Details
node -e "const si=require('./lib'); si.networkInterfaces().then((interfaces)=>{const item=interfaces.find((entry)=>entry.iface==='si-nmghsa0'); console.log('saw_dummy_iface=' + Boolean(item)); if (item)
console.log(JSON.stringify({iface:item.iface, ip4:item.ip4, dhcp:item.dhcp, dnsSuffix:item.dnsSuffix, ieee8021xAuth:item.ieee8021xAuth}));}).catch((e)=>{console.error(e); process.exit(1);});"
Confirm command execution:
test -e /tmp/si-nm-id-proof && echo CONFIRMED || echo FAILED
cat /tmp/si-nm-id-proof
cat /tmp/si-nm-pwd-proof
Inspect environment key categories without printing secret values:
node -e "
const fs=require('fs');
const keys=fs.readFileSync('/tmp/si-nm-env-proof','utf8')
.split(/\n/).map(l=>l.split('=')[0]).filter(Boolean);
const wanted=['PATH','USER','HOME','SHELL','PWD','SSH_AUTH_SOCK','GITHUB_TOKEN','NPM_TOKEN','AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID'];
console.log('env_key_count='+keys.length);
console.log('present_categories='+wanted.filter(k=>keys.includes(k)).join(','));
"
validated evidence:
saw_dummy_iface=true
uid=1000(smart) gid=1000(smart)
pwd=/home/smart/Downloads/systeminformation-master
env_key_count=74
present_categories=PATH,USER,HOME,SHELL,PWD,SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Local Validation Summary & Aggregate Reachability
Validation was performed against real NetworkManager and real `nmcli`. The primary proof did not rely on a PATH stub.
Observed behavior:
- The malicious profile was accepted by NetworkManager.
- The active connection name appeared unchanged in
nmcli device status. - Calling only
require('./lib').networkInterfaces()triggered execution. - The proof artifacts were created only after the library call.
- The
idoutput matched the calling Node.js process identity. - The
pwdoutput matched the Node.js process working directory. - The environment proof demonstrated access to process-environment categories without printing secret values.
Aggregate API reachability:
- `lib/index.js:94`:
getStaticData()reachesnetwork.networkInterfaces()as part of static data collection. - `lib/index.js:307`:
getAllData()reachesgetStaticData()first.
During local validation, an aggregate runtime attempt later hit an unrelated osinfo.js error in that environment. Because of that, aggregate source reachability is confirmed, but aggregate call completion was not used as the primary exploit proof.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
networkInterfaces() is documented and expected to return network interface metadata such as interface name, IP addresses, DHCP state, DNS suffix, and IEEE 802.1X status.
The library already shows an intent to protect shell command construction by sanitizing interface names before shell use. The missing sanitization for connectionName is inconsistent with that defensive pattern.
Executing shell commands embedded in a NetworkManager profile name is not a documented feature, not required to return network metadata, and not an expected design tradeoff. This is a command injection vulnerability caused by unsafe shell-string construction.
Recommended Fix
Avoid shell interpolation entirely for NetworkManager calls.
Replace shell command strings with execFileSync() or spawnSync() using argument arrays. For example:
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
const output = execFileSync(
'nmcli',
['connection', 'show', connectionName],
util.execOptsLinux
).toString();
Recommended code-level changes:
- Replace
nmcli device status 2>/dev/null | grep ${interfaceName}with argument-array execution and filter rows in JavaScript. - Replace every
nmcli connection show "${connectionName}" | grep ...shell string with argument-array execution. - Parse
ipv4.method,ipv4.dns-search, and802-1x.eapin JavaScript instead of using shellgrep. - Treat NetworkManager profile names as untrusted input even though they originate from local system state.
- Do not rely on quoting or escaping as the main mitigation. Argument-array execution is the correct fix.
Regression Test Ideas
Add Linux-specific tests for NetworkManager connection names containing shell metacharacters.
Suggested malicious connection names:
name$(...)name"; ...; #- `
name...``` name|...name;...
Expected behavior after the fix:
networkInterfaces()completes without executing shell syntax from the connection name.- No marker files or equivalent side effects are produced.
- The function either returns metadata for the interface or safely returns unknown/default values for fields that cannot be queried.
- Tests cover all three current sink helpers:
- DHCP lookup
- DNS suffix lookup
- IEEE 802.1x auth lookup
For unit-level coverage, mock the NetworkManager command wrapper so that nmcli device status returns a connection name containing metacharacters, then assert that subsequent calls use argument arrays rather than shell strings.
Credit request
If you publish an advisory or assign a CVE, please credit me as:
Ali Firas (thesmartshadow) - https://www.smartshadow.dev