Details
Workarounds
Operators can mitigate temporarily by:
- Disabling the reschedule link in confirmation emails (in
Booking_settings/Email_settingstemplates), forcing customers to re-book instead. - Disabling the public booking page entirely (
disable_bookingsetting) for deployments that can tolerate it.
Neither workaround removes the root cause; an attacker who already holds a hash can still extract.
Suggested fix
Whitelist customer fields before inlining. The reschedule UI only needs first/last name:
--- a/application/controllers/Booking.php
+++ b/application/controllers/Booking.php
@@ -239,7 +239,12 @@ class Booking extends EA_Controller
$appointment = $results[0];
$provider = $this->providers_model->find($appointment['id_users_provider']);
- $customer = $this->customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']);
+ $customer_record = $this->customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']);
+ $customer = [
+ 'id' => $customer_record['id'],
+ 'first_name' => $customer_record['first_name'],
+ 'last_name' => $customer_record['last_name'],
+ ];
$customer_token = md5(uniqid(mt_rand(), true));
The same pattern likely needs auditing in Booking_confirmation::of() and Booking_cancellation::of() — anywhere the customer record is loaded and inlined into a publicly-reachable view.
Credits
- Discovered through source-code audit by peoplstar
References
application/controllers/Booking.phplines 184-270 (v1.5.2)application/models/Customers_model.php::find— returns the full row, no projectionapplication/config/config.phpcsrf_exclude_uris— whitelistingbooking/.*- Related prior PR #1753 (permission checks on appointment search) — same project, adjacent code, vendor previously accepted this class of issue.
docker-compose.yml
easyapp_pii_disclosure.py
requirements.txt
consistency_test.txt
leaked_customer_data.txt