause is that imported history entries are treated as trusted filesystem paths instead of being restricted to safe basenames under watch.data_dir.

PoC
The following proof of concept demonstrates the end-to-end exploit chain. It assumes the attacker has gained access to the backup restore functionality to upload the crafted archive.

  1. Create a normal watch in the UI, for example:
https://example.com
  1. Trigger at least one successful check so the watch generates a valid history entry and can later be included in a backup.

<img width="1230" height="587" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a76302c9-48d6-4aa3-9bfc-0ba2fdb31156" />

  1. Go to the Backups section and create a backup archive.

<img width="1232" height="390" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8fef0444-d8f0-4db6-be75-04fa7db2fec8" />

  1. Extract the backup archive and identify the watch UUID directory that contains the target watch's watch.json. For example:
5db3d3d8-71e6-4db2-a81e-e1f0445c3e47
  1. Open that watch directory and edit history.txt.
  1. Replace the latest history entry with a path to an existing local file that is readable by the application process. For example:
1776969188,/etc/passwd

If the timestamp differs in the extracted backup, keep the original latest timestamp and only replace the filename/path portion.

Example:

1776969188,742215043ff9be7e635f05e680ff9b11.txt

becomes:

1776969188,/etc/passwd

<img width="1139" height="366" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/07277b36-4747-4181-82d1-523385b40de3" />

  1. Repack the backup so that the UUID directories are located at the root of the ZIP archive.

Important:

  • Do not add an extra parent directory layer when repacking.
  • The archive root should contain directories such as:
<watch-uuid>/
<group-uuid>/
changedetection.json
url-list.txt

<img width="986" height="353" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/21b30368-2cb5-4b88-9055-79d5bf06ad48" />

  1. In the UI, restore the modified backup and enable replacement of existing watches with the same UUID.

<img width="1229" height="700" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/79abd9d2-8b2d-4e08-abf3-3b63238a8055" />

  1. After restore completes, open Preview for the restored watch.
  1. The application will read the attacker-controlled path from history.txt and display the contents of the referenced local file instead of the original watch snapshot.

Observed result:

  • The Preview page returns the content of the attacker-selected local file.

Expected result:

  • The application should reject absolute paths or out-of-directory paths restored from history.txt.
  • Snapshot history should be restricted to files within the watch's own data directory.

Optional API verification:

  • The same issue can also be confirmed through the watch history API by requesting the modified timestamp after restore.
  • The API returns the same file content because it also calls watch.get_history_snapshot(timestamp=timestamp) on the trusted history entry.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-05-05 21:16 UTC
Modified
2026-07-08 08:14 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

changedetection-io

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.55.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.55.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.55.1
    pip install --upgrade changedetection-io==0.55.1

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences