Advisory

GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f

Also known as: CVE-2026-82659

Summary

Nodemailer: Message-level raw option bypasses disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the delivered message

Details

Message-level raw option bypasses disableFileAccess / disableUrlAccess, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the sent message

  • Target: nodemailer/nodemailer, npm nodemailer v9.0.0 (HEAD 4e58450eb490e5097a74b2b2cce35a8d9e21856e)
  • Verdict: CONFIRMED (local PoC, no network)

Summary

Nodemailer exposes disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess so an application that passes
untrusted message data to the library can forbid that data from reading local files or
fetching URLs. Every attachment, alternative, html/text/watchHtml/amp and icalEvent
content node honors these flags. The message-level `raw` option does not.

MailComposer.compile() builds the root MIME node for a raw message without threading the
two flags, so a raw: { path: '/etc/passwd' } or raw: { href: 'http://169.254.169.254/…' }
message is read / fetched anyway, and the file or HTTP-response bytes become the **actual
message that is sent** by every transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON). An actor whose
input the application intended to sandbox therefore obtains arbitrary local-file disclosure and
a full-response SSRF primitive, delivered to a recipient the same actor can choose.

This is the same vulnerability class as the already-published jsonTransport advisory
GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f, but a distinct code path (raw root node, not normalize()), and
strictly higher impact: the jsonTransport bug only affected the locally-returned JSON, whereas
this affects the delivered RFC822 message for all transports.

Affected component

  • lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35 — root cause:
  if (this.mail.raw) {
      this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline: this.mail.newline }).setRaw(this.mail.raw);
  }

The MimeNode is constructed with only { newline }. Compare the sibling node builders
_createMixed/_createAlternative/_createRelated/_createContentNode
(lib/mail-composer/index.js:389-527), which all pass
disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess, disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess.

  • lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52 — the constructor derives this.disableFileAccess/ this.disableUrlAccess solely from its own options; children do not inherit a parent's flags (createChild/appendChild, lines 175-194, pass options through verbatim).
  • lib/mime-node/index.js:812 — setRaw() content is resolved through this._getStream(this._raw).
  • lib/mime-node/index.js:984-1010 — _getStream reads the file (fs.createReadStream, 995) or fetches the URL (nmfetch, 1009) only guarded by `this.disableFileAccess`/`this.disableUrlAccess`, which on the raw root node are false.
  • Reached from the normal send flow at lib/mailer/index.js:188 (mail.message = new MailComposer(mail.data).compile()), so every transport is affected.

Reachability gate (hop-by-hop)

  1. Source. Application calls transporter.sendMail({ raw: <userControlled> , to: <userControlled> }) with disableFileAccess: true and/or disableUrlAccess: true configured on the transporter (forced onto mail.data in lib/mailer/mail-message.js:36-40) or per message. This is the exact scenario the flags exist for — the same precondition under which GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f was accepted.
  2. Guard — the access flags. For attachments the flag is enforced: a node created by _createContentNode carries disableFileAccess, so _getStream throws EFILEACCESS. Bypass: the raw branch (compile():34-35) never sets the flag on its node, so this.disableFileAccess === false and the guard at mime-node:985 / :999 is skipped. There is no other validation between mail.raw and the read; raw content shapes ({path}, {href}, stream, string, buffer) are accepted as-is by setRaw/_getStream.
  3. Sink. fs.createReadStream(content.path) (file disclosure) or nmfetch(content.href, …) (SSRF). The resulting bytes are emitted as the message body by createReadStream(), which every transport pipes to its destination (smtp-transport:233, smtp-pool/pool-resource:208, ses-transport:96, sendmail-transport:184, stream-transport:67).

No guard blocks the chain; the only guard (the access flags) is structurally absent on this node.

Root cause

Inconsistent enforcement: the access policy is applied per-MimeNode via constructor options and
must be re-passed at every node creation. The raw-message shortcut in compile() omits it,
while all five other node builders include it. The flags are therefore enforced for every content
type *except* the one that lets the caller supply a complete message body by path/URL.

Exploit path

Application that sandboxes untrusted mail input (disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess set):

  1. Untrusted actor supplies raw: { path: '/proc/self/environ' } (or any server file: /app/.env, key material, etc.) and to: [email protected].
  2. compile() builds the raw root node without the flags; the transport reads the file and sends its contents as the message → arbitrary server-file exfiltration to an attacker-chosen mailbox.
  3. Alternatively raw: { href: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin' } or a cloud metadata URL → Nodemailer fetches it server-side and delivers the full response body in the email → full-response SSRF (no blind-channel limitation).

Impact

  • Confidentiality (High): arbitrary local file read disclosed in the outgoing message; full-response SSRF to internal/metadata endpoints, also disclosed in the message.
  • Integrity (Low): attacker-fetched/file content is injected into the delivered mail.
  • The two protective flags an application relies on to contain untrusted input are silently ineffective for raw.

Preconditions

The application (a) passes disableFileAccess and/or disableUrlAccess (the documented sandboxing
flags) and (b) lets untrusted input influence the raw field (and, for maximal disclosure, to).
No other configuration is required; all bundled transports are affected. This mirrors the accepted
precondition of GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f.

Severity

  • AV — message data routinely originates over the network in the apps these flags protect.
  • AC — a single crafted raw object; deterministic.
  • PR — the actor is a user whose input the app already treats as untrusted (the reason the flags are set); not fully anonymous in the typical deployment.
  • UI — no victim interaction.
  • S — impact within Nodemailer's process scope.
  • C — arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF, both delivered to an attacker-chosen recipient. (The sibling jsonTransport advisory used C:L because its leak stayed in locally-returned JSON; here the bytes leave the system in the sent message, so C:H is warranted.)
  • I — attacker injects fetched/file bytes into the outgoing message.
  • A.

Note: if a deployment fixes the recipient (to not attacker-controlled) the disclosure channel
narrows and the rating degrades toward the sibling's Medium; the High rating reflects the
reasonable worst case where raw and to are both untrusted.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-18 14:28 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

nodemailer

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 9.0.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

9.0.1

Fix

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences