Details
Alice's web server at attacker.example/r responds to the POST with:
HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
Because CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION=true and HTTP 307 preserves method, the AVideo host re-issues the POST to the cloud metadata endpoint. This demonstrates that any future fix that only validates the stored URL (without disabling follow-redirects or validating each hop) remains bypassable.
Impact
- Blind SSRF from authenticated low-privileged users. An attacker reaches internal-only network resources from the AVideo server: loopback services, RFC1918 hosts on the same VPC, cloud metadata endpoints, and any other host the AVideo server can route to.
- State-changing POST to internal endpoints. Because the request method is fixed to POST and the body is attacker-influenced (the
messagefield is user-supplied), an attacker can trigger POST-handled internal admin endpoints, Redis/memcached HTTP-ish consoles, or webhook receivers that accept arbitrary POST bodies. - Cloud metadata reachability via 307 redirect chain. Follow-location support enables redirection into RFC1918 / 169.254.169.254 even if stored-URL validation is later added. Metadata endpoints that accept POST (or GET-via-redirect once the chain involves a 302/303 downgrade) become reachable.
- Blindness limits direct data exfiltration (the response is discarded) but does not prevent state-changing requests, port-probe timing, or DNS-rebinding timing side channels.
- No CSRF protection on
saveConfiguration.php, so this can also be compounded with a forced-browsing or CSRF vector against an authenticated user to plant the webhook on a victim's account.
Recommended Fix
- Call
isSSRFSafeURL()on both the store path and the dispatch path. Inplugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1015(setter) and line 1064 (dispatcher), replace:
if (!empty($donation_notification_url) && isValidURL($donation_notification_url)) {
with:
$resolvedIP = null;
if (!empty($donation_notification_url) && isSSRFSafeURL($donation_notification_url, $resolvedIP)) {
and reject the URL in setDonationNotificationURL() before persisting:
static function setDonationNotificationURL($users_id, $url)
{
$url = trim($url);
$url = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/', '', $url);
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($url)) {
_error_log("setDonationNotificationURL: rejected SSRF-unsafe URL for user {$users_id}");
return false;
}
if (strlen($url) > 2048) { ... }
$url = htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
...
}
- Disable automatic redirect following, or implement per-hop validation. Either:
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, false);
Or use CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS limited to CURLPROTO_HTTP | CURLPROTO_HTTPS and pin DNS via CURLOPT_RESOLVE using the $resolvedIP from isSSRFSafeURL(), then follow redirects manually by re-validating each Location: header with isSSRFSafeURL() before re-issuing the request.
- Add DNS-pinning to defeat DNS rebinding between the validation and the curl call:
$parts = parse_url($donation_notification_url);
$port = $parts['port'] ?? (($parts['scheme'] ?? 'http') === 'https' ? 443 : 80);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, ["{$parts['host']}:{$port}:{$resolvedIP}"]);
- Add a CSRF/global-token check on
plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php(consistent with the token validation added elsewhere in the codebase in commit11e7804f7) to prevent webhook planting via CSRF on a victim's authenticated session.