Details
"/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/docs/docs.go": "/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go",
"/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller/cron_csrf_poc_test.go": "/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go"
}
}
EOF
Replace /path/to/nezha above with the local checkout path, then run:
go test -vet=off -overlay=/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json ./cmd/dashboard/controller -run TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET -count=1 -v
Observed output in this environment:
```text
=== RUN TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET
--- PASS: TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET (0.00s)
PASS
ok github.com/nezhahq/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller 0.019s
The -vet=off flag was only needed because this checkout lacks the generated cmd/dashboard/docs directory and Go vet still tries to chdir into the overlay-created package directory. The overlay includes a minimal docs package stub so the controller package can compile without generating Swagger files.
Cleanup:
rm -f /tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go /tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go /tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json
Impact
A remote attacker can cause a logged-in dashboard user to trigger an existing cron task by making the user's browser navigate to /api/v1/cron/<known-id>/manual. If that cron task dispatches an agent command, the command is sent to the victim's online agent without the victim intentionally clicking the manual trigger in the dashboard.
Security impact is integrity and availability:
- Integrity: forced execution of a stored command on victim-controlled agents.
- Availability: forced execution of disruptive stored tasks, repeated task starts, or repeated notifications/offline failure paths.
- Confidentiality: not directly demonstrated; the PoC does not show data exfiltration.
Suggested remediation
- Make manual cron triggering a non-idempotent method such as
POST /api/v1/cron/:id/manualinstead of GET. - Require a CSRF token for cookie-authenticated state-changing requests, or reject unsafe cross-site requests with
Origin/Refererand Fetch Metadata validation. - Consider not accepting JWTs from cookies for state-changing API calls unless a CSRF token is present.
- Add a regression test that sends a cross-site-style GET with a valid cookie and asserts no cron task is dispatched.
- If frontend compatibility requires cookies, keep
SameSite=Laxor stricter, but do not rely on it to protect state-changing GET routes.