Advisory

GHSA-8757-69j2-hx56

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

<img width="1233" height="545" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2814a5a-2cdd-49a1-916b-c956dd5fda1f" />

Impact
This is an arbitrary local file disclosure vulnerability reachable through malicious backup restore content.

Who is impacted:

  • Deployments where the application process has read access to sensitive local system files.
  • Docker or host-mounted environments where secrets, config files, or operational artifacts are explicitly readable by the service.

What can be exposed:

  • Arbitrary System Files: Core operating system files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ), system-level configurations, and host metrics.
  • Application Data: Internal records and files residing under the /datastore directory.
  • Secrets & Artifacts: Application-local configuration files, API tokens, database credentials, and other sensitive artifacts accessible to the application process.

By accessing the backup restore functionality and importing a crafted archive, an attacker can exploit the application's fail-open path validation. The confidentiality impact is exceptionally high because, once the payload is ingested, the application can be manipulated to disclose arbitrary local system files and highly sensitive environment variables directly through standard UI or API responses.

Recommendation
The application should treat all paths restored from history.txt as untrusted input.

The root cause is in changedetectionio/model/Watch.py, where values containing path separators are currently accepted as filesystem paths and preserved if the referenced file already exists.

The fix should be:

  1. Never trust absolute or external paths from history.txt.
  2. Normalize every history entry to os.path.basename(v).
  3. Join the normalized filename to self.data_dir.
  4. Skip the entry if the resolved file does not exist inside the watch directory.

Suggested code change:

snapshot_fname = os.path.basename(v.strip())
resolved_path = os.path.join(self.data_dir, snapshot_fname)

if not os.path.exists(resolved_path):
    logger.warning(
        f"Skipping unsafe or missing history entry for {self.get('uuid')}: {v!r}"
    )
    continue

tmp_history[k] = resolved_path

This ensures restored history entries can only reference files inside the watch's own data directory and prevents arbitrary local file reads through Preview or the history API.

Sources & licences