knowns
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.30.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.30.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.30.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-86439
Knowns Unrestricted Path Traversal leading to out-of-bounds arbitrary .md file read, write, and deletion in MCP Docs + Memory Tools
Overview
Verified. Multiple Unrestricted Path Traversal vulnerabilities exist in the Knowns MCP docs and memory tools, allowing arbitrary file read, write, and deletion operations outside the project sandbox. The storage layer functions (Get, Create, Update, Rename, Delete) in both doc_store.go and memory_store.go concatenate user-controlled paths with filepath.Join() without any containment validation.
Additionally, the docs.update action with a newPath parameter performs a file deletion via Rename(), but is classified as CapWrite in the permission registry rather than CapDelete. This allows an attacker with a read-write-no-delete preset to bypass deletion restrictions and destroy arbitrary files outside the project root.
Affected paths
| File Path | Role | Vulnerability & Execution Impact |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `internal/storage/doc_store.go` | Vulnerable Sink (Docs) | Path Traversal in File Operations (CWE-22): Get(), Create(), Update(), Rename(), Delete() join user-controlled path with filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), ...) without validating path containment. |
| `internal/storage/memory_store.go` | Vulnerable Sink (Memory) | Path Traversal in Memory Operations (CWE-22): GetInLayer(), Create(), Update(), Delete() join user-controlled id with filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(id)) without validation. |
| `internal/mcp/handlers/doc.go` | Pass-Through Handler | Unsanitized Input Propagation: MCP handlers pass user-supplied path, folder, newPath directly to storage layer without sanitization. |
| `internal/mcp/handlers/memory.go` | Pass-Through Handler | Unsanitized Input Propagation: MCP handlers pass user-supplied id directly to storage layer without sanitization. |
| `internal/permissions/registry.go` | Authorization Bypass | Capability Misclassification (CWE-863): docs.update with newPath performs file deletion but is classified as CapWrite, bypassing CapDelete restrictions. |
Root Cause
Missing Path Containment in DocStore
In internal/storage/doc_store.go, all file operations use filepath.Join() to construct absolute paths without validating that the resolved path remains within docsDir():
// Get retrieves a doc by its relative path (without .md extension).
func (ds *DocStore) Get(path string) (*models.Doc, error) {
path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, "/")
path = strings.TrimSuffix(path, ".md")
// VULNERABLE: No containment check
absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(path)+".md")
if _, err := os.Stat(absPath); err == nil {
// ...
return ds.parseFile(absPath, path, folder, false, "")
}
// ...
}
// Create writes a new doc to .knowns/docs/{path}.md.
func (ds *DocStore) Create(doc *models.Doc) error {
if doc.Path == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("doc path is required")
}
// VULNERABLE: No containment check
absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(doc.Path)+".md")
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(absPath), 0755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create doc dir: %w", err)
}
return ds.writeFile(absPath, doc)
}
// Rename rewrites a doc to a new path and removes the old file.
func (ds *DocStore) Rename(oldPath string, doc *models.Doc) error {
// ...
oldAbsPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(strings.TrimSuffix(oldPath, ".md"))+".md")
newAbsPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(strings.TrimSuffix(doc.Path, ".md"))+".md")
// ...
if err := ds.writeFile(newAbsPath, doc); err != nil {
return err
}
if oldAbsPath != newAbsPath {
// VULNERABLE: Deletes file at oldAbsPath (can be outside docsDir)
if err := os.Remove(oldAbsPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// Delete removes a doc file.
func (ds *DocStore) Delete(path string) error {
path = strings.TrimSuffix(path, ".md")
// VULNERABLE: No containment check
absPath := filepath.Join(ds.docsDir(), filepath.FromSlash(path)+".md")
return os.Remove(absPath)
}
Critical Flaws:
filepath.Join resolves ../ sequences nativelystrings.HasPrefix(absPath, ds.docsDir()))Rename() performs file deletion via os.Remove(oldAbsPath), which can target files outside the docs directoryMissing Path Containment in MemoryStore
In internal/storage/memory_store.go, memory operations similarly lack path validation:
// GetInLayer retrieves a memory entry by ID from a specific layer only.
func (ms *MemoryStore) GetInLayer(id, layer string) (*models.MemoryEntry, error) {
// ...
dir, err := ms.dirForLayer(layer)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// VULNERABLE: No containment check for id containing "../"
absPath := filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(id))
if _, err := os.Stat(absPath); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("memory %q not found in %s layer", id, layer)
}
return ms.parseFile(absPath, layer)
}
// Create writes a new memory entry to the appropriate layer directory.
func (ms *MemoryStore) Create(entry *models.MemoryEntry) error {
// ...
dir, err := ms.dirForLayer(entry.Layer)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create memory dir: %w", err)
}
// VULNERABLE: No containment check for entry.ID containing "../"
absPath := filepath.Join(dir, models.MemoryFileName(entry.ID))
return atomicWrite(absPath, []byte(renderMemory(entry)))
}
// Delete removes a memory entry by ID.
func (ms *MemoryStore) Delete(id string) error {
// ...
filename := models.MemoryFileName(id)
dirs := []string{ms.projectDir(), ms.globalDir()}
for _, dir := range dirs {
// VULNERABLE: No containment check
absPath := filepath.Join(dir, filename)
if _, err := os.Stat(absPath); err == nil {
return os.Remove(absPath)
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("memory %q not found", id)
}
Authorization Bypass via Rename-as-Delete
In internal/mcp/handlers/doc.go, the handleDocUpdate() function accepts a newPath parameter that triggers a rename operation:
func handleDocUpdate(getStore func() *storage.Store, req mcp.CallToolRequest) (*mcp.CallToolResult, error) {
// ...
if v, ok := stringArg(args, "newPath"); ok && strings.TrimSpace(v) != "" {
doc.Path = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSuffix(v, ".md"), "/")
}
// ...
if oldPath != doc.Path {
if err := store.Docs.Rename(oldPath, doc); err != nil {
return errFailed("rename doc", err)
}
// ...
}
// ...
}
The Rename() function in doc_store.go performs file deletion:
if oldAbsPath != newAbsPath {
if err := os.Remove(oldAbsPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return err
}
}High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.30.0 (semver)0.30.0
0.30.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0