Details
The gated action (shell_execute: rm -rf /important/data, riskLevel: high) is approved by a client that sent no `Authorization` header, and the ApprovalGate promise resolves { approved: true } — the agent proceeds.
Browser CSRF variant (no tooling, just a visited page):
<script>
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:PORT/approvals/?status=pending') // ACAO:* -> readable
.then(r => r.json())
.then(list => list.forEach(e =>
fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:PORT/approvals/${e.id}/approve`, {
method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ approvedBy: 'attacker' }) // preflight passes via ACAO:*
})));
</script>
Impact
The Approval Gate is the package's human-in-the-loop safety control for high-risk agent operations (shell commands, file writes, budget spend — SECURITY.md). Unauthenticated, cross-origin access to its inbox lets an attacker:
- Approve any pending gated action → the agent executes an operation that was explicitly held for human review (integrity/availability impact; the gated action is whatever the agent proposed).
- Read pending requests (
GET /approvals,/stats) → disclosure of queued action details (command strings, file paths, justifications). - Deny pending actions → suppress legitimate operations.
The attacker controls the *approval decision*, not the action content, but the net effect is that the human-in-the-loop guarantee is void for any deployment that exposes the inbox — which is the inbox's documented purpose ("web-accessible approval queue").
Alignment with the security policy & documentation (in scope; not intended/documented behavior)
This finding does not contradict any documented design choice — it exposes a gap the documentation overlooks, and it matches a vulnerability class the maintainer has already accepted:
- **Documented as a *security measure*, never as intentionally unauthenticated.**
SECURITY.mdlists the Approval Inbox under "Security Measures in Network-AI" — *"ApprovalInboxprovides a web-accessible approval queue with REST API (/list,/approve/:id,/deny/:id,/stats)"* — andREADME.md/ENTERPRISE.mddescribe it the same way. No document states it requires authentication, nor that the operator must place it behind their own auth. A documented security control (human-in-the-loop approval for *"writes, shell commands, budget spend"*) that anyone can bypass without credentials is a defect in that control, not its intended behavior. - The project's own threat model treats this exact adversary as in scope.
THREAT_MODEL.md§3.1 designs against an *"Unauthenticated Network Caller"* that can reach a bound TCP port, with mitigations: *require a non-empty secret, default to127.0.0.1, warn on non-loopback bind.* It applies all of these to the MCP server — but it never lists `ApprovalInbox` as a network boundary at all (an omission, not a carve-out), and the inbox has none of those mitigations. - Direct precedent — the maintainer already fixed this class. The identical issue on the MCP server was accepted and patched: GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 ("Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation," fixed in v5.4.5 by requiring a secret and restricting CORS to localhost origins) and GHSA-r78r-rwrf-rjwp (fail-closed on empty secret, v5.7.2). The
ApprovalInboxis a second network-reachable server with the same flaw; it simply never received that hardening. - No carve-out covers it. The threat model's Explicit Non-Goals (localhost-IPC encryption, SLA, anti-analysis, npm-registry compromise) don't apply, and the documented ClawHub "by-design" Notes (ASI01 goal-hijack, ASI03 advisory tokens, ASI06 context poisoning, ASI07 *inter-agent messaging*) are unrelated — the approval inbox is a control plane, not inter-agent transport.
- The operator cannot fix it within the library. Unlike the MCP server (which now *accepts* a secret),
ApprovalInboxexposes no auth option and hardcodesAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *. So "the operator should add auth / restrict CORS" is not available — there is no hook to do so. And "it's opt-in / operator-exposed" did not exempt the MCP server, which is equally optional and explicitly started.
Honest scope caveat (state it plainly in the report). ApprovalInbox.startServer() is opt-in (not auto-started by a CLI bin) and defaults to 127.0.0.1, so the realistic vectors are (a) the wildcard-CORS drive-by from a page the operator visits, (b) a co-located/SSRF local process, or (c) a non-loopback bind. That bounds severity to Medium–High — but it is squarely the same class, on the same kind of surface, that the project's threat model and prior advisories already treat as a vulnerability.
Recommended fix
- Require a bearer secret on the inbox HTTP server, fail closed on empty secret, and verify it on
/approve,/deny, and ideally the list/stats/SSE routes — mirroring the hardening already applied toMcpSseServer/McpHttpServer. - **Remove the hardcoded
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ***; default to no CORS (same-origin) or an explicit allowlist, and never reflect*on the mutating routes. - Optionally add a CSRF token / require a non-simple custom header on
POSTto block browser-driven approval.
References
- CWE-862, CWE-352
- Affected:
lib/approval-inbox.ts(httpHandlerl.256 CORS,routeRequestl.369-405 no-auth approve/deny,startServerl.281); exported atindex.ts:1126. - Same class as prior accepted advisories: GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3 (MCP missing auth, fixed v5.1.3), GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 (MCP unauthenticated cross-origin invocation — fixed v5.4.5 by requiring a secret + restricting CORS to localhost), GHSA-r78r-rwrf-rjwp (MCP fail-closed on empty secret, v5.7.2). The
ApprovalInboxserver never received this hardening. - Documentation this finding is measured against:
SECURITY.md(Approval Inbox listed under "Security Measures"; Approval Gate = human-in-the-loop for "writes, shell commands, budget spend"),THREAT_MODEL.md§3.1 ("Unauthenticated Network Caller" adversary + its mitigations),README.md/ENTERPRISE.md("web-accessible approval queue"). None document the inbox as intentionally unauthenticated or require operator-supplied auth. - Disclosure: GitHub private security advisory (Jovancoding/Network-AI → Security → "Report a vulnerability"), per SECURITY.md.
---
Resolution (maintainer)
Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`). Install: npm install [email protected] — published to npm with provenance.
ApprovalInbox now accepts a secret option. When set, the mutating endpoints POST /:id/approve and POST /:id/deny require an Authorization: Bearer <secret> header, validated in constant time with crypto.timingSafeEqual. startServer() already binds to 127.0.0.1 by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.