Advisory

GHSA-fp5j-4fj2-4jvq

Also known as: CVE-2026-53999, GO-2026-5373

Summary

Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)

Details

Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)

Summary

A configuration-validation issue in the Radius Kubernetes controller can cause it to issue a DELETE for the container resource referenced by a tampered radapp.io/status annotation on a Deployment. It follows the "Confused Deputy" pattern. Real-world impact is bounded and depends heavily on install topology: in a multi-tenant install (one controller reconciling Deployments across resource groups owned by different teams) it can affect another team's container, while in a single-tenant install it is only self-DoS. There is no data disclosure, no privilege escalation, and no persistence, and deleted resources are recoverable through standard Radius deployment workflows.

  • Vulnerability Type: Configuration Injection / Cross-Tenant Resource Deletion
  • CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.7 (High in worst-case multi-tenant installs; Medium or lower in single-tenant or strict-RBAC installs)
  • CWE Classification: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-441 (Unintended Proxy or Intermediary)
  • Affected Versions: Radius v0.57.1 and earlier versions

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The Radius controller deserializes user-controllable JSON data from the radapp.io/status annotation on Kubernetes Deployments without validating whether the resource IDs belong to the current tenant. When the controller performs delete operations, it uses its own high-privilege credentials to send requests to the Radius API, enabling deletion of resources belonging to any tenant.

Vulnerable Code Locations

Vulnerability Source - pkg/controller/reconciler/annotations.go:110-119:

s := deploymentStatus{}
status := deployment.Annotations[AnnotationRadiusStatus]
if status != "" {
    err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(status), &s)  // Deserializes user-controllable data without validation
    if err != nil {
        return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal status annotation: %w", err)
    }
    result.Status = &s
}

Vulnerability Sink - pkg/controller/reconciler/deployment_reconciler.go:491:

poller, err := deleteContainer(ctx, r.Radius, annotations.Status.Container)  // Directly uses user-controllable data for deletion

Attack Chain

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                           Confused Deputy Attack                            │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                             │
│  Tenant-A (Attacker)                    Tenant-B (Victim)                   │
│  ┌──────────────────┐                   ┌──────────────────┐                │
│  │ legitimate-app   │                   │ victim-container │                │
│  │ (Deployment)     │                   │ (Radius Resource)│                │
│  └────────┬─────────┘                   └────────▲─────────┘                │
│           │                                      │                          │
│           │ 1. Inject malicious                  │ 4. DELETE request        │
│           │    radapp.io/status                  │    (no auth check!)      │
│           │    annotation                        │                          │
│           ▼                                      │                          │
│  ┌──────────────────┐                    ┌───────┴──────────┐               │
│  │ Radius Controller│ ─────────────────▶│   Radius API      │               │
│  │ (High Privilege) │  3. Uses injected  │   (UCP)          │               │
│  └──────────────────┘     container ID   └──────────────────┘               │
│           ▲                                                                 │
│           │ 2. Reads annotation                                             │
│           │    without validation                                           │
│           │                                                                 │
└───────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Proof of Concept (PoC)

Prerequisites

  • Kubernetes cluster with Radius v0.54.0 installed
  • Attacker has permission to modify Deployment annotations in a namespace
  • Target tenant has Radius-managed container resources

Environment Setup

Step 1: Install Kind Cluster and Radius

# Create Kind cluster
kind create cluster --name radius-test --image kindest/node:v1.27.3

# Install Radius
rad install kubernetes --set global.zipkin.url=http://jaeger-collector.radius-system.svc.cluster.local:9411/api/v2/spans

# Verify installation
kubectl get pods -n radius-system

Expected output:

NAME                            READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
applications-rp-xxx             1/1     Running   0          2m
bicep-de-xxx                    1/1     Running   0          2m
controller-xxx                  1/1     Running   0          2m
ucp-xxx                         1/1     Running   0          2m

Step 2: Create Attacker Tenant (tenant-a)

# Create resource group
rad group create tenant-a

# Create environment
rad env create tenant-a-env --group tenant-a

# Switch to tenant-a
rad group switch tenant-a
rad env switch tenant-a-env

Step 3: Deploy Legitimate Application in tenant-a

Create legitimate-app.bicep:

extension radius

@description('The Radius application resource')
resource app 'Applications.Core/applications@2023-10-01-preview' = {
  name: 'legitimate-app'
  properties: {
    environment: environment()
  }
}

@description('The container resource')
resource container 'Applications.Core/containers@2023-10-01-preview' = {
  name: 'legitimate-container'
  properties: {
    application: app.id
    container: {
      image: 'nginx:latest'
    }
  }
}

Deploy the application:

rad deploy legitimate-app.bicep

Step 4: Create Victim Tenant (tenant-b)

# Create resource group and environment
rad group create tenant-b
rad env create tenant-b-env --group tenant-b

# Create victim application and container via UCP API
kubectl port-forward svc/ucp -n radius-system 8443:443 &
PF_PID=$!
sleep 3

# Create application
curl -k -X PUT "https://localhost:8443/apis/api.ucp.dev/v1alpha3/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/applications/victim-app?api-version=2023-10-01-preview" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "location": "global",
    "properties": {
      "environment": "/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/environments/tenant-b-env"
    }
  }'

# Create container
curl -k -X PUT "https://localhost:8443/apis/api.ucp.dev/v1alpha3/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/containers/victim-container?api-version=2023-10-01-preview" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "location": "global",
    "properties": {
      "application": "/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/applications/victim-app",
      "container": {
        "image": "nginx:latest"
      }
    }
  }'

kill $PF_PID 2>/dev/null || true

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-12 20:08 UTC
Modified
2026-06-25 19:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/radius-project/radius

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.58.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.58.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences