Advisory

GHSA-q686-2qmg-hqc7

Also known as: CVE-2026-114619, PYSEC-2026-4359

Summary

Authlib: OpenID implicit grant checks raw scope instead of allowed scope before issuing ID tokens

Details

Report metadata

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Package | authlib (PyPI, pkg:pypi/authlib) |
| Repository | https://github.com/authlib/authlib |
| Component | authlib.oidc.core.grants.implicit.OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request |
| Vulnerability class | Authorization bypass: a client's scope restriction is bypassed for OpenID Connect ID token issuance |
| Verified against | c529a61af40e3efe05286140e00fbdced07d7987 (v1.8.0). Earlier releases were not checked. |
| API surface | Public API (OpenIDImplicitGrant, registered with server.register_grant(...)) |
| Affected in default configuration | Yes. No non-default option is needed once OpenIDImplicitGrant is registered. Client metadata decides exposure: Authlib's standard ClientMixin checks response type and scope independently, so a client can be permitted id_token responses without being allowed the openid scope. |

Summary

OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request() first runs the parent ImplicitGrant validation, which filters the requested scope through client.get_allowed_scope() and stores the result in request.scope. It then decides whether this is an OpenID request by checking the raw, client-supplied request.payload.scope instead of that filtered value. A client that is allowed profile but not openid can therefore request scope=openid profile, pass the check, and receive a signed ID token (with sub and profile claims) once the user consents. This happens even when Authlib's built-in, scope-filtering BearerTokenGenerator is in use.

The tainted input is the authorization request's scope parameter. The OAuth client fully controls it, and the client is the very party the scope restriction is meant to constrain. Any registered client can add openid to its request if it is permitted an id_token or id_token token response type and its allowed scopes exclude openid but include a claim-bearing scope such as profile.

Sibling paths treat the same client correctly, which suggests the raw-scope check is a bug rather than intended behaviour:

  • ImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request() -> filters the requested scope through client.get_allowed_scope() into request.scope (safe, `authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grants/implicit.py` lines 141-147)
  • OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request() -> checks the raw `request.payload.scope` (unsafe, [`authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py` line 72](https://github.com/authlib/authlib/blob/c529a61af40e3efe05286140e00fbdced07d7987/authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py#L72))
  • UserInfoEndpoint -> rejects the same client's access token with 403 insufficient_scope (safe; observed during verification, line not recorded)
  • OIDC authorization code flow -> issues no id_token for the same client (safe; observed during verification, line not recorded)

Impact

A registered OAuth client that the operator has excluded from the openid scope can get an OpenID Connect ID token for any user who logs in and approves its authorization request. During verification the provider returned an RS256-signed ID token carrying iss, aud (the requesting client), nonce, auth_time, at_hash, sub and name, while the granted scope was only profile. A consent page built the way the Authlib docs show lists only profile, so the user is not shown that an identity token will be issued.

Without this bug, the same request fails with InvalidScopeError ("Missing 'openid' scope") because the client's resolved scope does not include openid. The new capability is the ID token itself: a signed assertion of the user's identity (sub) plus claims from the client's other allowed scopes. Gating that token is exactly what the openid scope is for. The access token stays restricted when the built-in token generator is used: Authlib's UserInfoEndpoint rejects it with 403 insufficient_scope.

Scoring note: we did not compute a CVSS score. An initial triage rated this High. After dynamic verification we assess practical severity as closer to Medium, because:

  1. The attacker must be a registered client that is permitted id_token response types.
  2. The user must log in and consent.
  3. The ID token's aud is the attacking client.

Two kinds of deployment are not affected:

  • Deployments that use only the OIDC authorization code flow. During verification, that flow issued no ID token for the same client.
  • Deployments where every client permitted an id_token or id_token token response type is also allowed the openid scope.

Preconditions

  1. The authorization server registers OpenIDImplicitGrant (or a subclass), e.g. server.register_grant(MyOpenIDImplicitGrant). The vulnerable method runs on every OIDC implicit authorization request.
  2. A client's metadata permits an OIDC implicit response type (id_token or id_token token). Nothing in Authlib ties this to the openid scope. The standard SQLAlchemy ClientMixin checks response type and scope independently, and it filters requested scopes against the client's allowed scopes at `authlib/integrations/sqla_oauth2/client_mixin.py:124-129`.
  3. That client's allowed scopes exclude openid but include another claim-bearing scope, such as profile.
  4. The attacker controls that registered client and sends an authorization request that adds openid to otherwise allowed scopes (e.g. scope=openid profile), with a nonce.
  5. A user logs in and approves the request.
  6. Branch condition: the raw request.payload.scope contains openid while the filtered request.scope does not. So is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope) is true at implicit.py:72 and no InvalidScopeError is raised.

No non-standard usage, monkey-patching or unusual configuration is needed: this is the public grant used as intended. Keeping a client's response types and allowed scopes in sync is not documented as the integrator's responsibility. The parent grant stores the filtered request.scope specifically so that authorization decisions use it. We did not capture a link to the relevant Authlib docs page, but the verification built its consent page the way those docs show.

Data flow

  1. Source: the OAuth client controls the authorization request's scope parameter, e.g. GET /authorize?response_type=id_token%20token&client_id=c&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fc%2Fcb&scope=openid%20profile&nonce=n. The raw value remains available as request.payload.scope.
  2. Propagation: ImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request() filters the requested scope through client.get_allowed_scope() and stores the result in request.scope (here 'profile'). request.payload.scope still holds the raw openid profile (`authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grants/implicit.py:141-147`).
  3. Sink: OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request() uses the raw value to decide whether this is an OpenID request: if not is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope): (`authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py:72`). The injected openid satisfies the check, so the method returns the redirect URI instead of raising InvalidScopeError (`authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py:70-84`).
  4. Reachability: OpenIDImplicitGrant is the public grant that serves OIDC implicit authorization requests. After the user consents, create_granted_params() and process_implicit_token() issue the ID token and user claims (`authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py:112-129`, `authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py:132-169`).

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-10-27 15:38 UTC
Modified
2026-10-30 10:10 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

authlib

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.9.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.9.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.9.0
    pip install --upgrade authlib==1.9.0

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences