Details
The trigger is unauthenticated, network-reachable, and trivially scriptable, the forged token is just three base64url segments concatenated with dots.
Suggested fix
Reject zero-length HMAC secrets in prepareKeyOrSecret:
function prepareKeyOrSecret(key, isSecret) {
if (typeof key === 'string') {
key = Buffer.from(key, 'utf-8')
}
+
+ if (isSecret && (!key || key.length === 0)) {
+ throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidKey, 'HMAC secret key must not be empty.')
+ }
+
return isSecret ? createSecretKey(key) : createPublicKey(key)
}
This patch in-place was verified against the same PoC and against the full attack matrix: every one of the 18 vulnerable cells now rejects with FAST_JWT_INVALID_KEY, while valid-token verification, valid-secret verification, and the synchronous key: '' rejection path are unaffected.
For defence in depth, the maintainer may also want to enforce RFC 2104's recommended minimum HMAC key length (≥ output size of the hash, 32 bytes for HS256, 48 for HS384, 64 for HS512), gated behind a strictMode flag if backwards compatibility with shorter-but-valid secrets is needed. The empty-key check above is the minimum fix that closes the auth-bypass primitive.