open-webui
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.9.5(semver)
Fixed versions
0.9.5
Fix
- Fixed version
0.9.5npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45395
Open WebUI: Missing workspace.tools Authorization Check on Tool Update Endpoint Allows Privilege Escalation to Code Execution
Summary
The tool update endpoint (POST /api/v1/tools/id/{id}/update) is missing the workspace.tools permission check that is present on the tool create endpoint. This allows a user who has been explicitly denied tool management capabilities ( and who the administrator considers untrusted for code execution ) to replace a tool's server-side Python content and trigger execution, bypassing the intended workspace.tools security boundary.
Open WebUI's security policy correctly states that workspace.tools is the trust boundary for code execution: *"Granting a user the ability to create Tools is equivalent to giving them shell access to the server."* This vulnerability breaks that boundary. A write access grant on a single tool is sufficient to bypass workspace.tools entirely.
This is not a report about exec() being unsandboxed (that is acknowledged as intended behavior). This is a report about a missing authorization check that allows an untrusted user to reach the exec() sink that should be gated behind workspace.tools.
Root Cause
The create and update endpoints for tools have asymmetric authorization checks. The create endpoint enforces the workspace.tools permission; the update endpoint does not.
Create endpoint, enforces workspace.tools
File: backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py, lines 326-345
@router.post('/create', response_model=Optional[ToolResponse])
async def create_new_tools(
request: Request,
form_data: ToolForm,
user=Depends(get_verified_user),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_async_session),
):
if user.role != 'admin' and not (
await has_permission(
user.id, 'workspace.tools', # ← CHECKED
request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS, db=db
)
or await has_permission(
user.id, 'workspace.tools_import', # ← CHECKED
request.app.state.config.USER_PERMISSIONS, db=db
)
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
)
# ... proceeds to exec(content, ...) at line 367
Update endpoint does NOT enforce workspace.tools
File: backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py, lines 451-485
@router.post('/id/{id}/update', response_model=Optional[ToolModel])
async def update_tools_by_id(
request: Request,
id: str,
form_data: ToolForm,
user=Depends(get_verified_user),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_async_session),
):
tools = await Tools.get_tool_by_id(id, db=db)
# ...
if (
tools.user_id != user.id
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='tool',
resource_id=tools.id,
permission='write', # ← only checks write grant
db=db,
)
and user.role != 'admin'
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
)
# NOTE: No has_permission(user.id, 'workspace.tools', ...) check
# ... proceeds to exec(content, ...) at line 485
tool_module, frontmatter = await load_tool_module_by_id(id, content=form_data.content)
The write access grant is a collaboration primitive used across the application (knowledge bases, prompts, models, tools) for content editing. On every other resource type, a write grant allows editing metadata and content. On tools specifically, because the update endpoint triggers exec(), a write grant silently escalates to code execution but only because the `workspace.tools` check is missing. If the check were present (as it is on create), the write grant would not confer execution privilege.
Prerequisites
workspace.tools permission. workspace.tools is disabled by default (config.py:1364-1366), so this is the default state for all non-admin users.workspace.tools permission who creates a tool and grants write access to Bob. This is a normal collaboration workflow Alice is sharing editing access, not granting code execution rights.workspace.tools grant to Alice (which is the intended, documented workflow).Note on default configuration: The workspace.tools permission defaults to false. An administrator must explicitly enable it for at least one user (Alice). This is a documented, recommended workflow the security policy explicitly describes granting workspace.tools to trusted users. The vulnerability is not that Alice has this permission; it is that Bob can bypass it.
Proof of Concept
Environment
docker run -d -p 3000:8080 --name open-webui ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main
Default configuration. Admin creates an account, enables workspace.tools for trusted users via Admin Panel > Settings > User Permissions.
Step-by-step reproduction
Step 1 Setup users
Create two non-admin users: Alice (trusted, will get workspace.tools) and Bob (untrusted, will NOT get workspace.tools).
ADMIN_TOKEN="<admin-jwt>"
BASE="http://localhost:3000"
# Create Alice
ALICE=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/auths/add" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"alice","email":"[email protected]","password":"alice123","role":"user"}')
ALICE_TOKEN=$(echo $ALICE | jq -r .token)
ALICE_ID=$(echo $ALICE | jq -r .id)
# Create Bob
BOB=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/auths/add" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"bob","email":"[email protected]","password":"bob12345","role":"user"}')
BOB_TOKEN=$(echo $BOB | jq -r .token)
BOB_ID=$(echo $BOB | jq -r .id)
Step 2 Admin enables `workspace.tools` globally
This is the documented workflow for allowing trusted users to build tools.
# Get current permissions
PERMS=$(curl -s "$BASE/api/v1/users/default/permissions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN")
# Enable workspace.tools
PERMS=$(echo $PERMS | jq '.workspace.tools = true')
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/users/default/permissions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$PERMS"
Step 3 Alice creates a benign tool
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tools/create" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"id": "helper_tool",
"name": "Helper Tool",
"content": "class Tools:\n def hello(self):\n return \"Hello\"\n",
"meta": {"description": "A benign helper", "manifest": {}}
}'
Step 4 Alice grants write access to Bob (collaboration)
Alice wants Bob to be able to edit the tool's description or parameters. This is a standard collaboration feature.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.9.5 (semver)0.9.5
0.9.5npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0