Details
The patch also adds regression coverage for both redirect cases:
- redirect before origin authentication reaches a different origin;
- redirect after origin authentication reaches a different origin.
diff --git a/registry/remote/auth/client.go b/registry/remote/auth/client.go
index 35826eb..60c9f88 100644
--- a/registry/remote/auth/client.go
+++ b/registry/remote/auth/client.go
@@ -122,7 +122,23 @@ func (c *Client) send(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
for key, values := range c.Header {
req.Header[key] = append(req.Header[key], values...)
}
- return c.client().Do(req)
+ client := c.client()
+ clientCopy := *client
+ checkRedirect := client.CheckRedirect
+ clientCopy.CheckRedirect = func(redirectReq *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+ if len(via) > 0 && !sameHTTPOrigin(via[len(via)-1].URL, redirectReq.URL) {
+ redirectReq.Header.Del(headerAuthorization)
+ }
+ if checkRedirect != nil {
+ return checkRedirect(redirectReq, via)
+ }
+ return nil
+ }
+ return clientCopy.Do(req)
+}
+
+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {
+ return strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) && strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)
}
// credential resolves the credential for the given registry.
@@ -168,6 +184,9 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
var attemptedKey string
cache := c.cache()
host := originalReq.Host
+ if host == "" {
+ host = originalReq.URL.Host
+ }
scheme, err := cache.GetScheme(ctx, host)
if err == nil {
switch scheme {
@@ -193,6 +212,13 @@ func (c *Client) Do(originalReq *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
return resp, nil
}
+ respHost := resp.Request.Host
+ if respHost == "" {
+ respHost = resp.Request.URL.Host
+ }
+ if respHost != host {
+ return resp, nil
+ }
// attempt again with credentials for recognized schemes
challenge := resp.Header.Get(headerWWWAuthenticate)
diff --git a/registry/remote/repository.go b/registry/remote/repository.go
index 74d6b89..0bd20ec 100644
--- a/registry/remote/repository.go
+++ b/registry/remote/repository.go
@@ -982,6 +983,7 @@ func (s *blobStore) Push(ctx context.Context, expected ocispec.Descriptor, conte
// Push or by Mount when the receiving repository does not implement the
// mount endpoint.
func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request, resp *http.Response, expected ocispec.Descriptor, content io.Reader) error {
+ originalURL := req.URL
reqHostname := req.URL.Hostname()
reqPort := req.URL.Port()
// monolithic upload
@@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.
q.Set("digest", expected.Digest.String())
req.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
- // reuse credential from previous POST request
- if auth := resp.Request.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" {
+ // reuse credential from previous POST request only when the upload location
+ // remains on the same origin.
+ if auth := resp.Request.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" && sameHTTPOrigin(originalURL, location) {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", auth)
}
resp, err = s.repo.do(req)
@@ -1032,6 +1035,10 @@ func (s *blobStore) completePushAfterInitialPost(ctx context.Context, req *http.
return nil
}
+func sameHTTPOrigin(a, b *url.URL) bool {
+ return strings.EqualFold(a.Scheme, b.Scheme) && strings.EqualFold(a.Host, b.Host)
+}
+
// Exists returns true if the described content exists.
func (s *blobStore) Exists(ctx context.Context, target ocispec.Descriptor) (bool, error) {
if err := s.repo.checkPolicy(ctx, ""); err != nil {
Validation Performed
The repaired candidate fix blocked:
- manifest redirect credential forwarding;
- upload
Locationcredential forwarding.
Targeted tests passed:
go test ./registry/remote/auth -run 'TestClient_Do_Basic_Auth_Redirect|TestClient_Do' -count=1
go test ./registry/remote -run 'Test_BlobStore_Push|TestRepository' -count=1
Prior Art / Duplicate Notes
Public pull request #1152 fixes credential forwarding via unvalidated blob upload Location and references GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7. The residual manifest redirect path described here is adjacent but not covered by that PR's stated upload Location scope.
Bearer realm credential exfiltration appears to be a separate issue family and is not part of this report's primary claim.
Claim Boundaries
Proven:
- Origin registry Basic credentials can reach a different redirect or upload
Locationorigin in local loopback tests. - ORAS CLI stored registry credentials can reach a redirect sink in a normal manifest fetch workflow.
- The candidate fix blocks the tested redirect and upload
Locationcredential exposures.
Not claimed:
- Live third-party exploitation.
- RCE, host compromise, or registry compromise.
- Arbitrary-host exposure beyond the tested redirect/
Locationorigin transitions. - Bearer realm behavior as part of the same claim.