Advisory

GHSA-q686-2qmg-hqc7

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Vulnerable code

authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py, lines 70-84 at c529a61af40e3efe05286140e00fbdced07d7987 (an excerpt; ... marks code left out of the captured snippet):

redirect_uri = super().validate_authorization_request()  # safe: parent grant sets the filtered request.scope
if not is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope):  # <-- sink (line 72): raw, client-supplied scope
    raise InvalidScopeError("Missing 'openid' scope", ...)
...
return redirect_uri

Reproduction

Verified two ways on Authlib c529a61af40e3efe05286140e00fbdced07d7987 (v1.8.0):

  • a pytest PoC using the Flask test client
  • a standalone Flask OpenID Provider on localhost, driven with curl

The Python and Flask versions were not recorded.

Setup: a client registered with scope='profile' only (no openid) and response types id_token / id_token token. It uses Authlib's built-in SQLAlchemy ClientMixin and the built-in scope-filtering BearerTokenGenerator.

  1. The client sends an authorization request with scope=openid profile and a nonce.
  2. ImplicitGrant sets request.scope='profile'. A consent page built the way the docs show displays only profile.
  3. OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request() checks the raw request.payload.scope at line 72, so the request passes.
  4. After the user approves, the provider returns an RS256-signed ID token with iss, aud (the client), nonce, auth_time, at_hash, sub and name, while the granted scope is profile. The ID token's signature verified against the provider's JWKS.

Controls run during verification:

  • The same request without openid returns invalid_scope ("Missing 'openid' scope").
  • Authlib's UserInfoEndpoint rejects this client's access token with 403 insufficient_scope.
  • The OIDC authorization code flow for the same client issues no id_token.

The sketch below shows the request shape against Authlib's Flask OIDC test app. The verification's own test script is not included here.

# Client metadata: scope='profile' (no openid), response_types=['id_token token'].
rv = client.get('/authorize?response_type=id_token%20token&client_id=client-id&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.test%2Fauthorized&scope=openid%20profile&nonce=n')
# after the user grants consent:
assert 'id_token=' in rv.headers['Location']  # should have been rejected: openid is not an allowed scope
  • Expected: InvalidScopeError / invalid_scope ("Missing 'openid' scope"), because the client's resolved allowed scope (request.scope == 'profile') does not include openid.
  • Actual: after consent, the redirect carries a signed ID token (including sub and name) while the granted scope is profile.

Suggested remediation

Decide whether to issue OpenID tokens from the scope the grant actually authorized, never from the raw requested scope. The authorized scope is self.request.scope, which the parent grant has already filtered through client.get_allowed_scope().

 redirect_uri = super().validate_authorization_request()
-if not is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope):
+if not is_openid_scope(self.request.scope):
     raise InvalidScopeError("Missing 'openid' scope", ...)

During verification, this one-line change at line 72 blocked the exploit, and the existing OIDC implicit/hybrid tests still passed (23 passed).

The same rule should hold for the rest of OIDC issuance. create_granted_params() (`authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py:112-129`) passes the raw payload.scope to generate_token. It should pass self.request.scope instead.

Notes:

  • Adjacent raw-scope use, worth fixing in the same change: create_granted_params() hands the raw payload.scope to generate_token. So a deployment whose custom token generator does not filter scope also grants the client access-token scopes it is not allowed; verification noted openid and email. Authlib's built-in BearerTokenGenerator re-filters the access-token scope, so this only shows up with a non-filtering generator. That re-filtering does not stop the ID token.
  • Other paths through the same raw value: beyond create_granted_params(), we did not audit every scope read in process_implicit_token() (`authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py:132-169`), or in other OIDC grants such as the hybrid grant. Whether they share the pattern is not verified.
  • Already safe, no change needed:
  • the scope filtering in the parent ImplicitGrant and in ClientMixin
  • UserInfoEndpoint, which rejects this client's access token with 403 insufficient_scope
  • the OIDC authorization code flow, which issues no ID token for this client

Suggested regression test, alongside the existing Flask OIDC implicit-grant tests:

  1. Register a client with scope='profile' and response_types=['id_token token'].
  2. Send an authorization request with scope=openid profile and a nonce, and approve it.
  3. Assert that the response is an invalid_scope error ("Missing 'openid' scope") and that the redirect contains no id_token.

A second case should use a token generator that does not filter scope, and assert that the issued access token carries only the client's allowed scopes.

Sources & licences