Details
However, in internal/permissions/registry.go, docs.update is classified as CapWrite:
"docs.update": {Capability: CapWrite, Target: TargetDoc, Risk: RiskMedium},
This allows an attacker with a read-write-no-delete preset (which permits CapWrite but denies CapDelete) to delete files by using docs.update with a newPath parameter.
Attack Vector
| Phase | Request / Action | Effect |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1. Arbitrary File Read | docs.get with path="../../../victim/secret" | Server reads file outside project root via path traversal in DocStore.Get(). |
| 2. Arbitrary File Write | docs.create with folder="../../../victim" | Server writes file outside project root via path traversal in DocStore.Create(). |
| 3. Arbitrary File Delete | docs.update with path="../outside/secret.md" and newPath="../../../victim/renamed.md" | Server deletes file outside project root via path traversal in DocStore.Rename(). Bypasses CapDelete restriction because docs.update is classified as CapWrite. |
| 4. Memory File Read/Write | memory.update with id="x/../../../../victim/secret" | Server reads and overwrites file outside project root via path traversal in MemoryStore.Update(). |
Analysis
Classic Path Traversal Pattern
Both DocStore and MemoryStore follow the same vulnerable pattern: user-controlled input is concatenated with a base directory using filepath.Join(), then passed directly to file system operations (os.ReadFile, os.WriteFile, os.Remove, os.Stat) without any validation.
absPath := filepath.Join(baseDir, filepath.FromSlash(userInput))
// No containment check: strings.HasPrefix(absPath, baseDir)
// No rejection of ".." or absolute paths
filepath.Join resolves ../ sequences, allowing attackers to escape the intended directory:
- Input:
"../../../etc/passwd" - Result:
/project/.knowns/docs/../../../etc/passwd→/etc/passwd
Rename-as-Delete Authorization Bypass
The Rename() function performs two operations:
- Write the file to the new location (
newAbsPath) - Delete the file from the old location (
oldAbsPath)
Both paths are vulnerable to traversal. An attacker can:
- Set
pathto a file outside the project (e.g.,"../../../victim/target.md") - Set
newPathto another location outside the project - The
Rename()function will delete the file atpath(outside the project)
Because docs.update is classified as CapWrite rather than CapDelete, this operation bypasses deletion restrictions in read-write-no-delete presets.
Compounding Factor - Unauthenticated Access
Due to the previously identified Auth Bypass vulnerability, all MCP tools are accessible without credentials when the server is started without a password, making this a zero-credential attack.
Fix
*Patch is available right now at New Release.*