Details
- Stored-XSS pivot: every subsequent visitor (including other admins) now executes
https://attacker.example.com/evil.jsfrom the victim site's origin, yielding session theft / full admin takeover on what were previously unrelated accounts.
- SMTP exfiltration pivot: trigger a password-reset flow on the victim site; the SMTP handshake now goes to
smtp.attacker.com:587withattacker:password, and any future mail from AVideo is observable by the attacker.
Impact
- Full site configuration takeover from a single cross-origin form submission against any logged-in administrator.
- Persistent stored XSS site-wide via
setHead(), affecting every visitor and enabling session hijack of other admins and users. - Credential / reset-token exfiltration via attacker-controlled SMTP relay.
- Encoder pipeline hijack: attacker controls the upstream URL the server fetches metadata from, enabling downstream content and data poisoning.
- Arbitrary file write under web root via
logoImgBase64/faviconBase64. - No bypass of admin auth is needed — the attacker uses the victim admin's own authenticated session; only a single visit to an attacker-controlled link is required.
Recommended Fix
Call the existing CSRF primitive immediately after the admin check, matching what objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 already does:
// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('configurationUpdate'); // same-origin / CSRF token check
Preferably also require a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken($_REQUEST['globalToken'])) as include_config.php:140-143 prescribes, and update view/configurations_body.php to include that token in the AJAX payload. Audit all other objects/*.json.php state-mutating endpoints for the same omission — the pattern is structural and likely present on more endpoints.