Advisory

GHSA-965m-v4cc-6334

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Impact Assessment:

  • Confidentiality: Medium - Attacker can trigger WASM execution which may access controller context data
  • Integrity: High - Combined with VUL-001, attacker can create arbitrary Kubernetes resources
  • Availability: Medium - Attacker can cause resource exhaustion through repeated requests

Attack Scenario:

  1. Attacker compromises a pod or gains access to the cluster network
  2. Attacker sends crafted AdmissionReview requests directly to ATC webhook
  3. ATC processes requests without verifying they came from the API Server
  4. Combined with annotation injection (VUL-001), attacker can execute arbitrary WASM code
  5. Malicious WASM can create resources or exfiltrate data using ATC's cluster-admin privileges

Severity

CVSS v3.1 Score: 7.5 (High)

Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network - Accessible from cluster network
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low - Simple HTTP request
  • Privileges Required (PR): None - No authentication required
  • User Interaction (UI): None - Automatic processing
  • Scope (S): Unchanged
  • Confidentiality (C): None - Direct impact limited
  • Integrity (I): High - Can trigger unauthorized WASM execution
  • Availability (A): None - No direct availability impact

Note: When combined with VUL-001, the overall impact increases significantly.

Affected Versions

  • Yoke ATC v0.18.x and earlier versions
  • All versions that implement Admission Webhook endpoints without client authentication

Patched Versions

No patch available at time of disclosure.

Workarounds

  1. Network Policy: Deploy NetworkPolicy to restrict access to ATC service, allowing only kube-apiserver to connect
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: atc-webhook-policy
  namespace: atc
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      yoke.cd/app: atc
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - namespaceSelector:
        matchLabels:
          kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
      podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          component: kube-apiserver
  1. Service Mesh: Use a service mesh (Istio, Linkerd) to enforce mTLS between services
  1. Pod Security: Implement strict pod security policies to limit which pods can be created in the cluster

References

  • Yoke Project: https://github.com/yokecd/yoke
  • Kubernetes Admission Webhooks: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/extensible-admission-controllers/
  • CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html

Credits
credit for:
@b0b0haha ([email protected])
@lixingquzhi ([email protected])

Sources & licences