@budibase/server
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected3.38.1(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-73302
Budibase: OIDC SSO account takeover: incoming identity linked by email without checking email_verified
Summary
Budibase's OIDC SSO login links an incoming SSO identity to an existing Budibase account by email address alone, without ever checking the email_verified claim of the OIDC ID token. Budibase first tries to match the IdP sub; when that misses (any fresh attacker IdP account) it silently falls back to matching by the email claim and merges into the existing account by email, preserving that account's _id and roles. Because the email_verified flag is never read, an attacker who can make a configured/trusted IdP emit a token carrying email = <victim> with email_verified = false is logged into Budibase as the victim, inheriting the victim's roles (including global admin/builder). Per OIDC Core §5.7 the email claim MUST NOT be used as an identity key unless email_verified is true; Budibase effectively delegates all account-linking trust to every configured IdP's email-verification policy while checking nothing itself. Full account takeover of any existing Budibase user, including the instance owner.
Details
The OIDC verify callback extracts the email and never consults email_verified:
packages/backend-core/src/middleware/passport/sso/oidc.ts:59 — email: getEmail(profile, jwtClaims).getEmail (oidc.ts:113-135) returns profile._json.email ->jwtClaims.email -> preferred_username. No `email_verified` check.buildJwtClaims (oidc.ts:99-107) assembles claims from _json.email/emails[0].value — no verification flag is read. grep -r email_verified packages/ -> 0 hits.The email is then used as the account-linking key:
sso.authenticate(...) -> packages/backend-core/src/middleware/passport/sso/sso.ts::38,44 users.getById(generateGlobalUserID(details.userId)) keyed on the IdP sub; for a fresh attacker IdP account this 404s and is swallowed (:45-54).:57-59 fallback: dbUser = await users.getGlobalUserByEmail(details.email) -> loads the victim's account (victim _id + roles) purely by email (packages/backend-core/src/users/users.ts:100-124, USER_BY_EMAIL view, no binding to the IdP sub).syncUser(...) (sso.ts:80,102-138) spreads ...user, preserving the victim _id/tenantId/roles; only overwrites provider fields.UserDB.save (packages/backend-core/src/users/db.ts:235): because ssoUser._id is the victim's, the _id branch runs (:253), getById(_id) matches the victim (:256), the "Email address cannot be changed" guard (:257-259) does not fire (dbUser.email === email), and the EmailUnavailableError guard (:269-275) is skipped (it only runs in the !dbUser branch). The merge proceeds silently; a session JWT is issued for the victim.Per OIDC Core §5.7, the email claim MUST NOT be used as an identity key unless email_verified is true. Budibase never reads the flag.
Preconditions (attack requirement — `AT:P`): the attacker must be able to authenticate through an IdP that the Budibase instance trusts AND get that IdP to assert the victim's email with email_verified = false. This is reachable, not exotic:
email = <victim> at sign-up. No confirmation email is needed — the IdP stores and asserts it unverified.**It is not exploitable through a strict corporate IdP that enforces email verification (there email_verified = true and the attacker cannot claim the victim's address) — which is exactly why Budibase must check the flag rather than assume every configured IdP enforces it. The defect is unconditional on the Budibase side; the attack requirement is purely the (default, common) IdP email policy.
PoC
Reproduced live on Budibase 3.39.14 (self-hosted, community license) against a stock Keycloak 26 realm budi with default "Verify Email" = off; OIDC client registered and activated in Budibase.
Setup: a pre-existing victim global-admin Budibase account [email protected] (_id = us_1ab2dfcf…, local account, *no IdP link*). The attacker owns their own IdP account (attacker, distinct sub) and can set its email attribute unverified.
Step 1 — the IdP asserts the claim (proves `email_verified=false`):
POST /realms/budi/protocol/openid-connect/token (Keycloak)
grant_type=password&client_id=budibase&client_secret=…&username=attacker&password=Attacker123!&scope=openid email profile
-> id_token payload: { "sub":"3cf58c45-…", "preferred_username":"attacker",
"email":"[email protected]", "email_verified":false }
The authenticated principal is provably `attacker` (its own sub/preferred_username/password), merely *claiming* the victim's email, unverified.
<img width="1484" height="685" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdddac3c-b7c0-4c59-aaec-9092706a7ad8" />
Step 2 — drive the standard OIDC flow as attacker:GET /api/global/auth/default/oidc/configs/kc-oidc-1 -> IdP login as attacker/Attacker123! -> GET /api/global/auth/oidc/callback?code=…&state=….
<img width="1145" height="454" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac0a73d0-c5fc-4d0f-b9b0-95f6273b99f7" />
<img width="1172" height="445" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4b27a7e-4293-4caf-957f-d27c54ea461a" />
<img width="1157" height="648" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/06699774-92b0-4163-a171-9a30bc877ecc" />
<img width="1201" height="525" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/92a92fcf-9d29-42ca-921d-de6fbd78198f" />
Step 3 — result (takeover): Budibase sets budibase:auth to a session JWT{ "userId":"us_1ab2dfcf…", "email":"[email protected]", "tenantId":"default" }, andGET /api/global/self returns the victim: _id = us_1ab2dfcf…, admin.global = true, builder.global = true, providerType = oidc. The attacker authenticated as a *different* IdP principal with an *unverified* email yet now holds a full global-admin session for the victim.
<img width="1001" height="456" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c8dfc25f-aed7-4cd7-9323-f029e4d1a725" />
Negative control (proves the email claim is the cause, not a normal self-login):
A second attacker attacker2 with a benign unverified email [email protected] (matching no Budibase user) runs the *identical* flow:
id_token: { "sub":"55794bf2-…", "preferred_username":"attacker2", "email":"[email protected]", "email_verified":false }
-> budibase:auth: { "userId":"us_55794bf2-…" } (a NEW account, _id derived from the IdP sub)
-> /api/global/self: { "_id":"us_55794bf2-…", "email":"[email protected]", admin.global: null, builder.global: null }
<img width="1153" height="489" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f6cb849-e6f3-49f1-b576-8aeba026a3be" />
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, last affected 3.38.1 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0