Details
<img width="1089" height="466" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a892ec3e-3753-4bc0-9eee-9f0613b2d92e" />
<img width="826" height="532" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc30bd9c-1bdb-4bea-934f-a8b3e228940e" />
With a benign email the attacker gets their own new low-privilege account; only when the email claim equals the victim's does the same flow yield the victim's admin account. Same self-authentication, single variable changed = the unverified-email merge is the vulnerability.
Impact
Takeover of any existing Budibase account by email, including the instance owner / global admin -> full control of the tenant (apps, datasources, automations, user management, stored datasource credentials). The attacker authenticates as their *own* (different) IdP principal and ends up holding the victim's session and roles. The only requirement beyond a trusted IdP login is that the IdP assert the victim's email unverified — the default for a freshly-created Keycloak/Authentik realm and common in social logins (see Preconditions). Any deployment that trusts an OIDC IdP without enforced email verification is exposed; the Budibase-side flaw (ignoring email_verified) is unconditional.
Remediation
Primary fix: in the OIDC verify path, require email_verified === true before using email to look up / link an existing account; otherwise reject the login (or fall back to sub-only matching and never merge into a pre-existing local/SSO account). Concretely, thread the email_verified claim through buildJwtClaims/getEmail (oidc.ts) and gate the getGlobalUserByEmail fallback in sso.ts:57-59 on it.
Audit the whole class: apply the same email_verified (and, for SAML, EmailVerified/assertion-signature) gate to every SSO strategy that links by email — OIDC, SAML, and any social provider — not only the Google strategy (which already passes requireLocalAccount=true). Email-based account linking anywhere must require a verified email.
Defense-in-depth for operators who cannot patch immediately:
- On the IdP, enable "Verify Email" / require verified email before issuing tokens (Keycloak: realm -> Login -> Verify Email = on), and restrict which email domains the IdP will assert.
- Prefer
sub-based account mapping over email in the IdP/Budibase mapping config where available. - Audit existing accounts for unexpected OIDC links to privileged users; rotate sessions.