Advisory

GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Adversarial re-read (attempts to refute)

  1. "`raw` content is by-design trusted, so the flags shouldn't apply." Rejected: every other content path (attachments, alternatives, html/text, icalEvent) honors the flags, and the maintainer already accepted GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f for exactly this "untrusted input + flag set" model. The asymmetry — attachment {path} is blocked but raw:{path} is not — is the bug, and the PoC's CONTROL case proves the flag is otherwise effective on the same file.
  2. "The raw node inherits the flags via rootNode." Rejected by code and by PoC: compile():35 constructs the node with { newline } only; MimeNode constructor sets this.disableFileAccess = !!options.disableFileAccess → false; rootNode is itself; no inheritance exists.
  3. "The PoC leaks for an unrelated reason." Rejected: the CONTROL message (attachments:[{path}], same file, same transporter) returns EFILEACCESS; only the raw:{path} message leaks. The sentinel nonce exists solely in the temp file; the URL nonce is generated server-side and is only obtainable by an actual fetch. Both observables are uniquely bound to the bypass.
  4. "Maybe only jsonTransport (already reported) is affected." Rejected: the PoC uses streamTransport and the root cause is in MailComposer.compile() (mailer:188), shared by all transports; jsonTransport is a different (already-fixed) path.

I could not find any guard that blocks the chain; the finding survives.

Proof of concept (safe, benign)

findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js — local, no network egress (loopback only),
no destructive action. Output:

[CONTROL] attachment path with disableFileAccess: BLOCKED (EFILEACCESS) — flag works here
[ATTACK]  raw:{path} with disableFileAccess=true: BYPASSED — sentinel file CONTENT present in message
[ATTACK]  raw:{href} with disableUrlAccess=true (loopback server): BYPASSED — fetched body present (SSRF)
VERDICT: CONFIRMED

Run: node findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js (exit 0 = confirmed).

Remediation

Thread the access policy onto the raw root node, exactly as the other builders do:

if (this.mail.raw) {
    this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', {
        newline: this.mail.newline,
        disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess,
        disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess
    }).setRaw(this.mail.raw);
}

(Defense in depth: setRaw/_getStream could also refuse {path}/{href} raw content when either
flag is set, regardless of how the node was constructed.) Add a regression test asserting that
raw:{path} and raw:{href} reject with EFILEACCESS/EURLACCESS when the flags are set, mirroring
the attachment tests.

Sources & licences